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ABSTRACT

This dissertation develops a framework to assess digital forensic readiness (DFR) in
organizations. DFR is the state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present digital evidence when
needed. This research collects indicators of digital forensic readiness from a systematic literature review.
More than one thousand indicators were found and semantically analyzed to identify the dimensions to
where they belong. These dimensions were subjected to a Q-sort test and validated using association
rules, producing a preliminary framework of DFR for practitioners. By classifying these indicators into
dimensions, it was possible to distill them into 71 variables further classified into either extant or
perceptual variables. Factor analysis was used to identify latent factors within the two groups of variables.
A statistically-based framework to assess DFR is presented, wherein the extant indicators are used as a
proxy of the real DFR status and the perceptual factors as the perception of this status.
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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

ACON

Extant Active Control

BACK

Extant Backup Resourcing

BURD

Perceived Burden

CDE

Comprehensive Digital Evidence

CERT

Computer Emergency Response Team

COMM

Perceived Organizational Commitment

CULT

Perceived DFR Culture

DCOC

Digital Chain of Custody

DE

Digital Evidence

DF

Digital Forensics

DFI

Digital Forensic Investigation

DFMF

Digital Forensic Management Framework

DFR

Digital Forensic Readiness

DFRMS

Digital Forensic Readiness Management System

DFRWS

Digital Forensics Research Workshop

EEDI

End-to-End Digital Investigation

EMBD

Extant DFR Embeddedness

EMP

Evidence Management Plan

EXPO

Perceived Exposure

EXT

Extant (Factor/Indicator)

FRP

Forensic Readiness Policy

IA

Information Assurance
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IAAC

UK Information Assurance Advisory Council

IDS

Intrusion Detection System

IEXP

Extant Incident & Evidence Expertise

INFO

SEC Information Security

INVE

Extant Investigative Capacity

IS

Information Security

NFR

Network Forensic Readiness

NTP

Network Time Protocol

PDFR

Perceived Perceived DFR

PER

Perceptual (Factor/Indicator)

POLI

Extant Policing

ProDF

Proactive Digital Forensics

RESP

Perceived Perceived Response Control

SEM

Security Event Management (software)

SPF

Security Policy Framework

SPOC

Single Point of Contact

TECH

Extant Technological Capacity

WIRE

Extant Wireless Accessibility
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The use of information systems generates traces of all kinds due to activities exerted by humans
as well as by computers. The art of discovering, collecting, managing and reporting this digital evidence is
called digital forensics and has become a discipline of increasing importance for governments and
organizations alike. John Tan (2001) described the different measures that can be taken in order to
prepare systems to reduce the digital forensic work required to recover from an incident, and collect
information to detect the source of the attack and reduce the system’s vulnerabilities. Tan’s paper is
called “forensic readiness” and he is commonly credited with the coining and definition of this term. The
present dissertation builds over Tan’s and many other authors’ works on digital forensic readiness to offer
a quantitative assessment of the ability of organizations to provide digital evidence when needed.
Tan’s seminal paper recounts that during the Honeynet Project, 13 subjects participated in a contest in
which they reported findings of their forensic analysis on disk images of a compromised honeynet system.
The head of the project, Dave Dittrich noticed that on average, two hours of intruder time turned out to
mean 40 billable hours of forensic identiﬁcation. This did not include: intrusion detection (human element),
forensic acquisition of disk images, restoration of the compromised system, hardening of the
compromised system, network scanning for other vulnerable systems, and communications with
stakeholders (Tan 2001).
Forensic readiness measures have emerged as a response to the situation described by Tan,
and as a complement to the traditionally reactive approach used in digital forensics. “Digital Forensics is a
discipline that primarily focuses on the post-incident side of an investigation. However, during the last
decade, there is a considerable amount of research that considers proactive measures taken by
organizations. Such measures comprise a digital forensic readiness plan” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li
2011). Today forensic readiness is an indispensable part of the digital forensics discipline.
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The development of digital forensics has not been free of challenges. On one hand, there has
been a slow and complex process in adapting the legal framework to the admissibility of evidence stored
and processed by computers and networks. On the other hand, companies are reluctant to disclose
information that may cast doubts on their ability to control the security of their assets. A small percentage
of hacker attacks are reported; 26% on non-reporters fear bad publicity, 22% believed law enforcement
couldn’t help, and 14% think competitors would use it in their favor (Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010).
Still, being able to assess and improve the forensic readiness status of organizations is a highly desired
goal with clear benefits. Better preparedness reduces the occurrence of incidents and the associated
excessive costs of corrective actions. Moreover, measures taken within an adequate program for forensic
readiness enhance the weight of the digital evidence before courts of law. Additionally, organizations
seeking forensic readiness are in better control of the situation when digital incidents occur. They would
be able to manage many situations without the help of official security forces; hence, reducing the need to
disclose their vulnerabilities before law enforcement and the public.
Despite these benefits, organizations do not have standard mechanisms to assess this readiness.
“Digital forensic readiness is often ad hoc and no consistent application or framework exists globally. As a
result, there is no standard way to specify computer system's forensic capabilities or to formally compare
systems” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011), and rather, a lack of maturity in the discourse that is
rooted in the reliance on informal deﬁnitions of key terms and concepts (Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie
2015). In consequence, Pangalos & Katos (2010) ask for security policies to be assessed for their
forensic readiness status, and suggest the need of a metric of forensic readiness to achieve this.
The present paper seeks to produce such a framework and develop a mechanism to assess the
digital forensic readiness in organizations. This endeavor is undertaken through a process divided in two
phases. In phase one, the extant literature in digital forensic readiness (DFR) is systematically reviewed
to understand the concept of DFR and extract its potential indicators and dimensions. A preliminary
framework, tested through Q-Sorting among independent qualified reviewers and validated using
association rules, is revealed. This can be considered a practitioners’ framework of DFR, not yet the
theoretical framework seeked for by this research. Phase two uses the discovered dimensions to further
synthesize the indicators into measurable variables. These variables are tested in a pilot study among a
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small sample of organizations. The pilot study assesses the feasibility of the survey in terms of length,
clarity of the questions, and adequacy of the results to be analyzed via exploratory factor analysis. Once
the survey is refined and adjusted, a bigger sample of organizations is surveyed and factor analysis is run
again in order to discover the latent factors that explain DFR.
The systematic review of the extant literature on DFR is deemed the most comprehensive
mechanism to extract potential indicators of a specific status of DFR in organizations. This process
includes the discovery of: 1) the different terms associated to digital forensic readiness, 2) the purposes
for which this readiness is sought, 3) the steps and requirements for achieving certain status of forensic
readiness and 4) the previous attempts to define a framework of factors that determine the digital forensic
readiness capability of organizations. This information is aggregated, refined and sorted using structured
techniques such as the Q-Sort test.
The application of quantitative techniques as a means to elaborate the digital forensic readiness
framework distinguishes this work from previous proposals, which have implemented qualitative
approaches to build the framework. Furthermore, the present research proposes a framework that can be
used both as an instrument for the implementation of DFR measures and as an instrument to measure
DFR levels at specific moments. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first time this
subject is addressed with a quantitative approach.
The general hypothesis of this research is that the framework to assess DFR can be developed
using quantitative techniques such that a number of identifiable factors might suggest the level of DFR of
an organization; it is, to be able to present valid digital evidence whenever it is required to do so.
Furthermore, other factors, representing the perception about this readiness, and their correlation with the
former, can also be discovered. The definition of these factors and their relationships constitute the DFR
framework looked for by this research.

3

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Digital Forensic Readiness is a term in the making. Different terms in the literature have been
used to describe similar concepts and different descriptions are found to refer to equivalent terms. In
addition, the domain of the concept has extended to different disciplines, objectives and stakeholders,
making it, heretofore, an unstandardized, yet vital, measure for organizations. The following sections are
used to explain this and other associated terms as they show up in the literature. Given that digital
forensic readiness is considered part of the wider discipline of digital forensics, this term is explained first.
Digital Forensics
“Digital Forensics can be defined as the efficient use of analytical and investigative techniques for
the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, analysis, and interpretation of computer media
which is digitally stored or encoded for evidentiary and/or root-cause analysis and presentation of digital
evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the reconstruction of
events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to
planned operations” (Grobler & Louwrens 2007). “Digital evidence is present in disputes and crimes
where (i) computers and the information they store have been targeted, (ii) computers have been used as
tools, and (iii) computers have been used as repositories for information used or generated in the
commission of crimes or disputed events” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004).
The concept of digital forensics has experienced evolution in regards to the appropriate term and
the corresponding definition. Law, on one hand, and informatics, on the other, are the two disciplines that
converge in the initial development of this discipline. Digital forensics is closely associated to the
management and legal treatment of “electronically stored information (ESI),” which is also known as
digital evidence (e.g. Richard 1999).
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On the legal side, the U.S. “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in 1970 to
acknowledge the widespread use of computers by allowing for discovery of electronic media in addition to
traditional forms of printed media” (Youst & Koh 1997). On the technology side, works such as “Secure
Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics” (Schneier & Kelsey 1991), “Forensic Readiness” Tan (2001),
“Investigating Sophisticated - Security Breaches” (Casey 2006), among others have been developed in
order to guide the collection and production of electronic evidence. Garfinkel (2010) says that 1999 to
2007 is kind of the “Golden Age” for digital forensics due to the realization of our ability to see the past
through the recovery of residual data.
One of the first terms used instead of digital forensics was “forensic computing” (e.g. McKemmish
1999; Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003) referred to as “the methodologies used to capture and authenticate
data at its source, analyse that captured data for evidence relevant to the case at hand, produce an
understandable report that can be introduced into evidence in a court of law, and testify as to the
authenticity of evidence presented” (Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003). Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang (2006)
notice that digital forensics is also known as computer and network forensics, and has many definitions.
“Generally, it is considered the application of science to the identification, collection, examination, and
analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody
for the data. It comprises four basic phases: collection, examination, analysis, and report” (Kent,
Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006).
This definition includes the application of science in response to courts’ requirements for the
admissibility of evidence, which is a major challenge for presenting digital data before courts of law. For
example, the Daubert test asks for the recognitions, testability, error rate, and acceptance of the
technique producing the evidence for its admissibility. “We might extend the common definition of forensic
science, in the case of digital forensic science, as the application of computer science and mathematics
to matters of law” (Stephenson 2003).
Some practitioners might consider the limitation of digital forensics to evidence that has the
potential to be used in courts of law as inconvenient compared to the practical use of digital forensics.
Broader definitions may be preferred. For example, when used to detect nosey people accessing data
they are not supposed to access. “Determining what is an act of curiosity and what is a genuine access of
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confidential records is a subjective issue” (Hoolachan & Glisson 2010). Hoolachan & Rowlingson (2001)
contend that forensic readiness “is that an organisation can pre-empt the occurrence of a crime by
preparing the environment in advance and in doing this, organisations will benefit not only in instances
where prosecution becomes an issue, but also in limiting their own business risks” (Pooe & Labuschagne
2012).
Two more definitions support this broader view of digital forensics. The first one says that “digital
forensics comprises analytical and investigative techniques used for the preservation, identification,
extraction, documentation, analysis and interpretation of computer media, which are digitally stored or
encoded for evidentiary and/or root cause analysis” (VonSolms, Louwrens, Reekie & Grobler 2006). In
the second, Whitcombe (2002) says that digital forensics refers to digital evidence, understood to be any
information of probative value that is either stored or transmitted in a digital form (Bem, Feld, Huebner &
Bem 2008).
Some authors also coincide in that digital forensics can also include evidence not stored in
computers: “many of the issues facing digital security exist in a non-digital medium (Hoolachan & Glisson
2010). Bem et al. (2008) explain that digital forensics “refers not only to computers, but also to digital
audio and video, digital fax machines, and similar.” They also propose seven components of incident
response of which the Pre-incident preparation stage has been matched to forensic readiness.
No agreement in the models used to approach digital forensic investigations, perhaps due to the lack of
technology neutrality of some proponents of such frameworks (Beebe & Clark 2005). In the next section
different approaches for the decomposition of the digital forensic investigation process are presented as a
starting point in defining the concept of digital forensic readiness.
Digital Forensics Investigation Process
At a very high level every digital forensic investigation must go through the following phases:
1. Deﬁne the scope and goals of the investigation
2. Determine the work and materials
3. Acquire the images of the devices to be examined
4. Perform the digital forensic analysis
5. Prepare the report (Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010)
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An evidence-centered view of the digital forensic investigation (DFI) process includes 5 phases:
1. Identiﬁcation
2. Collection
3. Transportation
4. Storage
5. Examination and presentation (Trenwith & Venter 2013)
For the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRW) - a large-scale consortiums lead by
academia rather than law enforcement - that process includes 7 stages:
1. Identification
2. Preservation
3. Collection
4. Examination
5. Analysis
6. Presentation
7. Decision (Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002)
Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee (2005), combine the high level and evidence-centered approaches in a
cycle of 7 stages:
1. Officially accept a fact or an object to be examined
2. Plan a forensics procedure for producing a legally admissible report
3. Carry out the forensics process
3.1 Evidence
3.2 Identification
3.3 Analysis
3.4 Verification
3.5 Individualization
3.6 Crime scene reconstruction
4. Collect forensics results
5. Analyze the forensics results
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6. Present the forensics results and compile a forensics report
7. Determine the evidential effect
Bem et al. (2008) also say that there are “seven components of incident response, but they
moved the planning to the initial stage:
1. Pre-incident preparation
2. Detection of incident
3. Initial response
4. Formulate response strategy
5. Investigate the incident: data collection followed by analysis
6. Reporting
7. Resolution (lessons learned, long-term solutions)
Other stages of the digital forensic investigation process different to those described by Bem et
al. (2008) are proposed by different authors. For example, Kruse & Heiser (2002) summarize the phases
of the digital forensic process in:
1. Securing the evidence without contaminating it
2. Acquiring the evidence without altering or damaging the original
3. Authenticating that the recovered evidence is the same as the original seized data
4. Analyzing the data without modifying it
However, VonSolms, Louwrence, Reekie & Grobler (2006) point out the reactive nature of this
approach lacking planning and preparation. Thus, they propose a sequence of:
1. Planning and preparation
2. Incident response
3. Investigation and juridical/evidentiary
What we can infer form these different approaches is that literature supports that DFR is a first
stage in the DFI process. DFR is defined as the preincident plan within the DF lifecycle that deals with
digital evidence identification, preservation, and storage whilst minimizing the costs of a forensic
investigation” (Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012).

8

Carrier & Spafford (2003) make a parallel between the physical and the digital investigations and
mention different approaches of these processes in order to offer a summarized view. For example,
Prosise & Mandia (2001) propose an investigation sequence comprised by:
1. Detection of the Incident
2. Initial Response
3. Response Strategy Formulation
4. Duplication
5. Investigation
6. Secure Measure Implementation
7. Network Monitoring
8. Recovery
9. Reporting
10. Follow-up (Carrier & Spafford 2003)
Whereas the Department of Justice (DoJ) proposes a process following:
1. Preparation
2. Collection
3. Examination
4. Analysis
5. Reporting (Carrier & Spafford 2003)
And the US Air Force considers a sequence of stages involving:
1. Identification
2. Preparation
3. Approach Strategy
4. Preservation
5. Collection
6. Examination
7. Analysis
8. Presentation
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9. Return Evidence (Carrier & Spafford 2003)
After considering these approaches, Carrier & Spafford proposed a comprehensive set of 17
phases into 5 groups:
1. Readiness Phases
Operations Readiness
Infrastructure Readiness
2. Deployment Phases
Detection and Notification
Confirmation and Authorization
3. Physical Crime Scene Investigation Phases
Preservation
Survey
Documentation
Search and Collection
Reconstruction
Presentation
4. Digital Crime Scene Investigation Phases
Preservation
Survey
Documentation
Search and Collection
Reconstruction
Presentation
5. Review Phase
Review
This model of the digital investigation process has been adopted by later authors (e.g.
Rowlingson 2004; Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis 2013; Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012) with zero or few
modifications. In fact, Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis (2013) and Mouhtaropoulos & Li (2012) use the
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model to define DFR as “the preincident plan within the digital forensics lifecycle that deals with digital
evidence identification, preservation, and storage whilst minimizing the costs of a forensic investigation”
(Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis 2013). A subtle variation of Carrier & Spafford’s model can be seen in
forensiccontrol.com, where the digital forensic process is divided into 6 stages:
1. Readiness
2. Evaluation
3. Collection
4. Analysis
5. Presentation
6. Review
Pollitt (2007) does a review of some of these and other process models of digital forensics and
reminds us that there are different knowledge management contexts involved in them. They are the
physical, the logical and the legal contexts. Likewise, Pollitt shows that Mocas (2003) also identifies other
contexts for the analysis of digital forensics. They are law enforcement context, a military context and a
business system security context.
Regardless of the conceptual model of digital forensics used, we can see digital forensic
readiness as an initial state of this general digital forensic process that is becoming more relevant due to
its implications in later stages and the costs associated to a complete investigation. “Proactive digital
forensics is a phase within the digital forensics lifecycle that deals with pre-incident preparation.
(Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012). In the next section, the concept of digital forensic readiness is
explored.
Conceptual Approaches to Forensic Readiness
The oldest antecedent of the term forensic readiness is found in John Tan’s paper “Forensic
Readiness” of 2001. He defines the concept by stating its 2 objectives:
1. Maximizing the environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence, and
2. Minimizing the cost of forensic during an incident response.
In this seminal paper the elements of forensic readiness are listed as:
1. How Logging is done
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2. What is logged
3. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
4. Forensic acquisition
5. Evidence handling
The paper also describes 4 potential sources of incident data, which are:
1. The victim’s RAM
2. The attacker’s RAM
3. The intermediary system’s logs
4. The physical security (For example, cameras)
In consequence, Tan gives recommendations to incident management in Windows and Unix
operating systems and explains that the digital data from an intrusion can be used with diverse purposes,
such as a leverage in an internal incident or evidence in court, as a base for formulating response plans
during an incident response or to look for additional vulnerability and compromise, and even as an auto
incriminating evidence (Tan 2001).
Robert Rowlingson (2004) developed a commonly cited definition of forensic readiness (i.e.,
Grobler & Louwrens 2007; Reddy & Venter 2009) that says that it “is the ability of an organisation to
maximise its potential to use digital evidence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation;” and adds
“forensic readiness is a security process which is more procedural and staff-intensive than technological”.
Garcia (2005) modified Rowlingson’s definition to describe forensic readiness as the “art of
maximizing the environment's ability to collect credible evidence” (Pooe & Labuschagne 2012). Spike
Quinn (2005) is even more concise and defines forensic readiness as being prepared to deal effectively
with events that may require forensic investigation. While appropriate, Quinn’s definition allows
interpretations outside the context of digital systems. In contrast, Rowlingson’s definition fits the context of
computerized systems.
Other terms such as “proactive computer system forensics” and “network forensic readiness” are
also used in agreement with the context of DFR as defined by Tan (2001) and Rowlingson (2003). In the
present paper the term Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) is considered a more appropriate term to
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denote the concept expressed by Tan and Rowlingson. However, the similarities among these terms are
evident and it can be expected that authors refer to digital forensic readiness with other names.
For instance, instead of forensic readiness, some authors use the concept of proactive forensics:
“proactive computer system forensics is the design, construction and conﬁguring of systems to make
them most amenable to digital forensics analyses in the future” (Bradford, Brown, Perdue & Self 2004).
Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis (2013) highlight the equivalence of the concepts “proactive forensic
capability” and “digital forensic readiness” by saying that “little academic research has been conducted on
an organization's proactive forensic capability. This capability is referred to as digital forensic readiness
and aims to maximize the forensic credibility of digital evidence, while minimizing its post-incident forensic
investigation.”
Another term, network forensic readiness (NFR), is defined as "maximizing the ability of an
environment to collect credible digital evidence while minimizing the cost of an incident response”
(Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007). Although constrained to the specific context of networks, this
definition is very similar to the general concept of forensic readiness given the hyper connectivity of
current systems. Yet, later papers (e.g. Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 2007; Forte 2010; Pangalos,
Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010) use the term forensic readiness.
One way to synthesize what is common to this diversity of terms used to denote the same
concept is to define its scope. For example, the word “digital” seems to have a more comprehensive
scope than the words “computer” and “network”.The following section addresses these issues of the
scope of forensic readiness.
Forensic Readiness’ Scope
The posterior development of the concept of forensic readiness has turned it into an
organizational matter more than a matter of the technology used. Unlike information technologies, which
include data, hardware and software, information systems include also people and procedures, and the
management of this information systems must be aligned to the corporate strategy (Kroenke 2013).
Forensic readiness is, then, understood as a state or capability of the organization’s information systems
with special recognition of the role played by people and procedures, as shown in more recent definitions
(e.g. Rowlingson 2004).
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Forte describes the complexity of the forensic readiness implementation by adding that “planning
and preparation involve the drafting of guidelines, procedures and standards, the development and
preparation of training programs tailored to the various figures involved, and the selection and validation
of technologies to use in incident response and digital investigation processes. It is also quite clear that
these responsibilities entail keeping abreast of the state of the art in terms of both tools and skills, and
keeping all documents hardware and software up to date” (Forte 2010).
Also, different authors stress the importance of legal (e.g. Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010a
and b; Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011) and financial (e.g. Tan 2001; Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012)
aspects in forensic readiness. (Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 2007) describe forensic readiness as
“the capability of the system to efﬁciently collect credible digital evidence that can then be used in legal
proceedings”. They explain that “efﬁciency for digital forensics has been described in terms of cost since
costs tend to be signiﬁcant, especially for systems that are not forensics ready”, and that “credible digital
evidence refers to data that have been collected and preserved through a process that does not
invalidate the legitimacy of the data”.
The use of the term digital forensic readiness (DFR) is more recent than the use of the term
forensic readiness. However, the connotation remains the same, as shown by the research of
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li (2011), who explore different understandings of DFR in governments and
the academia. Some of the illustrative assertions in their work are: “digital forensic readiness involves the
identification, preservation and storage of digital evidence (DE)”, “Forensic readiness is cited as proactive
digital forensics, a term introduced by Bradford, Brown, Purdue and Self to include all preventative
security measures taken by a system”, and “Forensic readiness for a computer system, as defined by the
US, is the capability of the system to efficiently collect credible digital evidence that can be used in legal
proceedings”.
Two peculiarities of these statements must be noted. On one hand, there is a reference to
“credible digital evidence”. On the other hand, it includes specific jurisdictions as a relevant characteristic
of DFR. This is important because the word “forensics” implies “the use of science and technology to
investigate and establish facts in criminal and civil courts of law”, which means that “the goal of any
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forensic investigation will be to prosecute the criminal or offender successfully, determine the root cause
of an event and determine who was responsible” (Grobler & Louwrens 2007).
In consequence, the domain of DFR has been limited to only evidence that can be accepted in
courts of law of specific jurisdictions. Because DFR is a stage of the digital forensic investigation (DFI)
process, it is limited by the same legal boundaries for digital forensics made clear by authors such as
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke (2007) and Trenwith & Hein S Venter [2013], who state “only
evidence deemed to be legal and useful in building a case should be collected for analysis. This is
referred to as the proportionality rule”.
Although this view fits the semantics of the term, it is hardly appropriate to represent the cases
that researchers have elaborated to denote forensic readiness. For example, Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie (2015) found that “some experts were of the opinion that where investigations were not expected to
go to court then there was no need to meet an unnecessary high burden of proof”. Clearly, not all tasks
considered within the forensic readiness scope are meant to satisfy legal requirements. Non-legal uses of
forensic readiness tasks are also ackowledged when they are referred to as “the implementation of
preparatory measures that can immediately be put into effect in the event of an incident having
implications regarding either for internal processes or legal compliance” (Forte 2010). Not all evidence to
solve an internal disagreement would be strong enough for a court of law and not all evidence that is
useful to detect additional vulnerabilities in the organization, as suggested by Tan (2001), would be of use
in a trial.
Still, in an adaptation of Rowlingson’s definition, digital forensic readiness is said to be “the ability
of an organization to maximize its potential to use comprehensive digital evidence (CDE) whilst
minimizing the costs of an investigation” (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010), where authors propose
the new term “Comprehensive Digital Evidence (CDE)” as “digital evidence that is complete, relevant,
admissible, and have an evidentiary weight in a court of law to determine the root-cause of an incident
and link the attacker to the perpetrator” (Grobler et al. 2010).
The extent to which either the definition or the term are to be adapted in order to facilitate the
development of a standard measure of digital forensic readiness must be a primary endeavor for
researchers. On one hand, limiting DFR to only evidence usable in courts dismisses the potential benefits
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of DFR measures in non-legal organizational affairs. On the other hand, including non-legal evidence
increases the complexity of the concept and our ability to assess it.
This research considers that the scope of forensic readiness goes beyond the IT department’s
responsibility to become an organizational concern. It also includes more than software, hardware and
data; procedures and people are perhaps more important subjects of forensic readiness measures than
the technology itself. Forensic readiness actions are not limited to preparation of the system. They have
effect in the post-event activities of digital forensic investigations. In addition, these measures are
becoming more relevant in assessing the security and risks of the organization and the standing of its
stakeholders, not only from a legal perspective, but also from an economic and internal affairs
perspective.
Despite this complexity, forensic readiness must be measurable at any point in time in order to be
of any use for organizations. Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos (2010) suggest the need for a forensic
readiness metric of the security policies. This is why they describe forensic readiness as “the state of an
organisation where certain controls are in place in order to facilitate the digital forensic processes and to
assist in the anticipation of unauthorised actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations”. It is
important to opt for a definitive term for which to develop such a measure.
After realizing the large scope of forensic readiness, as well as the different meanings of similar concepts
and the context of the overarching discipline of digital forensics, we can proceed to define the nature of
the modern term digital forensic readiness, which is deemed the most appropriate to name the construct
of interest in this research.
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR)
Recent papers tend to use the term digital forensic readiness instead of the other terms
previously described. DFR is considered a program that “consists of a number of activities that should be
chosen and managed with respect to cost constraints and risk” (Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012), and also
“the preparedness of organizations for conducting digital forensics” (Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie
2014). These recent papers confirm that DFR is an initial stage of the more complex process of digital
forensics. DFR has become so important that the preincident plan for the identification, preservation, and
storage of digital evidence is mandatory for UK government offices (Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012).
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Maybe the first practical implementation of DFR policy happened after the HM Revenue and
Customs (HMRC) incident on October 18, 2007, when two CDs containing personal information of 25
million individuals and 7.25 million UK families claiming child benefits were missing. The UK government
then published the HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) in May 2010, mandating a Forensic Readiness
Policy (FRP) in departments and agencies (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011).
Mouhtaropoulos et al. (2011) also say that digital forensics can be proactive or reactive. The
proactive digital forensics is the discipline concerned with the achievement of digital forensic readiness.
Specifically, there is a clear distinction between digital forensic readiness (DFR) and digital forensics
(DF). Digital forensics is a discipline. Digital forensic readiness is a state of preparedness of an
organization to obtain, understand, and present digital evidence when needed. DF is to be known and
practiced. DFR is to be measured and achieved.
This said, we may be aware that, in both cases, authors use the terms to refer to processes and
disciplines. For instance, Farmer & Venema (2005) define computer forensics as the process of gathering
and analysing data in a manner as free from distortion or bias as possible to reconstruct data or what has
happened in the past on a system (Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 2008). Likewise, Fergusson-Boucher &
Endicott-Popovski said that network forensic readiness (NFR) has emerged as a method for supporting
collection of digital evidence from networks using suggested checklists, procedures, and tools
(Fergusson-Boucher & Endicott-Popovski 2012). On the other hand, we found statements such as “digital
forensic readiness is a discipline within the field of digital forensics” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004).
Both DF and DFR are associated to other terms, such as risk assessment (e.g. Rowlingson
2004), information assurance (IA) (e.g. Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007), IT governance (e.g.
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 a and b), and information security (IS) (Hamidovic 2012). This role
of DFR in the context of these concepts is not completely clear, although some illustrative contributions
are found in the literature. For example, “forensic readiness is complementary to, and an enhancement
of, many existing information security activities. It should be part of an information security risk
assessment” (Rowlingson 2004); “a forensically ready network incorporates the full spectrum of
information assurance (IA) elements: security policies, procedures, practices, mechanisms, and security
awareness training programs” (Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007); “The accepted literature on
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digital forensic readiness concentrates mainly on evidence identification, handling and storage, first line
incident response and training requirements. It does not consider the proactive application of digital
forensic tools to enhance the corporate governance structures (specifically information technology
governance)” (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010a); and “Digital forensic readiness is a natural
progression for organizations with a mature information security posture” (Hamidovic 2012). Given the
importance of these concepts in the organizational sciences, the following section elaborates on the role
of DFR in the framework of these information security elements.
Role of DFR in the Organization
Information security (IS) is, as DFR, a state; in this case, the state of security of an organization
or a system. Substantial development on the actions leading to better levels of information security has
allowed us to see IS as a process, as well. “Information security can be defined as the process of
protecting information and information assets from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business
continuity, minimize business damage, maximize return on investments and business opportunities by
preserving confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” (Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2007).
IS is also considered a discipline, due to not only the vastness of academic production on the
topic, but also due to its increasing importance in the organizations’ corporate governance. “Information
security governance is an integral part of corporate governance, and consists of the management and
leadership commitment of the board and top management towards good information security, the proper
organizational structures for enforcing good information security, full user awareness and commitment
towards good information security, and the necessary policies, procedures, processes, technologies and
compliance enforcement mechanisms all working together to ensure that the conﬁdentiality, integrity and
availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, hardware, people etc.)
are maintained at all times“ (VonSolms 2006).
Corporate governance, within which IS governance is embedded, is defined by Elachgar,
Boulafdour, Makoudi & Regragui (2012) as all taken responsibilities and practices implemented by a
general direction in order to provide a strategic direction and ensure objectives are met, risks are
managed appropriately, and organizational resources used responsibly.
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Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms (2010a) see governance as one of the dimensions of digital forensics
along with people, policies, laws, processes and technology. Other authors propose DFR as a step
beyond IS: “digital forensic readiness is a natural progression for organizations with a mature information
security posture, enabling them to pursue perpetrators in the legal domain when other security measures
have failed” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004; Hamidovic 2012). Likewise, a focus group of experts
suggested that “DFR supports the information security program by enhancing the security posture and
deterring potential attackers” (Elyas et al. 2015). Valjarevic & Venter (2011) “believe that DFR should be a
built-in security feature and not merely an add-on”.
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch (2001) contend that information systems security
(INFOSEC) has evolved into information assurance (IA) and that IA encompasses IS. Hamidovic also
shows a strong connection between information assurance and DFR. He contends that the organization's
forensic readiness ca be assessed based on criteria suggested by the UK Information Assurance
Advisory Council (IAAC): 1) the main likely threats it faces; 2) what sorts of evidence it is likely to need in
a civil litigation or criminal proceeding and how it will secure that data; 3) the amount and quality of
evidence it has collected; 4) knowledge of the potential legal problems such as admissibility, data
protection, human rights, limits to surveillance, obligations to staff members and disclosure in legal
proceedings; and 5) the management, skill, resource implications and action plan (Hamidovic 2012).
Despite the above suggested connections among DF, DFR, information security and other
concepts, there is not a widely accepted framework to assess DFR. “Digital forensic readiness is often ad
hoc and no consistent application or framework exists globally” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011). In
part, this is due to the lack of clarity on the nature of these concepts when put together in a conceptual
model. Some of them are processes, some are states or stages, others are disciplines, and some are
several of them simultaneously. Therefore, the proposed frameworks might be seen differently according
to the reader’s perspective.
One way to start visualizing the framework of DFR is by using a common unit among the
elements in the model. For that reason, the present paper proposes a comparison of the previously
explored concepts in terms of the tasks associated to them.
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Giiven that the tasks necessary to achieve DFR are the initial step in the complete DF
investigation process they must be a subset of the DF tasks. On the other hand, all the tasks of the IS
program are part of the global corporate governance activities. Likewise, the tasks in DF investigations
and DFR programs are part of the corporate governance. “DFR allows organizations demonstrate due
diligence for good corporate governance” [Grobler & Louwrens 2007]. Von Solms & Louwrens (2007)
show how IS and DF overlap (Table 1, p. 16) and how IS and DFR overlap (p. 20). “Whilst information
security and DF are considered as two different disciplines, there is a definite overlap between the two”
(Von Solms & Louwrens as cited by Grobler & Louwrens 2007).
However, despite the considerable overlap between IS and DRF, not all DFR-related tasks
belong to the IS strategy. “Information security programmes often focus on prevention and detection
measures. From a preventative information security perspective, there is little need for digital evidence”
Rowlingson (2004). Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad (2003) say that “in any computer security incident there will
be a tendency to focus on containment and recovery, as these are the foremost business critical issues.
However, in stressing these, any evidence that might be required may be damaged, discarded or simply
ignored” (Tan et al. 2003 as cited by Rowlingson 2004). Moreover, high levels of DFR provide benefits
beyond being the source of evidence for IS-related events. DFR allows organizations demonstrate due
diligence for good corporate governance (Grobler & Louwrens 2007).
In fact, the objective of achieving high levels of IS and DFR can be contradictory endeavors. IS
concentrates on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), but not on the preservation of evidence, as
DFR does (Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010). This means that some tasks, such as disconnecting a
hacked device from a network may be recommended by the organization’s IS protocol while contrary to
the DFR program. This is similar to the work of the police officer versus the work of the journalist. While
the officer wants to stop the crime as soon as possible, the journalist tries to find the right angle to capture
the complete video of it. Likewise, while Information security aims to eliminate vulnerabilities to eventual
attacks, DFR takes advantage of these vulnerabilities to collect as much evidence as possible from the
attacks. Forrester & Irwin (2007) assert that unlike the police, businesses use the approach of the military,
which requires identification of the incident, and propose mechanisms to deal with both the military and
the police approaches in parallel by using forensic readiness.
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Privacy, an important asset of IS, also goes in contradiction with DFR. “privacy concerns are a
“showstopper” for the deployment of digital forensic readiness” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004). Only
corporate governance may be able to reconcile these differences in some organizations. These set of
relationships among the activities of DFR, DF, IS and corporate governance can be represented by the
following model in figure 1:

DF

Information Security

Corporate Governance

DFR
Figure 1. Venn Diagram - The context of DFR tasks

Since the purpose of this research is to advance in finding a unified framework allowing the
measurement of DFR, we require understanding of the role of DFR in the organization, but also of the
goals, dimensions, activities and factors associated to DFR. The following section explores the literature
in relation to these aspects.
Digital Forensic Readiness Goals
Forensic readiness was from the very beginning defined in terms of its goals:
1. Maximizing the environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence, and
2. Minimizing the cost of forensic during an incident response (Tan 2001)
Mouton & Venter (2011), interpreting Tan, assert that DFR is put in place to:
1. Decrease the time period required to perform a digital forensic investigation
2. Reduce the cost involved in performing a digital forensic investigation
3. Maximize the ability to collect the evidence without disrupting the environment
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie (2014) recognize that the goals of DFR can be diverse. They
express them in the form of three capabilities that a forensically ready organization must have:
1. To produce evidence that facilitates the demonstration of regulatory compliance
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2. To produce evidence to facilitate internal investigations
3. To produce evidence that can be used in legal proceedings (legal evidence management)
In addition, Rowlingson (2004) says that this preparation can also be a deterrent for internal
crimes. Likewise, Danielsson & Tjøstheim (2004) say that the management of digital evidence is a means
to limit business risk, and compare the DFR measures with those that “organizations take in the physical
world to monitor their buildings with, for example, video surveillance (i.e. CCTV), guards, and by logging
information about all persons that enter and leave their office buildings”. The collection and preservation
of digital evidence would limit business risk by providing support for:
1. Legal defense
2. Civil litigation
3. Criminal prosecution
4. Internal disciplinary actions
5. Claim to intellectual property
6. The documentation of due care
7. The documentation of the impact of a crime or disputed action in order to support an insurance claim or
a claim for damages (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004)
They say that these measures serve 3 interdependent purposes:
1. Provide a deterrent effect
2. Support the detection of suspicious events
3, Provide support in answering the questions post mortem of who, when, how and what
Although, they acknowledge DFR support of the recovery process, its focus, according to them, is
on the third purpose of providing information about transpired events.
According to this diversity of purposes one question that researchers and practitioners should answer
before assessing the forensic readiness of organizations is: ready for what? A review of the literature
leads us to different approaches.
Carrier & Spafford (2003) say that this is an ongoing phase whose goal “is to ensure that the
operations and infrastructure are able to fully support an investigation. Both digital and physical evidence
can be lost if it is not maintained and collected properly” (Carrier & Spafford 2003). This statement
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highlights the infrastructure and operations dimensions and opens the domain of DFR not only to the
digital, but also to the physical evidence.
Other factors and dimensions can be identified from other authors. Factors such as cost,
business continuity, and benefit/cost proportionality can be inferred from Rowlingson’s (2004) proposed
goals of DFR, which are adopted in posterior research (e.g. Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010):
1. To gather admissible evidence legally and without interfering with business processes
2. To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and disputes that may adversely impact an
organization
3. To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in proportion to the incident
4. To minimise interruption to the business from any investigation
5. To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the outcome of any legal action (Rowlingson,
2004)
For Rowlingson, DFR is itself a corporate goal that involves technical and non-technical actions
that maximize the ability of an enterprise to use digital evidence (Reddy & Venter 2009).
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms (2010 a and b) use the term Proactive Digital Forensics (ProDF) for
which they propose the following goals:
1. Become DF ready
2. Enhance the Governance programs (IT and IS of the organization by proving (assessing) the
effectiveness of controls, measured against IT and IS objectives related to business objectives)
3. Improve IS / IT performance with the responsible use of DF tools to improve effectiveness and
efficiency in organization (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 a and b).
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos (2010) say that forensic practices are “departing fast from the niche
of law enforcement and becoming a business function and infrastructural component.” One example of
this happened to Target in 2014. According to the expert Steve Durbin, Target attack was done through
exploiting a web service application used by a HVAC vendor to supply invoices (Olavsrud 2015). “From
Target to Sony the number of breaches continues to increase affecting also employees and customers”
(Starkman 2014). This leads us to propose that another objective of DFR would be to demonstrate good
practices to suppliers and customers.
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An observation from this analysis is that the objectives of DFR might be identifiable according to
the interested party involved, which may also give an idea of the DFR status of the firm. A radial chart can
be used to show this coverage of stakeholders according to the DFR objectives. In general, companies
must be able to demonstrate regulatory compliance through the formalization of procedures and the
commitment of managers and members of the board. One step further includes control its own
environment, including employees’ behavior and daily interactions with customers. This will prepare the
organization to conduct internal investigations. Commercial disputes will require this internal control, as
well as control over the interactions with other companies, such as suppliers and partners. Finally, these
internal and external controls might not be enough for the firm to deal with unknown interested third
parties, such as anonymous cyber-criminals or digital bunglers. Dealing with this requires more than
having good policies and procedures, internal and external controls in place, and complying with
regulations. It requires up to date knowledge of threats, vulnerabilities and safeguards and sophisticated
methods and personnel to perform intelligence. At this level, interested parties easily include judiciary and
executive authorities, and foreign companies and governments. In general, the farther a stakeholder is
from the center of the circle the more challenging it is for the organization to deal with DFR goals
associated to that stakeholder.

Regulatory Compliance
[Different Authorities]
Internal Investigations
[Personnel & Customers]
Commercial Disputes
[Suppliers & Partners]
Intelligence
[Unknown bunglers]
Figure 2. Goals Coverage of DFR

The radial scope of this chart does not necessarily imply that organizations achieve higher levels
of DFR from the center outward. Casey (2005) gives an example of an intrusion difficult to track because
the organization only had monitoring systems on the internet border, but not on its internal subnets.
Which are the activities of DFR aiming to achieve its goals is the subject of the next section.
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Digital Forensic Readiness Activities
There are different approaches in understanding the several activities involved in the process of
gaining DFR. Carrier & Spafford divide them in operational and infrastructure. “The operations readiness
phase provides training and equipment for the personnel that will be involved with the incident and its
investigation. This includes training the responders, the lab analysts, and staff that will be receiving the
initial reports of the incident. The infrastructure readiness phase ensures that the needed data exists for a
full investigation to occur. After all, it is difficult to analyze data if it does not exist. This phase only applies
to those who maintain the environment that could be the target of a crime (Carrier and Spafford 2003).
In addition, they explain that infrastructure can be physical or digital. Cameras and card readers are
examples of the physical phase. Examples of the digital phase include sending server logs to a secured
log host, synchronizing the internal clocks on servers with network time protocol (NTP), creating a
baseline of MD5 hashes, and maintaining a change management database.
The key activities in implementing a forensic readiness programme for Rowlingson (2004) are:
1. Define the business scenarios that require digital evidence
2. Identify available sources and different types of potential evidence
3. Determine the evidence collection requirement
4. Establish a capability for securely gathering legally admissible evidence to meet the requirement
5. Establish a policy for secure storage and handling of potential evidence
6. Ensure monitoring is targeted to detect and deter major incidents
7. Specify circumstances when escalation to a full formal investigation (which may use the digital
evidence) should be launched
8. Train staff in incident awareness, so that all those involved understand their role in the digital evidence
process and the legal sensitivities of evidence
9. Document an evidence-based case describing the incident and its impact
10. Ensure legal review to facilitate action in response to the incident
Although policies are seen as a specific dimension of DFR, Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
(2007) offer steps to define the forensics policy addressing forensic readiness for a given system:
1. Identify digital assets that have value
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2. Perform a risk assessment for potential loss and threat to those assets
3. Remove assets that do not warrant the effort of prosecution
4. Identify associated data needed for these assets along with collection and storage needs
5. Write the forensic policy in terms of digital assets, forensic events, data collection and storage
6. Ensure adequate forensics policy enforcement is in place.
A structured approach in digital forensic readiness, according to Danielsson & Tjøstheim (2004),
should at least include:
1. An analysis of legal requirements and constraints on collection and preservation of potential digital
evidence in the applicable legal context
2. A method for analyzing the organizations’ need for digital evidence
3. An identification and classification of potential digital evidence sources, and enumeration of
technologies and processes for utilizing these sources
4. Guidelines for preserving digital evidence, including processes, procedures, and suggestions as to how
technology solutions can be used
5. Guidance on when and how to report incidents to the law enforcement, including content and formats
of reports, criteria for reporting, and standardization of the interaction between affected parties and law
enforcement
Grobler et al. (2010a) decompose the process of becoming forensic ready into steps as follows:
1. Provide and prepare the infrastructure to support DF investigations
2. Develop an evidence management plan (EMP) including an evidence map and evidence management
policies and procedures to manage CDE
3. Augment organizational risk mitigation plans to include evidence and process requirements. Apply an
algorithm to calculate the completeness and admissibility of the evidence. Implement an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS). Define trigger events for investigations. Prepare for containments of incidents to
include containment on live systems
4. Develop a DF training and awareness strategy with training and awareness programmes for the
organization
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5. Develop a management capability to outline the internal and external DF investigators and the role and
responsibilities of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
6. Document and validate a DF investigation (DFI) protocol (Active and Reactive) against best practice
7. Establish procedures and policies to ensure that an investigation proceed at a cost in proportion to the
incident
8. Minimize interruption to the business from any investigation
Factors Affecting Digital Forensic Readiness
One of the earliest approaches to determine the status of DFR in organizations can be extracted
from Yasinsac & Manzano (2001). They propose a set of computer and network policies to deter
computer crime and enhance computer forensics, which are some of the cited goals of DFR. Given that
the factors of interest are conditions that might determine the state of DFR in an organization we can turn
Yasinsac & Manzano’s policies into questions in order to assess their impact. For example:
A. Retaining Information
A1. Does the organization copy and retain application and local user files?
A2. Does the organization copy and retain computer and network activity logs?
B. Planning the response
B1. Does the organization have a forensic team?
B2. Does the organization have an intrusion response procedure?
B3. Is there a formal investigative procedure?
C. Training
C1. Is there training for the response team?
C2. Is there training for the investigative team?
C3. Is there training on DF for all personnel that use computers?
D. Accelerating the investigation
D1. Is personal file encryption prohibited?
D2. Is disk scrubbing tools and file shredding software prohibited?
D3. Are data indexes utilized?
D4. Is information fusion utilized?
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E. Prevent anonymous activities
E1. Is onion routing prevented or used?
E2. Are date, time and user stamps in file required?
E3. Is strong user authentication used?
E4. Are strong access control mechanisms used?
F. Protect the evidence
F1. Is there rigid control over administrative access for systems housing potential evidence?
F2. Are evidence files and connections encrypted?
F3. Is there strong integrity checking technology? (Adapted from Yasinsac & Manzano 2001).
Yasinsac & Manzano’s six categories of policies have been retaken by later authors (e.g.,
Rowlingson 2004; Pooe & Labuschagne 2012), and is a starting point to identify how different factors can
be grouped into different dimensions. However, because DFR is part of DF, the dimensions of DF must
also be considered in order to propose the dimensions of DFR. Grobler et al. (2010a) propose a model in
which the dimensions of digital forensics are:
1. Legal (which deals with compliance). The legal and judiciary dimension is the backdrop for the digital
forensic management framework (DFMF) as it will influence all the activities of the organization
2. Governance (Management of facilities, partners, and risk)
3. Policies (answers to the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ questions)
4. Process (answers to the ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, ‘where’ and ‘who’ questions)
5. People (answers to the ‘who’ question)
6. Technology (addresses applications and technologies to use)
Although there is a clear advantage in the categorization of factors and the identification of
dimensions, several challenges can be seen from these frameworks. On one hand, it is important to
identify the relationships among the different dimensions, which not always are comprehensive and
independent as to be put in a statistical analysis of principal components. This is evident based on the
statement “the governance dimension is a subset of the legal and judiciary dimension. The other
dimensions people, policy, process and technology are subsets of the Governance dimension” (Grobler,
Louwrens & Von Solms 2010).
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On the other hand, the dimensional approach can have several layers with relationships among
factors and dimensions crossing through those different levels. For example, from the two previous
categorizations we can see that Yasinsac & Manzano’s categories of policies are set in the form of
processes, which puts them into the process dimension of Grobler et al.’s (2010a) framework. However,
training is a process directed to people. Therefore, the training policies of Yasinsac & Manzano are also
closely related to the people dimension of Grobler et al., and both, then, are related to the governance
and legal dimensions, which are one and two levels above respectively, according to Grobler et al.
(2010a).
To top it off, one single category in Yasinsac & Manzano’s framework can demand several
indicators in order to be assessed appropriately. Let us take the category “retaining information” for
example. Basic questions about possible source of evidence to be retained are given by Rowlingson
(2004):
1. Where is data generated?
2. What format is it in?
3. For how long is it stored?
4. How is it currently controlled, secured and managed?
5. Who has access to the data?
6. How much is produced?
7. Is it archived? If so where and for how long?
8. How much is reviewed?
9. What additional evidence sources could be enabled?
10. Who is responsible for this data?
11. Who is the formal owner of the data?
12. How could it be made available to an investigation?
13. To what business processes does it relate?
14. Does it contain personal information?
Stephenson (2003) uses a similar set of questions to summarize what he considers factors
affecting the digital investigation, but in this case his focus is in the incident:
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1. What is the nature of the incident?
2. How can we be sure that there even was an incident?
3. What was the entry point into the target system? Was there only one?
4. What would evidence of an attack look like? What are we looking for?
5. What legal issues need to be addressed (policies, privacy, subpoenas, warrants, etc.)?
6. Who was in a position to cause/allow the incident to occur?
7. What security measures were in place at the time of the incident?
8. What non-technical (business) issues may have impacted the success or failure of the attack?
9. Who knew what about the attack and when did they know it? (Stephenson 2003).
In fact, the closest substitute for a DFR framework can be found in proposed frameworks for the
digital investigation process. Stephenson used the DFRWS Digital Investigation Framework to elaborate
his End-to-End Digital Investigation (EEDI) technique. This framework as cited by Reith, Carr & Gunch
(2002) comprises 7 stages, whereas Stephenson talks about 6 classes. Although, the framework is
essentially the same, the present research pays special attention to the terminology used in the literature
in order to propose a standard framework of DFR. Therefore, the elements of the DFRWS framework are
included as candidate factors or dimensions of DFR and submitted to later classification following the
methodology adopted here. These elements are:
A. Identification
A1. Event/Crime Detection
A2. Resolve Signature
A3. Profile Detection
A4. Anomalous Detection
A5. Complaints
A6. System
A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis
B. Preservation
B1. Case Management
B2. Imaging Technologies
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B3. Chain of Custody
B4. Time Synchronization
C. Collection
C1. Preservation
C2. Approved Methods
C3. Approved Software
C4.Approved Hardware
C5. Legal Authority
C6. Lossless Compression
C7. Sampling
C8. Data Reduction Recovery
C9. Recovery Techniques
D. Examination
D1. Preservation
D2. Traceability
D3. Validation Techniques
D4. Filtering Techniques
D5. Pattern Matching
D6. Hidden Data Discovery
D7. Hidden Data Extraction
E. Analysis
E1. Preservation
E2. Traceability
E3. Statistical
E4. Protocols
E5. Data Mining
E6. Timeline
E7. Link
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E8. Spatial
F. Presentation
F1. Documentation
F2. Expert Testimony
F3. Clarification
F4. Mission Impact Statement
F5. Recommended Countermeasure
F6. Statistical Interpretation (DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003)
Carrier & Spafford (2003) noted ambiguity in the distinction of the preservation and collection
phases, and the analysis and examination phases. Thus, they propose their own framework consisting of
five groups of phases:
1. Readiness
2. Deployment
3. Physical crime scene investigation
4. Digital crime scene investigation
5. Presentation
Other models of the digital investigation process can be found in Casey (2000) (1. Recognition, 2.
Preservation, collection, and documentation, 3. Classification, comparison, and individualization, and 4.
Reconstruction) and Lee ’s (2001) Model of Scientific Crime Scene Investigation (1. Recognition, 2.
Identification, 3. Individualization, 4. Reconstruction) (Ciardhuáin 2004). For the purpose of this research,
items such as preservation, which in Stephenson (2003) framework is present in several classes, or
spatial, which looks like a dimension itself rather than a factor, represent a challenge of classification
(These issues are addressed in the section of methodology). A more manageable set of factors come in
the form of questions.
From Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang (2006) Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into
Incident Response, which they developed for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
we can extract a different set of key questions:
1. What are the potential sources of data?
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2. Of the potential sources of data, which are the most likely to contain helpful information and why?
3. Which data source would be checked first and why?
4. Which forensic tools and techniques would most likely be used? Which other tools and techniques
might also be used?
5. Which groups and individuals within the organization would probably be involved in the forensic
activities?
6. What communications with external parties might occur, if any?
7. From a forensic standpoint, what would be done differently if the scenario had occurred on a different
day or at a different time (regular hours versus off-hours)?
8. From a forensic standpoint, what would be done differently if the scenario had occurred at a different
physical location (onsite versus offsite)?
Kent et al.. (2006) also highlight the importance of the existence of a toolkit and team response,
of clear weighed criteria on whether turning off a hacked device or not, and of clear weighed criteria on
volatility orders to collect evidence in each case.
It is not surprising then that, given this plurality of potential factors of DFR with such complex
relationships among them, there is not an accepted framework to assess DFR. Instead of a measurement
model many authors hence propose policies, requirements, strategies and protocols in order to help
organizations to be forensically ready. For example, Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor (2007) use four
strategies (called the 4R model for resistance, recognition, recovery and redress) to categorize the
abilities and tools necessary for network forensic readiness (NFR). These tools and abilities can be
considered factors that determine the DFR state. They are:
Resistance
1. Ability to repel attacks using tools such as firewalls, user authentication, and diversification
Recognition
2. Ability to detect an attack or a probe using ids and internal integrity checks
Recovery
3. Ability to provide essential services during attack and restore services following the attack using
incident response, replication, backup systems, and fault tolerant design
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Redress
4. Ability to hold intruders accountable in a court of law and to retaliate using forensics (the who), legal
remedies and active defense
Additionally, two more candidates of factors can be extracted from Endicott-Popovsky et al.’s work:
5. The identification of relevant target assets
6. The test and calibration of the collection devices and their frequency of calibration
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li (2011) say that a forensic readiness policy (FRP) should consider:
1. Digital evidence (DE) identification
2. Risk Assessment by classifying DE exposure and correlating with threats
3. Control to DE access and maintenance of a digital chain of custody (DCOC)
4. Statistical representation of the DE by establishing a Bayesian network; it will calculate the relationship
between cost and benefit factors of each measure
5. The events that will escalate an event into a full forensic investigation; the policy should specifically
correlate events with the established Bayesian network
6. Evidence Management Plan development
7. Single point of contact (SPOC) establishment with legal authorities
8. Digital forensic investigation (DFI) model choice - the procedure to be followed after an incident occurs
9. Technical infrastructure standards
10. Staff training procedures on the policy’s contents
Barske, Stander & Jordaan (2010) contend that “numerous varying factors such as the perceived
high cost, as well as the current lack of forensic skills, make the implementation of digital forensic
readiness appear difficult if not infeasible for smaller organisations”. They summarize the Components of
DFR as:
1. Strategy
2. Compliance & Monitoring
3. Policy & Procedures
4. Technology and Digital Forensic Response
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They also identified the following factors that may play a role in the decision of adopting a
forensic readiness plan and the level of its implementation:
1. The industry sector (financial institutions may be more likely to adopt a higher level of forensic
readiness as they handle financial transactions)
2. The funding available.
3. More employees increase the risk of internal criminal incidents and the need for forensic readiness
4. More staff with access to financial instruments increases the chances of incidents of fraud and the
need for forensic readiness
5. Staff with more advanced IT skills in the organization increases the chances of being able to multi-skill
some of them to handle forensic cases, which reduces costs of adoption
6. Organizations with public profiles are more likely to adopt forensic readiness to maintain their
reputation
Legal requirements, as well, give indications of what factors must be considered in order to be
forensic ready. According to Leigh (2012), English courts have an electronic disclosure protocol
requesting organizations providing digital evidence (including computer files, mobile phone records,
smartphone data, tablet data, electronic booking system records, photographs, voicemail, data back-up
tapes) to inform about:
1. IT systems in use
2. Where data is stored
3. Back-up procedures
4. Electronic document retention and archiving policies
5. The number of documents likely to be located (Leigh 2012)
Therefore, these five aspects plus the legal requirement itself can be considered among potential
DFR factors. In addition, Leigh underlines the importance of some considerations that could be
considered determinants in DFR. For example:
1. Tracing custody of individual PCs, laptops and PDAs for upgrades people's change of office or role
2. Asset registry for items of electronic equipment that could record information
3. Employment law or privacy issues
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4. Training in awareness
5. Centralization of data
6. Storage in personal devices (Leigh 2012)
Reddy, Venter & Olivier (2012) explain that the challenge for managers is to coordinate the
organisational resources to attain an acceptable level of DFR. Reddy & Venter (2013) developed an
architecture for a DFR Management System DFRMS based on basic requirements that the proposed
system should accomplish according to the extant literature (Details about the source of Reddy &
Venter’s requirements can be found in Table 1, p. 76 of their paper). Given that these requirements are
proposed as necessary conditions for achieving a good level of DFR, we can treat them as factors in a
preliminary exploration. These requirements are:
1. Monitor or log network and host activity
2. Secure storage of logs
3. Intrusion detection system
4. Distinguish whether hardware or software elements are being monitored
5. Automated alarm upon detection of potential or actual incident
6. Conﬁguration procedures for monitoring and logging
7. Investigative teams (DF teams) and incident response teams’ descriptions
8. Training requirements and training
9. Business process descriptions
10. Organizational DF policies and policies related to DFR
11. Suspicion policy
12. Law enforcement contact policy
13. Escalation procedure
14. Incident response procedure
15. Law enforcement contact procedure
16. Organizational structure and staff involved in DFR and incident response
They also make a contribution worth considering among potential factors, which is the existence
of three types of software related to the management of DFR:
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1. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitoring events on computers and networks
2. Security event management software (SEM), which ﬁlter real threats from false alarms
3. Incident management software, controlling the workﬂow involved in the incident management process
through incident records, escalation rules, information about end users, and about conﬁguration items
(Reddy & Venter 2013)
Similarly, an approach based on functionalities contends that a system for DFR in the cloud was
deemed to require:
1. Communication Channel
2. Encryption
3. Compression
4. Authentication of log data and proof of integrity
5. Authenticating the client and server
6. Timestamping (Trenwith & Venter 2013)
Finally, Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie (2014) propose eleven factors:
1. Forensic strategy
2. Non-technical stakeholders
3. Technical stakeholders
4. Technology
5. Monitoring
6. Architecture
7. Policy
8. Training
9. Forensic culture
10. Top management support
11. Governance
These same authors later changed the denomination of “factors” by the term “capabilities” in a
follow up of their framework performed with focus groups of DF experts (Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie
2015). In their new study, they introduced different perspectives from which DFR has been studied:
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1. Resourcing (e.g. Reyes & Wiles, 2007)
2. Technology use and selection (e.g. Carrier & Spafford, 2003)
3. Training (e.g. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Rowlingson, 2004)
4. Legal investigations (e.g. Casey, 2005)
5. Incident response (e.g. Ahmad et al.., 2012; Shedden et al.., 2010a; Tan et al.., 2003)
6. Policy (e.g. Yasinsac & Manzano, 2001)
All these factors must be considered in the analysis of the DFR framework. However, in this
paper, a factor will be treated as a condition, something that is present to a specific extent and can be the
cause of something else: “a phenomenon presumed to affect an experiment” (Wikipedia 2015). For this
reason, some of the factors previously listed are better seen as dimensions in the way this term is used in
the social sciences. A dimension is something that is characteristic of the subject or a perspective from
which that subject can be seen. “A dimension is a structure that categorizes facts and measures in order
to enable users to answer business questions … Perhaps the most basic way the word dimension is used
in literature is as a hyperbolic synonym for feature, attribute, aspect or magnitude” (Wikipedia 2015).
According to this, we cannot, for example, use governance as a factor. Governance could be a
dimension. The factor would be to what extent there is governance or to what extent governance includes
IT policies. This paper’s objective is to find factors that are measurable with scales that vary from low to
high. These factors, nevertheless, can be grouped in dimensions in order to facilitate the comprehension
and analysis of the problem. For this reason, the previous literature review on factors, dimensions,
activities, and goals related to DFR are of paramount importance in the final definition of the usable
factors for this paper. The work of these researchers, regardless of the terminology used, unveils many
relevant measurable indicators of the extent to what DFR is achieved in an organization.
A partial view of the preliminary list of potential factors and dimensions found in the literature is
presented below. This list considers not only what has been explicitly mentioned by the authors, but also
what could be inferred from their contentions. Therefore, some items in the list are presented as in the
original, while some others have been reworded or redacted for the first time. The complete list of 1115
items is too large to include in the body of this paper, but it is provided as Appendix A.

38

Predictor

Classification

Paper

Year

Management

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Access control
Systems development and maintenance

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Business Continuity management

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Compliance

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Having International Information Security Certification

Factor

VonSolms 2000

2000

Cultivating
an Metrics
Information
Security Culture
Implementing
to Continuously
and Right
Dynamically Measure IS aspects

Factor

VonSolms 2000

2000

Factor

VonSolms 2000

2000

Management of People Leaving the Company

Factor

VonSolms 2000

2000

Electronic Device type

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Tools & Equipment

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Securing and Evaluating the Scene

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Documenting the Scene

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Evidence Collection

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Packaging, Transportation, and Storage

Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Crime Category
Ability to collect evidence

Factor
Factor

US DoS/NIJ 2001
Tan 2001

2001

Cost of forensics

Factor

Tan 2001

2001

Multitiered logging

Element

Tan 2001

2001

How Logging is Done

Element

Tan 2001

2001

What is Logged

Element

Tan 2001

2001

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

Element

Tan 2001

2001

Forensic Acquisition

Element

Tan 2001

2001

Evidence Handling

Element

Tan 2001

2001

2001

Figure 3. Preliminary Factors and Dimensions of DFR (Partial View)
Clearly, some of these factors and dimensions show up repeatedly in different works, some are
mentioned by other authors not presented in the list, and others may not be in the list. This list does not
pretend to present the factors in a specific order or imply that a factor listed was proposed originally by
the article from where it was extracted. The list’s main purpose is to be as inclusive as possible from the
literature reviewed. Many of the factors included are indeed recurrent throughout the literature of digital
forensics.
This is only a preliminary step in the search for the final factors that might be affecting how an
organization moves towards a specific status of DFR. The next section explains the structured process
used to find the factors affecting DFR.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Although DFR is being practiced and studied more every day, the literature and practitioners have
not yet reached an agreement on a common framework to assess DFR and implement measures to
improve it. A diversity of methodologies exists for the implementation of DFR and several distinct factors
can affect its status according to different objectives.
This dissertation proposes a strategy that combines the review of the extant literature, the views
of other qualified reviewers and the answers from professionals working on IT security in order to obtain a
comprehensive framework of the factors that determine DFR. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques
are applied in the process of extracting the knowledge from primary and secondary sources of data.
This research shows that there is great diversity and amount of potential factors of DFR. The
challenge lies in identifying and classifying a complete and succinct set of those factors which can explain
the DFR status in organizations. Complete means that the DFR framework should include as many
factors as possible that explain variation in DFR status. Succinct means that only those factors which
capture variance of the DFR not explained by other factors should remain in the framework.
In order to be as complete as possible, this research extracts all potential indicators identifiable in
the DFR literature available. These indicators can be factors in their own right or be a lower level of a
factor in conjunction with other indicators. These factors and the relationship among them is what
constitute the resulting model of DFR. In addition, dimensions should be identified such that professional
practitioners, who may not be familiar with concepts such as latent variables and conceptual models, can,
nevertheless identify the aspects of the organization that the factors represent.
The terms factor and indicator are use indistinctly in parts of this work because they both are
indications or predictors of the level of certain condition, DFR in this case. They both can be variables in a
statistical model. When the factor can be subdivided in more specific lower level factors we talk about
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indicators. It is important to understand also that factors affecting a construct cannot be assessed
unless there is a measure of the construct to which to compare the impact of the variation of the factors.
Because that measure of DFR does not exist, this research proposes it and identifies the factors affecting
it. The way this is done is by distinguishing between extant and perceptual factors and then comparing
their relationship.
As academics, we should expect that researchers proposing frameworks, methodologies and
assessments of DFR are accounting for all what they consider affects its status. Therefore, a literature
review should provide a comprehensive set of indicators of DFR. Of those indicators, some refer to
elements that the organization has, knowledge that it possesses, and actions that it does, and by having
them, knowing them, and performing them it enhances its digital forensics preparation. These can be
understood as extant DFR indicators because they represent the reality of the DFR status of the firm. On
the other hand, there are elements for which no direct verification is available; thus, we search for
perceptions, opinions, and attitudes in order to obtain some measure of their presence. These are called
perceptual indicators in this research. It is hypothesized here that perceptual factors reflect the DFR
status assessed by the extant ones.
This research follows a process divided in two phases in order to develop and test a framework
for the assessment of DFR in organizations:
Phase 1: Elaboration of a practical framework through quantitative literature analysis
1. Definition of the research question and identification of the dependent variable
2. Systematic revision of the extant literature in DFR
3. Collection and classification of the DFR indicators extracted from the literature
4. Testing of the dimensional classification through a Q-Sort test
5. Adjustment of the validity of the dimensional classification using association rules
Phase 2: Elaboration and testing of an instrument to assess DFR
6. Refinement of indicators to be used to survey organizations
7. Distinction between extant and perceptual indicators of DFR
8. Assessment of reliability and validity
9. Final survey and exploratory factor analysis
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10. Drawing of conclusions, assumptions, limitations and contributions of the study
A detailed description of these stages is elaborated below:
Phase 1: Elaboration of a Practical Framework through Quantitative Literature Analysis
1. Definition of the research question and identification of the dependent variable
The research question of this study is whether a framework for the assessment of DFR can be
found and what the factors affecting DFR in organizations would be. Therefore, the dependent variable of
interest is DFR.
As any other variable, DFR can assume different values representing the DFR status of an
organization at different moments in time. There is, currently, not a standard measure of DFR against
which to develop tests to see how it changes when other variables change. On the contrary, DFR is yet to
be comprehensively understood. In fact, it seems like determining the DFR level of an organization will be
an unachievable task. How prepared is the organization to respond to a situation requiring digital
evidence cannot be known with certainty until such situation happens, which is not a moment firms are
longing for. If the situation, though, arises, it can come in many different fashions, and it is unlikely that it
will be the same or similar to any other event in the same or a different company. Comparisons, then, are
impossible.
Regardless of these difficulties, the need to assess this digital forensic preparedness is real and
growing. It is required that researchers minimize uncertainty on the assessment of DFR as much as
possible. Given that the DFR indicator does not exist and that no variables can be tested against it (and
because of this), this paper is in the quest for finding the factors comprised by the DFR construct.
After reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that many and varied factors complement each
other to create the idea of a specific status in terms of DFR in an organization. It is also clear that some
factors contribute to the DFR status in a way that is out of the domain of other factors. This indicates that
many factors in question are formative rather than reflective. Therefore, finding these factors is, at the
same time, understanding the composition of the construct and developing a measure for it that has not
been proposed heretofore.
Because many distinct and overlapping factors have been proposed to affect DFR, it is difficult to
understand what their prorated unique contributions are. For this reason, this paper proposes a
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preliminary framework for the classification of the factors found and exposes the indicators of this
framework to statistical tests of exploratory factor analysis.
2. Systematic revision of the extant literature in DFR
In the process of developing measures, which is the purpose of this paper, Churchill (1989)
recommends to start with specifying the domain of the construct. Likewise, the present paper has begun
with a detailed review of the extant literature on DFR in order to recognize the domain and scope of the
construct.
The amount of literature on DFR until Decemeber, 2015, is still moderate, especially considering
papers published in indexed academic journals. For this reason, this research attempts to review all
extant literature whose main topic is DFR frameworks, components, factors or similar aiming to describe
how is DFR composed and what factors determine its status. This includes similar terms such as preincident preparation (Mandia, Prosise & Pepe cited by Valjarevic & Venter 2011), operation readiness
phase and infrastructure readiness phase, (Carrier and Spafford cited by Valjarevic & Venter 2011),
proactive digital forensics (Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & Traore 2011; Mouhtaropoulos Li & Grobler 2012),
network forensic readiness, and forensic readiness in the cloud (Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-Popovsky
2012; Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013; and Trenwith & Venter 2013). Other papers are included as
deemed relevant by citations of the most directly related papers from indexed academic journals.
In the process of this research, 77 DFR-related documents have been examined. Two main sources have
been used to limit the scope of the search. One is the library system of a southern university in the United
States classified as a highest research institution by the Carnegie classification of institutions of higher
education. This includes those volumes available through interlibrary loan service. The second source is
the Google Scholar web search engine. The university’s library provides access to over 140 databases
and 27.000 electronic journals, while Google Scholar database allows access to an estimated of more
than 160 million documents including such recognized sources as Elsevier journals.
3. Collection and classification of the DFR indicators extracted from the literature
During this process, the complete selection of papers is reviewed to extract explicit nomination of
factors by the authors. Other factors that are inferred from the explanations of the authors are also
considered. Each item is initially classified as a factor, dimension, requirement, step, etc., as proposed by
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the paper’s author(s), and later reclassified as only a factor or a dimension according to the definitions
proposed in this research. As explained above, there is no clear and broadly accepted distinction
between factors and dimensions throughout the DFR literature. Authors talk about factors, elements,
categories, phases, requirements, etc. in ways that are coherent within their own discourse, but difficult to
reconcile with each other and to quantify in a comprehensive model. This is also an obstacle in the quest
to establish a structured general framework of DFR.
Despite the diversity of proposals, the raw list includes all factors, elements, categories,
requirements, etc. as originally mentioned by the authors. From this point on, they will be called items or
indicators, and can be part of factors or dimensions or remain as simple indicators. This inclusion of
explicit and implicit items helps recognizing different dimensions of the DFR construct according to the
literature. Furthermore, by putting all the items on the table, this research minimizes the possibility that
any relevant indicator of DFR is left out of consideration, and that any factor or dimension, that surges
with the support of that indicator, is dismissed.
One first obstacle is that this comprehensive approach leaves too many potential indicators with
no inferable structure. Therefore, some preliminary organization must be done on this list in order to distill
a unique categorized set of relevant indicators. Two preliminary operations are conducted on the raw list:
reclassification of items as factors or dimensions and elimination of redundant items.
First, all the items are reclassified as potential dimensions or potential factors, which may change
the initial denomination by authors as factors, elements, categories, requirements, etc. It was explained
before that all those items that can be expressed and seen as potential generators of a specific DFR
status are considered factors, whereas those items referring to a perspective or category, within which
more granular indicators can be grouped, are considered dimensions.
Factors are more specific than dimensions. They indicate conditions or choices or actions.
Although a single factor can be measured through two or more indicators, when several of those
conditions, choices or actions are needed to define the item, it may be better deemed as a dimension. For
the purpose of this research the factor has to be measurable through variables assuming values on a
continuum (e.g. time of experience of the CIO) or at levels/categories (e.g. industry, number of employees
by ranges) or, at least, as a binary variable (e.g. have/have not security policy). The description of the
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factor may also include a verb, such as “support from management”, which indicates that such action, the
support, takes place or is performed to some level.
Many items included are questions that authors suggest to ask in order to assess preparedness.
An observation from the review is that, in general, questions such as “how much”, “for how long”, “is
there”, “what type”, “who”, and “where” are indicative of factors because they tend to have single values
as responses, whereas a question such as “how to” might indicate a dimension because it, likely, requires
identifying several aspects and their relations to explain the way something occurs. In some cases,
wording the item as a question helps in applying this discriminant technique.
A dimension can surge when different indicators refer to the same subject. For example “cost of
technology” and “technology currency” might indicate that the subject “technology” is a dimension that
includes those two indicators. However, including another indicator such as “cost of training” might
indicate that “cost” is also a dimension including the first and third indicator. This is because dimensions
are also understood as perspectives from which to observe the subject in question, DFR in this case.
Spyridopoulos & Katos (2011), for example, talk about three dimensions of cloud forensics: technical,
legal and organizational.
Because there is not one single perspective that can be considered correct while excluding
others, this research offers a less subjective interpretation of dimensions, and instead defines them by
quantifying the recurrence of the words included in the items reclassified as dimensions. A caveat here is
that in the first round of reclassification the same item may appear as both dimensions and factors or in
two or more dimensions. Despite the previous explanation, distinguishing factors from dimensions is not a
straightforward task. Thus, allowing items to be in different groups helps quantifying their recurrence and
forces the analysis of those items in the context of other items in the extracted dimensions. The
classification of dimensions is contrasted with the judgment of external reviewers via a structured
methodology called Q-sort test, explained below.
4. Testing of the dimensional classification through a Q-Sort test
The content validity tests the completeness and correct classification of the words as real
representations of the dimensions of DFR. This is done through a Q-Sort test. Q-Sort tests have been
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previously used in the literature by Davis 1989; Segars & Grover 1998; and Guo 2014, among many
others.
The implementation in this study is slightly different. Those words and groups of words finally
selected as potential dimensions are separated from their sets and individually presented to a group of
academics and professionals of information systems for them to regroup them as they think will represent
independent dimensions.
5. Adjustment of the validity of the dimensional classification using association rules
The groups selected by the exterbal reviewers are assessed in terms of the cohesion of words in
a specific group and its distinction from other groups by using a data mining technique known as
association rules. This is equivalent to measures of convergent and discriminant validity, as shown in the
results section.
Phase 2: Elaboration and Testing of an Instrument to Assess DFR
6. Refinement of indicators to be used to survey organizations
Once the framework of dimensions is defined, all items are assigned to the dimension in which
they better fit. In order to perform this classification two tasks are implemented. First, all 1115 items are
checked via a lookup function in Excel for their containment of a word belonging to a dimension and
marked accordingly. Second, all 1115 items were semantically interpreted and assigned to all dimensions
where they could belong. Obviously, many items fall into several dimensions because words used to
describe the item appear in several categorical dimensions or because they semantically seem to belong
to several dimensions at the same time.
After separating items in dimensions, each dimension is reviewed individually to check on
repeated items that could be eliminated. Once all categories are cleaned, Items are organized by unique
item ID in order to detect ID duplication and decide in which of the several dimensions they will remain.
Finally, those items which are semantically equivalent are merged into a single one or clustered to be
redacted as measurable indicators.
The extra care and work that this stage entails is justified by the unique opportunity of conducting
a structured research with qualified professionals whose available time is in shortage. Given the
quantitative characteristics of this research, each qualified respondent is of paramount importance in
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order to assure the power of the test. Therefore, the construction of a parsimonious and optimized test is
useful to avoid attrition of respondents and minimize other threats of internal validity when conducting the
study.
The indicators must be tested through surveys using scales, such as the Likert scale, that allow
the statistical assessment of potential predictors. Alternatively, semantic differential scales are used when
considered more appropriate. The instrument also asks a pre and post survey question testing the effect
of the awareness on the perceived DFR status: What is the level of forensic readiness of your
organization?
After the elimination of duplicated items and grouping items based on semantic equivalence,
each category comprises a reduced set of items. They are not redacted in a way that can be used in a
survey. Therefore, they are reshaped into single questions that capture what they pretend to measure in
terms of DFR. Some groups are summarized in a single question whereas some items need two or more
questions in order to capture what they aim to assess.
7. Distinction between extant and perceptual indicators of DFR
The result is the list of measurable indicators of a survey instrument. Among them, there are
questions that describe the current status of the organization. For example, if a specific training has been
provided or a specific system is in place. These are called extant indicators. Demographic characteristics
such as the size of the company are considered a special case of extant indicators. Other questions
evaluate the opinion of the respondent regarding a condition hold by the organization. For example,
whether there is management support for the DFR program. These are considered perceptual indicators.
The distinction among extant and perceptual indicators is used to contrast the real and the
perceived situation of the organization regarding DFR. Extant indicators give an assessment of the level
of DFR in the organization according to what has been proposed by the literature, whereas the perceptual
indicators account for the perceived reflection of that reality. Those perceptual items found to be
correlated with the level of DFR as measured by the extant indicators make the proposed starting point of
a measurement model of DFR for social scientists.
8. Assessment of reliability and validity
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A sample of randomly selected companies completes a survey with the extant and perceptual
indicators. These are analized independently via exploratory factor analysis. The extant indicators are
considered formative of the DFR concept; therefore, they are processed using principal components
analysis. The perceptual indicators are considered reflective of the DFR concept; therefore, they are
processed using maximum likelihood.
The results of the pilot study are used to assess the feasibility of these factor analyses and to
have a preliminary approach of the nomological validity of the latent factors discovered in the final study.
Cronbach’s alpha measures are performed for the assessment of reliabilty of the indicators of the final
factors.
9. Final survey and exploratory factor analysis
Statistical exploratory factor analysis is used in order to detect the latent factors behind the tested
indicators. Although Churchill’s general framework proposes a procedure to develop measures for
marketing constructs using multi-item measures, this methodology is frequently used in other business
and social disciplines. An important consideration must be done regarding the adoption of Churchill’s
methodology. Even though multi-item measures are utilized in the present research, Churchill’s procedure
is designed for reflective items and not for some of the formative items resulting here. DFR is a complex
construct defined by interrelated yet independent aspects in the organization. For this reason, some of
the factors of interest of this study are mostly formative rather than reflective factors. Therefore, the
evaluations of reliability through tests such as Cronbach’s Alpha have limitations in assessing the items of
the final scale. Formative indicators may not respond as expected to the reliability tests even though they
indeed belong to the factor of interest. This issue requires the following short clarification.
Formative vs. Reflective Factors
Formative factors are conceived as the pillars of a composite variable hence this variable owes its
existence to the presence of each of those factors in an additive way. In other words, we understand that
the composite variable exists because the factors exist simultaneously. On the other hand, reflective
factors are indications that a latent variable is present. Therefore, when the latent variable changes all
their indicators change to reflect that change. In the case of formative factors, not all indicators need to
change in order to see a change in the latent variable, i.e., they are not expected to correlate. Because

48

the causal flow is different from formative to reflective factors, the indicators are exchangeable in the
reflective case and definitional in the formative case (Rash.org 2015 retrieved on 150622 from
http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt221d.htm).
The definition of indicators as formative or reflective must then be justified by the researcher
based on sound theory more than statistics. Notwithstanding, statistical analysis can open the door to
reevaluate the theory. As an example, let us use Elyas et al. (2014) summary of DFR in three goals and
turn them into measurable indicators:
1. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of digital crime.
2. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of litigation.
3. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of internal
dispute.
An assessment of DFR under this perspective seems to be formative because the organization’s
status on DFR depends on the combined status of three different indicators. They are: readiness to
provide evidence in a digital crime, readiness to do it in case of litigation, and readiness to do it in case of
internal dispute. However, a high correlation among the items associated to all of them might indicate that
these factors are indeed reflective rather than formative. This is, perhaps, because although DFR is
achieved through several independent ways, once a certain level of DFR is gained it will simultaneously
improve the ability to collect and present digital evidence regardless of the reason why this collection is
done.
This said, measures of reliability are implemented in this research regardless of the classification
of indicators. According to Davis (1989) who uses this methodology in the development of the technology
acceptance model (TAM), the appropriate selection of the initial scale items helps to assure the content
validity of the scales. Far from avoiding the theoretical discussion on the issues explained above, this
study aims to encourage it.
10. Conclusions, assumptions, limitations and contributions of the study
This process is as real a measure of DFR as it can be, considering the unattainable conditions of
a definitive assessment. Yet, the proposed tasks have their own challenges as well. Some assumptions
and limitations hold and are explained after the concluding remarks of the study.
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This methodology not only values the theoretical and practical knowledge on DFR, but also
combines qualitative and quantitative techniques whenever they are more convenient in order to
guarantee that the research follows a structured process that is testable and repeatable. In particular, this
study uses Q-Sort tests as a structured way to extract information from experts and statistical techniques
on all quantifiable data.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

1115 potential indicators of DFR where extracted from the literature. This list is found as
Appendix A. Of those 1115 potential indicators of DFR, 381 items were considered to be representative of
dimensions. A snapshot showing a partial section of a table of items reclassified as dimensions is in
Figure 4. The complete table of 381 items is too large to be included in the body of this paper; hence, it is
provided as Appendix B.
Predictor

Classification

Re-Classification

Paper

Year

Security policy

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Security organization

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Personnel security

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Physical and environmental security

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Communications and operations

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Management
Systems development and maintenance

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Compliance

Dimension

Dimension

VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799)

2000

Tools & Equipment

Factor

Dimension

US DoS/NIJ 2001

2001

Evidence Collection
Training.

Factor
Dimension

Dimension
Dimension

US DoS/NIJ 2001
Yasinsac & Manzano 2001

2001

Protect the evidence.

Dimension

Dimension

Yasinsac & Manzano 2001

2001

Information States

Dimension

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Security Services

Dimension

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Security Countermeasures

Dimension

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Time

Dimension

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Education

Factor

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Training.

Factor

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001

2001

Storage technology

Factor

Dimension

Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002

2002

Infrastructure digital and physical

Dimension

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

2003

Operations

Dimension

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

2003

Training

Factor

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

2003

Equipment

Factor

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

2003

A. Identification

Class

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

A6. System

Sub clas

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis

Sub clas

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

B. Preservation

Class

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

C. Collection

Class

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

D. Examination

Class

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

2003

2001

Figure 4. Items re-classified as potential dimensions of DFR (Partial View)
The number of items discovered is too big, which makes it difficult to make sense of the potential
dimensions by identifying groups of similar indicators that are at the same time different to indicators in
other groups. Thus, a semantic approach is used to discover the underlying dimensions to which these
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items belong. It consists of finding the recurrent terms used by authors when describing indicators,
grouping those words that are semantically equivalent, and counting their recurrence throughout the set
of items. The process so far explained can be summarized as follows:
1. Identify each item as a factor or dimension
2. Extract those items classified as dimensions
3. Select recurrent words that appear within the selected items indicative of dimensions
4. Group those words which are semantically equivalent
5. Create a matrix of word sets (in columns) versus items (in rows)
6. Compare each item against each word set and give it a point if the item contains the word or a
synonym of it
7. Add the total points for each word to show its weight according to the recurrence in the list (higher
counts are considered more indicative of a dimension)
The list of 128 word sets initially selected as potential dimensions of DFR comprises: Accelerate,
Access, Accreditation/Compliance/Certify, Action/Activity, Admissible/Credible, Advise, Alert,
Analysis/Intelligence, Anonymous, Apply/Conduct/Establish/Execute/Implement/Perform, Approve,
Architecture, Archive/Custody/Preserve/Protect/Storage, Assessment/Measure/Indicator/Statistics/Test,
Asset, Assurance, Attack/Risk/Threat, Audit, Authenticate/Authorize/Identity/Log (people), Available,
Awareness, Best Practice, Business, Capability/Ability, Case/Event/Incident, Chain/Flow, Cloud,
Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule, Collaborate/Interact, Collect/Acquire/Extract/Retain, Commitment,
Communicate/Disseminate/Notify/Present/Report, Computer/Hardware/Server, Contact,
Containment/Defense/Resilience, Context/Environment/External, Control, Coordinate, Cost, Create,
Culture, Customer, Data/Information/Record, Delete, Demonstration/Evidence/Proof,
Detection/Monitoring/Surveillance, Deter/Disrupt/Interrupt/Limit, Develop, Digital, Document,
Education/Training, Electronic, Emergency, Enforcement, Escalate, Forensic, Formal, Functionality,
Governance, Hierarchy/Structure, Hypothesis, Identify/Classify, Impact, Industry, Infrastructure, Integrity,
Inter/Multi-disciplinary, Internal, Intrusion, Investigate, Expertise/Knowledge/Literacy/Skill, Lab, Lead, Live,
Maintenance, Manage/Adm/Handling, Mature, Media, Mitigate/Minimize, Mobile, Model, Need, Network,
Objective, Obligation, Organization/Corporate, People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User, Physical, Plan, Policy,
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Prepare/Prevent, Privilege, Procedure/Process/Operation/Method, Professional, Program, Prosecute,
Quality/Effectiveness, Readiness, Recover, Reliable, Reputation/Status, Resource, Response,
Responsibility/Role, Review, Search, Security, Select, Service, Social, Software, Source, Space/Location,
Standard, Strategy, Support, System, Target, Task, Team, Technique/Technology, Time,
Tools/Equipment, Traceability, Transport, Use, Wireless.
The repetition of nominations indicates consensus, throughout the literature, on the existence of a
relevant dimension denoted by the word(s), while allowing reduction of the number of potential
dimensions. Indicator items that do not contain any of the words of the selected dimensions, are then
assigned to a created dimension, grouped together to make other eventual dimensions, left alone as an
independent dimension or reconsidered as a factor.
It became clear, from this selection, that indicators of DFR classified under this framework of
dimensions would belong to many of them at the same time. In addition, 128 dimensions are too many to
be useful for a practical framework. Further analysis revealed that each one of the 128 terms belongs to
one of three categories of words, those which refer to entities, those referring to actions, and those
referring to conditions. The impact list of Table 1 below shows the number of items associated to each
word from the most to the least frequent, and their classification into these three types of words.
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Table 1. Frequency impact of word sets indicating dimensions

Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Terms Impact List
Term
Procedure/Process/Operation/Method
Archive/Custody/Preserve/Protect/Storage
Demonstration/Evidence/Proof
Data/Information/Record
Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule
Forensic
Security
Policy
Digital
People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User
Technique/Technology
Manage/Adm/Handling
Case/Event/Incident
Collect/Acquire/Extract/Retain
Education/Training
Expertise/Knowledge/Literacy/Skill
Investigate
Analysis/Intelligence
Organization/Corporate
Response
System
Accreditation/Compliance/Certify
Computer/Hardware/Server
Tools/Equipment
Plan
Chain/Flow
Deter/Disrupt/Interrupt/Limit
Communicate/Disseminate/Notify/Present/Report
Detection/Monitoring/Surveillance
Attack/Risk/Threat
Capability/Ability
Develop
Premises/Site/Space/Workspace
Apply/Conduct/Establish/Execute/Implement/Perform
Authenticate/Authorize/Identity/Log (people)
Awareness
Business
Context/Environment/External
Infrastructure
Maintenance
Prepare/Prevent
Team
Document
Network
Responsibility/Role
Admissible/Credible
Architecture
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Count
56
47
47
46
45
42
39
37
33
31
30
27
26
23
20
20
20
19
17
17
17
16
15
15
14
13
13
12
12
11
11
11
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
7
6
6

Type
Entity
Action
Entity
Entity
Entity
Condition
Condition
Entity
Condition
Entity
Entity
Action
Entity
Action
Condition
Condition
Action
Action
Entity
Action
Entity
Condition
Entity
Entity
Entity
Entity
Action
Action
Condition
Entity
Condition
Action
Entity
Action
Action
Condition
Entity
Entity
Entity
Condition
Action
Entity
Entity
Entity
Condition
Condition
Entity

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Assessment/Measure/Indicator/Statistics/Test
Cloud
Governance
Identify/Classify
Integrity
Readiness
Anonymous
Collaborate/Interact
Control
Cost
Culture
Enforcement
Jurisdiction
Physical
Resource
Software
Accelerate
Action/Activity
Hierarchy/Structure
Inter/Multi-disciplinary
Internal
Program
Quality/Effectiveness
Transport
Use
Approve
Assurance
Audit
Available
Containment/Defense/Resilience
Coordinate
Hypothesis
Lead
Strategy
Asset
Commitment
Electronic
Formal
Intrusion
Lab
Live
Mitigate/Minimize
Reliable
Review
Standard
Time
Traceability
Access
Advise
Alert
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6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Action
Entity
Condition
Action
Condition
Condition
Condition
Action
Action
Condition
Condition
Condition
Condition
Condition
Entity
Entity
Action
Action
Condition
Condition
Condition
Entity
Condition
Action
Condition
Action
Condition
Action
Condition
Condition
Action
Entity
Action
Entity
Entity
Condition
Condition
Condition
Entity
Entity
Condition
Action
Condition
Action
Condition
Entity
Condition
Condition
Action
Action

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Best Practice
Contact
Create
Customer
Delete
Emergency
Escalate
Functionality
Impact
Industry
Mature
Media
Mobile
Model
Need
Objective
Obligation
Privilege
Professional
Prosecute
Recover
State
Search
Select
Service
Social
Source
Support
Target
Task
Wireless

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Condition
Action
Action
Entity
Action
Condition
Action
Condition
Condition
Condition
Condition
Entity
Condition
Condition
Condition
Entity
Condition
Condition
Condition
Action
Action
Condition
Action
Action
Action
Condition
Entity
Condition
Entity
Entity
Condition

These categories can be dimensions by themselves because they present different perspectives
from which to approach the problem. This means that the DFR status can be seen from the perspective of
the processes involved, from the perspective of certain conditions that together represent the DFR status
or from the perspective of which entities, on which those conditions and processes operate, must be
considered to evaluate the level of DFR in an organization. In addition, the interactions among the three
groups of words, naturally describe indicators of DFR status. Entities can be the object and subject of
different processes and achieve different conditions. Processes can also fulfill or achieve a specific
condition.
One reason to not use these three categories of words as dimensions is that each would include
too many indicators as many other terms within each category seem to be relevant and independent from
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the others. Another reason is their poor usefulness in helping to discriminate indicators. Let us take an
example. Imagine that we classify students into those who study biology, those who are above 21 years
old, and those who are born in California. Several students would belong to all categories at the same
time. Therefore, the dimensions major, age and birth place would lack discriminant validity. Therefore, we
should choose either major, age or birthplace as a first level of categorization. Likewise, we should
choose either entities, conditions or actions as a first level of categorization because indicators can easily
belong to all of the simultaneously. Despite the reasonableness of this approach it is hardly adopted in
the reviewed literature. For the purpose of this research, minimizing overlapping among dimensions is
important.
Although any of the groups of word sets can be selected as the initial perspective, conditions and
actions are slightly more conceptual whereas entities include mostly tangible elements or elements of
easier recognition. A glimpse to the impact list of this word sets in Table 1, also reveals the prevalence of
entities at the top of the list - half of the top 30 words are entities -, which indicates that more indicators
can be directly classified according to the entity they refer to than according to an action or condition they
refer to. Therefore, only word groups representing entities will be used as potential dimensions. Because
all actions and conditions found owe their existence to their association to one of the entities, any relevant
factor of DFR will be classified into at least one dimension. Moreover, all actions are included in the
“Procedure/Process/Operation/Method” entity because all actions are themselves a process or a stage in
a process. The “Entities” group comprises terms such as procedures, data, people, and law, which are
expected to define the domains within which indcators are circumscribed. By implementing this
methodology the space of possible dimensions is reduced to 42. The following list shows the set of words
grouped as entities with their respective impact.
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Table 2. Word sets indicating dimensions classified as entities
Term

Count

Procedure/Process/Operation/Method

56

Demonstration/Evidence/Proof

47

Data/Information/Record

46

Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule

45

Policy

37

People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User

31

Technical/Technology

30

Case/Event/Incident

26

Organization/Corporate

17

System

17

Computer/Hardware/Server

15

Tools/Equipment

15

Plan

14

Chain/Flow

13

Attack/Risk/Threat

11

Premises/Site/Space/Workspace

10

Business

9

Context/Environment/External

9

Infrastructure

9

Team

9

Document

8

Network

8

Architecture

6

Cloud

6

Resource

5

Software

5

Program

4

Hypothesis

3

Strategy

3

Asset

2

Intrusion

2

Lab

2

Time

2

Customer

1

Media

1

Objective

1

Service

1

Source

1

Target

1

Task

1
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Several terms show high recurrence among the items extracted from the literature, while other
terms with fewer repetitions seem to be relevant and independent enough to be included as unique
dimensions. There is, however, a big difference between the top and the bottom of the list in terms of
recurrence. While terms at the top repeat tens of times, there are several terms at the bottom that appear
only one or few times throughout the items selected as dimensions. Although the lack of convergence
around a term among authors may indicate that such terms are not dimensions, it can also mean that
some of these terms can be regrouped into better defined dimensions.
For example, the terms Plan, Program, Objective, Target, Task and Strategy are all elements of
the digital forensics strategic plan of the organization and can be put together; the term Document fits well
with Data, Information goes with Record; Intrusion can be grouped with Attack, Risk and Threat go well
together; Business goes with Organization/Corporate; Customer and Team can join the terms referring to
People; Assets fits with Resources; Lab with Workspace; and Tools/Equipment with Computer and
Hardware. In the context of the new list, the term Policy, which makes a category by itself with 37 counts,
could be placed at the same level of Rules and Guidelines, which as a group are distinct from all other
terms. These associations among terms would have been very difficult to detect in earlier stages of this
research.
As for the low-frequency terms that remain in the list (i.e. Hypothesis, Time, Media and Source), a
second look at their originator items gives important information to make decisions on them as potential
dimensions or not. The three times that the term Hypothesis shows up, it originates from the same paper,
hence there is probably not a real recurrence in the literature for it, and it can be discarded as a
dimension. The term Time comes from two different papers, and it is the judgement of the researchers
that Time gives a relevant and unique perspective as to be kept as a potential dimension. Source and
Media appear a single time each and might not be good descriptors of dimensions. The regrouping of
word sets of potential dimensions with their aggregate counts is listed below.
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Table 3. Potential dimensions extracted from Literature Review
Dimensions
Code/Guideline/Law/Policy/Requirement/Rule
Procedure/Process/Operation/Method
Data/Document/Information/Record
Demonstration/Evidence/Proof
Customer/People/Personnel/Stakeholder/Team/User
Computer/Equipment/Hardware/Server/Tools
Technical/Technology
Case/Event/Incident
Business/Corporate/Organization
Plan/Program/Strategy/Objective/Target/Task
System
Chain/Flow
Attack/Intrusion/Risk/Threat
Lab/Premises/Site/Space/Workspace
Context/Environment/External
Infrastructure
Network
Asset/Resource
Architecture
Cloud
Software
Time

Count
82
56
54
47
41
30
30
26
26
24
17
13
13
12
9
9
8
7
6
6
5
2

It seems like these 22 groups of words selected represent the most internally consistent and
externally differentiated categories where DFR factors can be placed. However, this selection is
submitted to the judgement of qualified reviewers in order to validate the discriminant and convergent
validity of the groups through a Q-Sort test.
Q-Sort Test
The 22 selected dimensions include 65 words. The reviewers are given the 65 words, which they
classify in as few as possible unique categories containing only the words required to give sense to the
dimension. This is a slight variation over conventional Q-sort tests in that no pre-established categories
were suggested to respondents. Reviewers were free to assign as many categories as they wanted, each
with as many words as they deemed appropriate.19 reviewers completed the Q-sort test. They are either
technical people with experience in information systems and security, graduate students in information
systems or computer sciences, or faculty. Each reviewer worked independently. All tests took place in
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December, 2015. The instructions for the classification task can be seen in Appendix C. A summary of
the demographics of respondents is shown below as number of respondents in each category:

Table 4. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Age)
Reviewer's Age
Below 18 (1)

0

18 to 25 (2)

2

26 to 33 (3)

6

34 to 41 (4)

4

42 to 49 (5)

4

50 to 57 (6)

2

Above 57 (7)

1

Table 5. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Gender)
Reviewer's Gender
Male (1)

11

Female (2)

8

Table 6. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (IS Experience)
Reviewer's Experience in Information Systems
Less than 1 (1)

0

1 to 5 (2)

3

6 to 10 (3)

4

11 to 15 (4)

3

16 to 20 (5)

5

21 to 25 (6)

0

More than 25 (7)

4

Table 7. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (InfoSec Experience)
Reviewer's Experience in Information Security
Less than 1 (1)

4

1 to 5 (2)

6

6 to 10 (3)

4

11 to 15 (4)

2

16 to 20 (5)

1

21 to 25 (6)

1

More than 25 (7)

1
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Table 8. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Self-Assessment)
Reviewer's Selfvaluation of Expertise in Security
Layman (1)

2

Minimal (2)

1

Below average (3)

0

Average (4)

2

Above average (5)

7

Superior (6)

5

Expert (7)

2

The results of the sorting were organized and prepared for analysis using Microsoft Excel. The
file with the raw data was named Data0 and imported into R (the open source and domain-specific
programming language for statistics and data analysis). This research applies an unsupervised data
mining technique called association rules in order to detect possible dimensions. Association rules are the
algorithms used to perform market basket analysis through which the co-occurrence of products among
transactions in a store is looked for in order to gain insights on cross-selling opportunities. It was deemed
appropriate to apply the same technique in this research because the occurrence of products in
transactions is very similar to the occurrence of words in selected categories chosen by respondents of
the Q-sort test.
Two differences exist between these two scenarios. First, whereas basket analysis aims to find
causation relationships between products, the sole coexistence of words is enough indication of a
category in this research. Second, unlike transactions, where a product can be not purchased at all or
appear many more times than others, in our categories each word appears exactly as many times as
respondents completing the classification task. These characteristics are important in defining the
minimum value of parameters to assess the validity of the dimensions.
One of the earliest and most fundamental algorithms for generating association rules is called
Apriori (EMC 2015 Data Science and Big data analytics). The application of the apriori algorithm requires
the creation of a model under which rules of association are created by R. Although the rules of
association are found by the software in an unsupervised way, the parameters of the model must be
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defined by the researcher. In particular, values for the support, confidence and minimum length
parameters must be entered.
The minimum length refers to the minimum number of items that are expected in a group or an
itemset. Itemset is the generic term used by data miners using association rules for what this research
calls groups of words or group sets, categories or potential dimensions. For our case, the minimum
number for an itemset is two (2) because the research is trying to find which of the 65 words can be put
together in a category in order to reduce the potential number of categories, and at least one pair of
words will suffice to make a category.
The support parameter refers to the proportion of a specific itemset (a word or group of words)
that is expected to be found among the selections of respondents. In this research, there are 19
respondents; hence, itemsets that are selected by at least 10 respondents have the support of the
majority. Given that the total itemsets selected by the 19 respondents is 252 (see summary of Data0
below), the minimum value for the support parameter is 10/252 or 0.03968254. Beacuse an itemset
cannot be selected more than once by a respondent, the maximum possible support for any itemset is
19/252 or 0.075396825.
The confidence value indicates the probability that an itemset A is chosen in a selection given
that another itemset B was chosen in the same selection. This probability is calculated by comparing the
total times that the itemset A is selected with the total times that the itemset A is selected along with the
given itemset B. In our case, each given itemset (a word or group of words) is selected exactly 19 times,
once by each respondent. Therefore, an acceptable value for confidence that an itemset A implies the
presence of another itemset B in the same selection is that at least 10 respondents put itemset A and
itemset B together in the same category. This value is 10/19 or 0.5263.
Analysis of Q-Sort Test Using Data Mining Association Rules
Once the data is collected from the Q-sort tests, it is organized and imported to R, where the
summary(data) instruction provides the characteristics of the data set:
Summary of Data0
Categories as itemMatrix in sparse format with:
252 rows (Itemsets/categories)
65 columns (items) and a density of 0.07539683
Most frequent items:
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Architecture
Asset
Attack
Business
Case
19
19
19
19
19
1140
Itemset/Category length distribution:
Sizes: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16 17 18 21 22
Number of categories: 43 28 35 30 25 28 23 7 6 8 6 2 5 1 1 2 1 1
Descriptive Statistics:
Min.
1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1.000 2.000
4.000
4.901 6.250
22.000

(Other)

In the R output shown above, 252 rows indicate that a total of 252 categories were selected; “65
columns” indicate the number of words to be classified. The “Most frequent items” is a list of the top five
words most chosen (which in our case is irrelevant because all words are chosen 19 times, although it
confirms that all selections are complete). The “Itemset/Category length distribution” shows the frequency
of categories’ sizes. For example, categories of one element where chosen 43 times, while categories of
17, 18, 21 and 22 words were chosen only once each. Finally, the “Descriptive statistics” show that the
minimum words per category is one, while the maximum is 22, and the average size of a category in
number of words is close to 5.
Our sparse matrix has a size of 16,380 (252 groups times 65 words) and a density of
0.07539683. This indicates that 1,235 selections were made (16380*0.07539683), which is correct
because each of the 19 respondents assigned each of the 65 words (19*65=1,235). This is another way
to assure that no words were missing or misspelled or counted twice. Excel’s filters and find functions
were also used to assure this. The 19 respondents chose a total of 252 groups or categories, which gives
an average of 13.26 dimensions per respondent (252/19). The mean size of a group is 4.9, but it must be
an integer number, so we should say it is 5. Data0 is used as the raw data to create the model called
Model0 with the parameters adopted. The instruction to build Model0 in R is: > Model0<-apriori(Data0,

parameter = list(support=0.03968, confidence=0.5263, minlen=2)).
The first part of the output (attached in Appendix D to facilitate replication of the analysis), show
the type of algorithm implemented (Apriori), the values of the parameters used by the algorithm, and
times of internal operations in the computations.
The summary of Model0 below shows that, under these conditions, the algorithm finds 403 rules
of which 156 involved 2 words, 135 rules involved 3 words, 76 rules involved 4 words, 30 rules involved 5
words, and 6 rules involved 6 words. The “lhs” and “rhs” terms in the output refer to the left and right hand
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sides of the rules, respectively. This is because, as explained above, the Apriori algorithm is mostly used
for market basket analysis looking for rules where the existence of a product on the left implies the
purchase of a product on the right. In our case, only the coexistence of words (instead of products) in a
category (instead of a transaction) is relevant.
Summary of Model0
Set of 403 rules
Rule length distribution (lhs + rhs): sizes
2
3
4
5
6
156
135
76
30
6
Min.
1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
2.000 2.000 3.000 2.995 4.000 6.000
Summary of quality measures:
Support
confidence
Min.: 0.03968
Min.: 0.5263
1st Qu.: 0.04365
1st Qu.: 0.6842
Median: 0.04762
Median: 0.8421
Mean: 0.04922
Mean: 0.8176
3rd Qu.:
0.05357
3rd Qu.:
Max.: 0.07540
Max.: 1.0000
Mining info:
Data; Data0
Ntransactions: 252
Support: 0.03968
Confidence: 0.5263

lift
Min.: 6.981
1st Qu.:
9.075
Median: 11.169
Mean: 10.844
0.9474
3rd Qu.:
Max.: 13.263

12.565

The complete set of rules is available as Appendix D, and can be obtained with the instruction >
inspect(Model0) in R. 403 rules result from the application of the model using the selected parameters.
The rules suggest that some words are associated with others in what can be considered a dimension of
DFR. However, many of the rules are redundant for the purpose of this research. This happens for two
reasons: first, unlike common transactions where products can be selected never or many times in a
group of transactions, words in this research are selected once by each respondent and thus appear the
same number of times (N) in the group of selections. If two words A and B appear together only once,
they both will appear N-1 times not together; hence, both have the same confidence. If the association of
these words passes the minimum parameter test of Model0, two rules will show up, one with word A
implying word B and another with word B implying word A. Association of more words follow similar logic.
The second reason for redundancy is that rules associating a subset of words that are contained
within bigger sets of associated words in other accepted rules are unnecessary. For example, if a
suggestion is accepted from a rule associating words A, B and C, six other accepted rules are redundant:
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A implying B, B implying A, B implying C, C implying B, A implying C, and C implying A. Thus, only the
rule involving A, B and C should be kept.
After trimming off unnecessary rules, only 36 rules remain. They are shown in Table 5 in the
original format resulting from R, and with their respective original number as posted in Appendix D, in
order to facilitate tracking down the trimming process. The rules are grouped in clusters representing the
dimensions found after the Q-sort test. Some of them, such as rules 335, 216, and 403, are exact
representations of researcher’s choice of dimensions, which is meaningful given that reviewers were
completely free to associate words in dimensions. Rule 363 involving four words was also predicted by
the researcher, except for a fifth word not included by the reviewers.
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Table 9. Potential dimensions after application of association rules algorithm
#
335
359
252
17

Rule

Support
0.048
0.040
0.040
0.040

Confidence
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.526

Lift
13.263
13.263
13.263
6.981

{Attack,Intrusion,Risk}
{Attack,Event,Incident}
{Attack,Target}
{Threat}

=>
=>
=>
=>

{Threat}
{Intrusion}
{Intrusion}
{Target}

234
235
240
243
54
57
63

{Site,Space}
{Site,Workspace}
{Premises,Space}
{Environment,Space}
{Premises}
{Workspace}
{Site}

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

{Workspace}
{Premises}
{Workspace}
{Workspace}
{Workspace}
{Lab}
{Environment}

0.040
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.048
0.040
0.040

1.000
0.833
1.000
0.833
0.632
0.526
0.526

13.263
11.053
13.263
11.053
8.377
6.981
6.981

93
91

{Proof}
{Evidence}

=>
=>

{Case}
{Proof}

0.040
0.063

0.526
0.842

6.981
11.169

85

{Record}

=>

{Document}

0.040

0.526

6.981

95

{Information}

=>

{Data}

0.063

0.842

11.169

279
120

{Guideline,Strategy}
{Strategy}

=>
=>

{Plan}
{Objective}

0.040
0.040

1.000
0.526

13.263
6.981

100
87
131
275

{Policy}
{Law}
{Policy}
{Guideline,Rule}

=>
=>
=>
=>

{Requirement}
{Rule}
{Procedure}
{Policy}

0.040
0.048
0.040
0.040

0.526
0.632
0.526
0.909

6.981
8.377
6.981
12.057

147
155
135
133
102

{Guideline}
{Method}
{Process}
{Process}
{Process}

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

{Procedure}
{Procedure}
{Procedure}
{Flow}
{Operation}

0.044
0.040
0.048
0.040
0.056

0.579
0.526
0.632
0.526
0.737

7.679
6.981
8.377
6.981
9.773

89

{Resource}

=>

{Asset}

0.052

0.684

9.075

216

{Corporate,Organization}

=>

{Business}

0.052

1.000

13.263

127

{Architecture}

=>

{Infrastructure}

0.044

0.579

7.679

273
97

{Code,Software}
{System}

=>
=>

{Program}
{Software}

0.044
0.040

0.846
0.526

11.223
6.981

363
367
265
137

{Computer,Hardware,Server}
{Computer,Hardware,Network}
{Equipment,Network}
{Technology}

=>
=>
=>
=>

{Equipment}
{Server}
{Hardware}
{Computer}

0.052
0.040
0.040
0.040

0.867
0.909
1.000
0.526

11.495
12.057
13.263
6.981

403

{Customer,People,Personnel,Team,User}

=>

{Stakeholder}

0.044

0.917

12.158
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Adjustment of Framework Based on Results of Q-sort Test
Exact coincidences, however, were not expected. Instead, patterns of words that frequently
appear together in reviewers’ selections are looked for. These co-occurrences are even more meaningful
if those words in identified dimensions do not appear in distinct dimensions, thus reinforcing the
characteristics of internal validity within the groups and external validity among them.
The 36 rules summarizing all supported co-occurrences display 12 distinct dimensions with no
overlapping among them. These rules include 56 out of the 65 words presented. If each of the nine
remaining words makes a dimension on its own, the result of the Q-sort test delivers a total of 21
dimensions compared to 22 dimensions initially defined. In general, the two sets of dimensions are very
similar and can be reconciled with minor adjustments described in the description of each dimension.
The application of the Q-Sort test consist on printed labels that reviewers spreaded on a table
and bundled together with rubber bands. Reviewers were told to choose a word to put on top of each
bundle of words as their choice of that dimension name. The word that is chosen more times by the
reviewers is adopted as the dimension’s name. As shown in the instructions of the Q-sort, reviewers could
have chosen super categories where other categories were included. These super categories are also
indication of the representativeness of the word as to be used as a dimension name. The basic practical
framework is determined by the dimensions within which factors can be placed. The following is the final
list of dimensions resulting from the reconciliation of the two sets of categories pre and post Q-sort test.
DFR Dimensions
1. People
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
users, customers, stakeholders, personnel, teams and people in general. There is a perfect match of the
words included in this dimension between the researcher’s categorization and the result of the Q-sort test.
“People” is the most selected word as category or super category name (14 times).
2. Business
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the business, the organization or the corporation. There is a perfect match of the words included in this
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dimension between the researcher’s categorization and the result of the Q-sort test. “Business” is the
most selected name as category or super category (12 times).
3. Events
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
events, incidents, targets, attacks, risks, intrusions, and threats. The researcher and the Q-sort test
coincide in four words included in this dimension. A representative number of reviewers associated the
words “event,” “incident,” and “target” with at least three of the others in the category. Therefore, their
inclusion seems to be consensual. “Event” is the most selected name as category or super category (14
times).
4. Technology
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the hardware, the servers, the computers, the equipment, the network, the technology, and the technical
issues. The researcher and the Q-sort test coincide in that the words computer, equipment, hardware,
and server belong together. However, the pre Q-test classification had Tools as part of this category, and
network and technology in different categories. Unlike the definition of technology as comprising
hardware and software (Kroenke 2014), the reviewers did not include any of the words of the System
category, where software is, at the levels of support and confidence expected. Likewise, the majority of
reviewers did not include here the word “technical.” The relationship between “technical” and
“technology,” though, shows up at the more lenient conditions of support 0.357 (9/252) and confidence
0.473 (9/19). Given that the pre Q-sort categorization also puts them together, “technical” is included in
this category. As for the word “tools,” the reviewers’ choice is adopted. “Technology” is the most selected
name as category or super category (13 times).
5. Information
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the information or the data. The initial category contained also “record” and “document,” but the majority
of reviewers see these two words as making a different category. “Information” is the most selected name
as category or super category (12 times).
6. Document
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This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
documents or records. Although the pre Q-test has these terms in the same category with “information”
and “data,” the reviewers seem to associate them more with the word “proof.” This can be seen by
creating a model in R with more lenient parameters (i.e., support = 0.357 or 9/252 and confidence = 0.473
or 9/19). At this level, a rule associating record and proof shows up ({Record} => {Proof} support =
0.03571429, and confidence = 0.4736842). Given this lack of agreement, this category will be kept as the
majority of reviewers see it. “Document” is the most selected name as category or super category (2
times).
7. Evidence
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the proof, the demonstration, the case, the evidence or the chain of evidence. The pre Q-test has
“demonstration” in the same category of “evidence” and “proof,” but the majority of reviewers include the
word “case” instead of “demonstration.” Still, “demonstration” is by definition the action of giving proof or
evidence, hence having it as an independent category would be redundant. Therefore, “demonstration” is
included in this category as initially proposed. Likewise, “chain” is included in this category despite not
being associated with any category by reviewers. The word “chain” is almost always used in the literature
reviewed as “the chain of evidence;” hence, this is the natural category for it. “Evidence” is the most
selected name as category or super category (13 times).
8. Environment
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the premises, the site, the space, the workspace, the lab, and the environment in general. The pre Q-sort
test did not include “environment,” but it included all other words in this category. The majority of
reviewers, however, associate “environment” with “workspace,” “space,” and “site.” Moreover, it was
considered the most comprehensive term. “Environment” is the most selected name as category or super
category (15 times).
9. Resources
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the assets, the tools or the resources in general. The category of “assets” and “resources” was predicted
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exactly as it was proposed by the majority of reviewers. The word “tools” is added because reviewers did
not agree placing it in any other category, and it is generic enough to be understood as any helpful
resource available. “Resource” is the most selected name as category or super category (21 times).
10. Infrastructure
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the architecture or the infrastructure. Both words were independent categories in the pre Q-sort test. The
reviewers’ consensus is that they are together. “Infrastructure” is the most selected name as category or
super category (6 times).
11. System
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the software, the program, the code, and the system. All words in this category were proposed in distinct
groups in the pre Q-sort test. However, the majority of reviewers put them together with no overlapping
with other categories at the levels of support and confidence assigned. “Software” and “system” are the
most selected names as category or super category (7 times), but “system” is selected more times (3) as
super category than “software” (1).
12. Methods
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the guidelines, the flow, the methods, the processes, the procedures, and the operations. “Policy” was
associated with “procedures” by reviewers. However, it was also associated with two other words in a
different category (rule and requirement), where it seems to fit better and agrees with the pre Q-sort
classification. “Guideline” is also associated with “strategy” and “plan,” which belong to a different
category. However, such an association has a weaker support than with “procedure.” Although the pre Qsort classification assigned guideline to the Law category, the evidence post Q-sort test supports leaving
it in the Methods category. “Method” is the most selected name as category or super category (13 times).
13. Law
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the law, the policies, the rules, and the requirements. “Policy” also shows up in the Methods category
associated with “procedures.” However, it has a better fit in this category where it is associated with “rule”
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and “requirement” as in the pre Q-sort classification. On the other hand, “guideline” is also associated
with “rule” and “policy.” However, such an association has a weaker support than with “procedure;”
hence, although the pre Q-sort classification assigned “guideline” to the Law category, the evidence post
Q-sort test supports leaving it in the Methods category. An additional consideration is that factors with the
word “legal” are not filtered by the word “Law;” therefore, “legal” must be added as a selection criterion
when adding indicators to the Law dimension. “Law” is the most selected name as category or super
category (8 times).
14. Strategy
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are
the strategy, the plan, the tasks, and the objectives. A majority of reviewers also associated “guideline”
with “strategy” and “plan,” but with a weaker support than the relation between “guideline” and
“procedure.” The evidence post Q-sort test supports leaving it in the Methods category. “Task” is not
supported by reviewers in any category. However, it was included in the initial classification and has a
better fit in the Strategy dimension because strategic plans are deployed through tasks. “Strategy” is the
most selected name as category or super category (10 times).
15. Miscellaneous
The words “cloud,” “time,” “external,” and “context” did not have support from a significant number
of reviewers to share the same category with any other word. They will be put in a separate dimension
where factors with unclear classification can be placed. This dimension is called miscellaneous in order to
convey the idea that it is not associated with any particular entity, but with general aspects.
Reduction of Indicators per Dimension
After the dimensions are defined, items representing factors or indicators are assigned to
dimensions. This is done, initially, by matching the words describing them with the words describing each
dimension. A sparse matrix as the one used in R is created in Excel with the list of entities (e.i., word sets
or dimensions) in the first row and the list of items (factors or indicators) in the first column, and filled with
the formula: =IFERROR(IF(SEARCH(“Dimension Word Cell”,”Factor Cell”)>0,1,0),0),
If the item mentions the entity, the intersecting cell of item and entity displays a number one,
otherwise, it displays a number zero “0”. A root word instead of the complete word is used in order to
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improve the recall of words derived from the entity. For example the root “spa” retrieves the word “spatial”
associated to “space” whereas “space” would not. A drawback is that by using “spa” the formula also
retrieves “Transparency” because “spa” is included in that word. Yet, it is better to have extra items that
can be trimmed off later, instead of losing factors that can be important in shaping dimensions. It also
does not happen often enough times to demand writing a more complex algorithm.
This matrix is loaded into MS Access in order to make selection queries for each dimension of the
items including any of the words associated to that dimension; hence, obtaining the group of items by
dimension. The fact that some items are listed in more than one dimension is acceptable and convenient
because those factors/indicators must contribute relevant content to several dimensions. Other items are
not listed in any of the dimensions because none of the words describing them is part of the words
defining a dimension. This are classified as “Unclassified” factors/indicators.
The complete list of items is sent back to Excel for further refinement. 1554 items are initially
listed, including those unclassified and duplicated. This means that 439 items are duplicated factors.
Before deleting repeated items, the list is transformed into a matrix by adding the dimensions in the first
row. Each item is assigned a number one in its intersection with a column describing the dimension it
belongs to, as shown below.

Figure 5. Extract of the list of 1554 classified factors by dimension
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In order to get rid of the duplicated items, the list is ordered by FactorID which is a key field used
to uniquely identify each item; hence, the duplicated factors/indicators are easily spotted next to each
other. Only one of the items is left in the list, preserving its association to all dimensions to which it was
assigned. In the image below records 263 and 264 corresponding to FactorID 260 are deleted and record
265 remains with number ones marked in its intersections with business, evidence, and method. A list
free of duplicates has 1115 items.

Figure 6. Extract of the list of reordered factors by FactorID to spot duplicates

There are also factors with very similar description and different FactorID. For example, training,
training of personnel, and staff training may appear as independent factors while being semantically
equivalent. Because only one is needed, duplicates must be eliminated. In order to refine the allocation of
unclassified or misclassified factors, the items are reviewed one by one, and marked with ones in the
dimensions where they can belong. By later applying a filter of items by dimension, semantically
equivalent items can be spotted and reduced to a single one.
In addition, items addressing the same topic are grouped together for further elaboration of the
appropriate questions. The figure below shows several items per cell separated by a period or a question
mark. For example, row 32 groups several items under the FactorID 465 which together inquire about the
organization’s ability to repeal attacks by implementing user authentication, firewalls and other technology
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resources. Likewise, row 33 groups items under the FactorID 58 inquiring about the organization’s ability
to perform a fast investigation in the event of an incident.

Figure 7. Extract of the list of regrouped factors without semantic duplicates

Indicators grouped this way reduce the whole list to 148 Items throughout all dimensions.
Because they still are independent phrases it is necessary to work on redacting specific phrases that can
be put in a survey such that respondents can show their level of agreement with them. Redacting the
items of the survey aims to identify the entities involved in the indicator, any relevant qualifying aspect of
the entity (the type, the amount, etc.), the action that the entity exerts or that is exerted on the entity, and
the attributes of such action that renders the factor measurable. As a result, each group of items can be
represented by one or more questions.
After re-estructuring these phrases, the number of independent questions or usable indicators
increases to 206. However, few of the independent questions coming from different groups of items were
found similar, merged into one, and assigned to the most appropriate dimension leaving. Also, given the
importance that authors give to awareness as a factor affecting DFR, two similar questions asking for the
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general perception of DFR are added at the beginning and at the end of the survey to test the impact of
the survey as an instrument of awareness of DFR.
In total, 191 questions remain.
One more revision and adjustment is performed to assure that all rephrased questions are
assigned to the dimension where they are most relevant. Provided that a professional is in charge of the
assessment and detailed analysis of some of the items can be peformed in order to respond them, this
detailed questionnaire classified by dimensions is a practical DFR framework that a practitioner can use
to assess the level of DFR in an organization in a structural way. Most questions are stated such that they
can be answered in terms of respondents’ agreement with the assertion. Few remaining questions require
numeric answers. When strong agreement or higher numeric value is associated to higher digital forensic
readiness, this correlation is positive. The theoretical relationship between each item and the DFR status,
as inferred from the literature review, is added in the column to the right of the table. In few cases, it is to
the practitioner to decide whether the response is associated to more or less DFR. This questionnaire can
also help a professional DFR specialist spot when perceptions of respondents do not match the reality of
the readiness of their organization. Questions IDs are not consecutive because the list was alphabetically
reordered by dimensions.
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Table 10. Practitioners’ DFR Framework
QID

Question

Dimension

1
2
3
4

Industry sector of the organization.
Organization size in sales.
Organization size in number of employees.
Organization size in number of customers.
The organization has a forensic culture of preserving evidence,
following digital evidence preservation processes, and acquiring
and sharing knowledge in computer security and digital forensics.
The organization has a corporate culture of secrecy such that
proactive forensics activities are kept from users and few staff
knows detailed security information.
The organization has a reputation of back-tracking intruders and
assessing their danger to society.
Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic
readiness (e.g., they show support, provide governance, and
assume full commitment, responsibility and accountability towards
the forensic program).
Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive.
This organization is exposed to many risks and threats.
Our firm has a public profile therefore protecting its reputation and
image is a corporate objective.
This organization has a high number of locations.
The organization has a quality assurance system that covers
policies, activities, procedures, documentation, and management
thereby ensuring consistency, efficiency and transparency of
technical and non-technical business processes.
The organization funding for digital forensic readiness (i.e.,
collection, analysis and preservation of digital evidence) is
sufficient.
The organization uses computer forensics to seek legal
accountability for intruder behavior.
IT security and digital forensics governance programs, policies,
services, and procedures are mature enough to guarantee
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and nonrepudiation of information.
IT security and digital forensics governance programs, policies,
services, and procedures guarantee adequate management, skills,
and resources to determine the source of an attack and the
recovery of digital evidence.
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state
of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable
digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR
as high.
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital
forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain,
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I
would rate my organization's DFR as high.
The system security architecture is documented.
The organization has an asset registry for items of electronic
equipment that could record information.

Business
Business
Business
Business

DFR
Corr.
Depends
Negative
Negative
Negative

Business

Positive

Business

Negative

Business

Positive

Business

Positive

Business
Business

Negative
Positive

Business

Positive

Business

Negative

Business

Positive

Business

Positive

Business

Positive

Business

Positive

Business

Positive

Business

Depends

Business

Positive

Document

Positive

Document

Positive

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
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The organization has a documented and validated investigation
protocol guided by best practices.
The organization has an archive of the organization’s incident,
crime and dispute history identifying each case, date, impact, entry
point of attack, security measures in place at the moment,
suspected causes that allow the incident to occur, who knew what
about the attack and when they knew it, investigative digital
forensic team rosters and roles, descriptions of incident responses
and errors, and technical and non-technical issues affecting the
success or failure of the attack.
The organization has reports on the lessons learned from
incidents, including success in dealing with and recovering from
the incident, what could have been done differently if the scenario
had occurred on a different day or at a different time (regular hours
versus off-hours) or at a different physical location (onsite versus
offsite).
The organization keeps records of user behavior with networkbased applications and documents anomalous observations.
The organization maintains a database of file hashes for common
operating system files and for deployed applications, using file
integrity checking software on important assets.
The organization maintains a change management database.
The organization maintains documented records (e.g., baselines)
of network and system configurations.
The organization has a secure location for logs storage that also
stores meta-data, such as author and date, with the record.
The organization stores records about training, procedures,
people, roles, and policies.
The organization provides security wizards for safe conduct within
the workspace environment.
The organization can safely and effectively control and document
the scene of a digital forensic incident.
The organization can conduct an onsite examination without
affecting the integrity of the original evidence.
The location of the organization makes it insecure.
Physical access to work sites and to the perimeter of any premises
that contain servers are controlled and secured with security
technologies such as physical access control, location sensors,
and closed-circuit television (CCTV).
The organization's forensic laboratories are accreditated and
frequently audited.
Computer forensic examiners in the organization have a proper
laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite
examinations.
The organization has multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless
networks, and/or a mobile platform.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization's personnel have clear
criteria on whether or not they should turn off a hacked system or
device.
The organization knows how to handle a politically sensitive or
publicly embarrassing incident.
The organization automatically preserves evidence related to a
suspicious event, via hashing, in case of an incident.
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In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to assess
the impact on stakeholders and to propose forensic analysis
hypotheses that will help identify potential charges.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization knows which forensic
tools and techniques it needs to deploy.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization knows where to look
in the system in order to identify case specific evidence supported
by event log information and Internal integrity checks.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization can anticipate its
discovery needs and accelerate its investigation to find timely and
useable evidence.
The organization is able to forecast and control the escalation of
costs when facing a digital forensic incident.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization is able to determine
whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination,
seizure and removal of the system(s).
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to
recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be
involved in a legal inquiry.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to
determine the remoteness of the crime by identifying remote web
access and establishing the location of the network intrusion
detection system relative to an intruder.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to
determine the time, timeline of events, and duration of the incident.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to
determine the nature of the incident, the type of case, and the
crime category.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization can determine the
technical skill and knowledge level of the suspect.
In case of a cyber incident, the organization is able to determine
what IT systems and types of technologies were involved, such as
standalone systems, complex networks, multi-user systems, etc.
The organizational plan of incident response incorporates policies,
procedures, personnel assignments, and/or technical requirements
to mitigate risk and prepare for events requiring digital forensic
intervention.
The incident response plan of the organization correlates events
with an established Bayesian network, determines critical
response times, and specifies when to activate the Disaster
Recovery Plan (DRP) and the Business Continuity Plan (BCP).
The organization applies an algorithm to assess evidence value by
considering its nature (content or metadata), evidencial weight
(completeness and admissibility), its temporal value (MAC times,
cookies, cache and the index.dat file), its exposure and risk, and
the cost/benefit of its retrieval..
The organization knows what information in what format is
required as evidence in a civil litigation or criminal proceeding as
well as how to use it to determine the root cause of an event.
The organization has a plan to prepare, map, store, transport,
control access to, and present evidence, preserving its integrity
and ensuring it makes a positive impact on the outcome of any
legal action.
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In case of a cyber incident, the organization can provide detailed
log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every step (e.g.
data collection, storage, examination, handling) which can
demonstrate the authenticity, credibility, and reliability of electronic
evidence, including information about the tools used.
The organization has identified, classified, and prioritized the
sources and types of potential evidence by considering the legality
and cost-effectiveness of the collection process, alternative
evidence sources, and the potential for escalation into formal
investigations involving law enforcement agencies.
The organization employs encryption standards and cryptographic
hashes for evidence files.
The organization applies a proportionality rule to collect only useful
evidence upon good cause and balances liability vs. obligation in
the retention of log data.
The amount of data produced in the organization every month is
high.
The organization knows the sources and format of its data, when
and where data is generated, the associated threats to the data,
and how data is preserved for long-term storage.
The organization requires network activity logs that lists date, time,
and user stamps for all files, and triangulates logs with other data
(e.g., timing of links, CCTV pictures, user identification records,
etc.) to be able to guarantee internal integrity of authentication logs
in client and server computers and prove timeline and association
of data to metadata, including cloud-based resources.
The organization uses statistical interpretation, data mining,
filtering techniques and pattern matching to find digital evidence.
The organization formats log data in a single format, such as
syslog.
The organization keeps data regarding the state of the file system,
patterns of physical traces and imprints (i.e., logs, audits, what is
logged, and how logging is done).
Wireless access is allowed in the organization.
The organization mantains effective controls on information flow
and channels (including remotely located logs) to prevent
anonymous activities, access to central servers and systems
housing potential evidence, access to digital forensics tools, and
anti-forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers,
steganography software etc.).
The digital and physical infrastructure and architecture have been
developed with embedded forensic capabilities in networks and
computing platforms such that all authentication attempts are
recorded, applications perform auditing, the design is fault tolerant,
and the architecture facilitates recovery.
The organization's systems security architecture configuration
follows consistent standards throughout the entire platform.
The organization implements endpoint security in order to maintain
control over its data and decrease access to forensic data.
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The organization routinely evaluates Internet activities (cookies,
temporary files, URLs, email, instant messages), checks for gaps
in the SMTP send-receiver pairs, acknowledges packet protocols,
and monitors interactions between network applications and the
traffic they generate. These monitored interactions include layer 7
of the OSI model (e.g. static and dynamic web applications, web
clients, web servers, application servers and web services).
The organization implements multitiered logging.
The organization has centralized logging and data, thus audit
records are forwarded to secure centralized log servers.
Logging features are architected to support effective incident
response.
The organization implements strong user authentication and role
based access control with the least privilege principle in mind and
with separate life-cycle related logs per user.
Strong two-factor authentication is required to access all critical
systems.
The organization implements defined procedures and public key
infrastructure (PKI) system architecture where log files relating to
access (log-in, access to all files) are separated from PKI servicesrelated logs.
Logs are shared across institutional boundaries. Information is
kept in several repositories to minimize impact in case of loss of
data.
The organization’s IT infrastructure is monitored using intrusion
detection systems (IDS), antivirus software, and spyware detection
and removal utilities in servers, workstations, removable/portable
devices, and network devices/activities (e.g. log network and host
activity). This monitoring distinguishes between hardware and
software and considers trade-offs involving IDS monitoring and
reporting.
Digital forensic tools are used for non-forensic purposes to
enhance the organization's security architecture, for example to
recover lost data.
The organization's wireless infrastructure is kept secure.
The organization has policies defining a point of contact with
authorities and how communications with external parties (e.g.
stakeholders, law enforcement, ISPs) might occur, particularly with
regard to emerging issues, potential risks, investigation results,
and evidence release.
The organization has policies clarifying consent of monitoring
without expectation of privacy/ownership of data by employees,
and conditions for Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) practices.
The organization has policies clarifying its ownership of data and
use of information systems resources by members of the
organization, including data storage in personal devices with
specific directives governing device type and the use of small/easy
to hide devices.
The organization has policies defining business scenarios that
require digital evidence, what information must be preserved under
certain circumstances and for how long, its accessibility, and the
conditions necessary to destroy it without losing history, in
compliance with records legislation.
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The organization has policies that disallow the use of its intranet
when handling digital evidence.
The organization has corporate security policies that govern digital
assets, forensic events, data collection/storage, preventive
security, and codes of conduct.
The organization implements measures to enforce forensic policies
and make staff accountable of their digital forensic responsibilities.
The organization has policies establishing the need for compliance
with the regulatory framework of fiduciary, statutory and/or
governmental regulations, even in the absence of forensic
incidents (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, and penalties for security
incidents).
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are
consistent with its personnel privacy policies and applicable
employment law.
Safeguards for sensitive information and measures for handling
inadvertent exposures are implemented.
Disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file
encryption, and anti-forensic strategies (e.g. anonymous activities,
data destruction/alteration, and onion routing) are banned.
The organization has policies defining types of risks, information
retention requirements, security countermeasures, resourcing,
intelligence, trigger events for internal investigation, when external
professional or formal investigation is required, and the actions
that may be taken
Organization policies define the legal and managerial authority
required for search and examination during ongoing investigations
to ensure compliance with information security and regulatory
requirements (e.g. rules of evidence for admissibility, 4th
Amendment issues, litigation holds, and timely reporting
obligations to a judge).
The organization has a suspicion policy used to continually review
potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, potential crimes
and disputes, and threats from opportunists, criminals, competitors
or disgruntled employees. This policy indicates what evidence of
an attack would look like and how to manage people leaving the
company.
The organization has policies for the specific jurisdictional
requirements of countries where it has an operating presence and
offers guidance on other industry-specific and multi-jurisdiction
conditions regarding admissible evidence.
The organization has policies on roles and responsibilities of all
people and external organizations involved in digital forensic
investigations, as well as separate policies for those involved in
preserving, maintaining, and examining evidence (e.g.,
response/investigative teams and security personnel).
The organization has received legal advice and review of forensic
policies and high-level procedures regarding privacy, subpoenas,
warrants, admissibility, data protection, human rights, limits to
surveillance, obligations to staff members and others, disclosure in
legal proceedings, and legal requirements and constraints on
collection and preservation of potential digital evidence.
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The organization has a broad and complete digital forensics model
defining the standardized phases (capture, store, analyze,
preserve, integrate, and present evidence) of the response and
investigation process.
The organization conducts regular compliance reviews and
updates its policies, procedures, and organizational memory
according to changes in risk assessment, the legal framework
and/or organizational requirements (e.g. moving to the cloud).
The organization has formal incident response procedures
describing the trigger events to start active monitoring and
systematic gathering of potential digital evidence (including preincident data collection), first response guidelines to preserve
evidence, when and how to report incidents, how to choose an
investigation model, and how to set action plans.
The organization has formal procedures describing packaging,
transportation, storage, handling, and preservation of physical and
digital evidence.
The organization has archive management procedures to assure
that records (including those in the cloud) possess content, context
and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability.
The organization has formal procedures to assess its needs for
digital evidence according to its risk assessment practices and its
regulatory/legal framework.
The organization has procedures (e.g., penetration tests, probes,
audit analysis of server and network logs, and alerts from incidents
detection/deterrence systems) describing the configuration and
use of active monitoring and logging mechanisms to continually
detect and deter incidents in system activities and electronic
communications, including procedures to prevent alteration of
intercepted communications.
Forensic techniques are embedded in the organization's regular
information management audits.
Information security audit procedures follow standards, guidelines,
and best practices that include protection of IT and business
systems, monitoring of the forensics process, and patch
management.
The organization has reliable procedures for gathering admissible
post-incident evidence which include: how to discover hidden data,
weighed criteria that guide the collection of evidence based on
storage volatility, sampling & reduction techniques, verifying the
integrity of the data, and how to store and manipulate data.
The organization has a formal unbiased procedure for examination
of post-incident digital and physical evidence without modifying it.
It includes choosing a forensic investigation model, a
triage/prioritization model for analysis and interpretation by
selecting which data source to check first and why, and managing
all of the tasks in the investigation process.
The organization has procedures for performing regular and
sporadic backup of systems (e.g. imaging a hard disk, capturing
volatile information or securing physical evidence), ensuring the
use of hashing functions during evidence acquisition, and retaining
backups for a specific period of time to facilitate recovery.
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The organization has policies and procedures guiding reasonable
and appropriate use of forensic tools.
The organization has procedures for performing RAM forensics
and the collection of volatile data in the order of volatility and
priority that are related to a specific organizational requirement and
that deal with the forensic blurriness affecting ﬁdelity and quantity
of evidence acquired in live digital forensics.
The organization can demonstrate due diligence and compliance
with the organization’'s policies and all applicable laws and
regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation process.
The organization has a formal process for the selection, use,
testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in the
organization's information systems, including the test and
calibration of evidence collection devices and specifying their
frequency of calibration.
The organization's forensic procedures have been reviewed by
experts and/or published in peer reviewed articles.
The organization's forensic procedures are accepted within the
relevant scientific community.
The organization's forensic procedures have known error rates.
The organization's forensic procedures state that the Daubert test
will be applied to any expert testimony.
The organization's forensic procedures have been tested and are
kept up to date.
In our organization, the forensic incident handlers do a good job of
collecting evidence about compromised systems.
The organization's non-IT staff has substantial training in digital
forensics; they understand forensics technologies and have
practical experience with them.
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics
program; they see the tangible/intangible benefits of technologies
such as anti-spyware.
Self-education on new forensic technologies is common among
personnel in the organization.
The organization's employees have knowledge of information
management.
Employees have digital forensic skills.
The organization's staff learns effectively from previous incident
response experiences.
Employees understand the organization's security policies.
The organization has identified and developed the technology and
personnel computing expertise to perform computer and network
forensics and manage legal evidence properly.
The organization has a multi-disciplinary forensic
response/investigative team, involving legal, IT, law enforcement,
business, and auditing representatives, ready to work
collaboratively on assigned roles in case of a cyber incident.
The organization's multi-disciplinary forensic
response/investigative team is internal rathern than external.
Investigators who are members of the forensic team have
education and certifications in digital forensics.
Information security auditors' assessment produces confidence in
the security system.
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The organization identifies and profiles system use, users,
suspects, attackers, and victims at risk through: (1) ID
management, (2) authorization and authentication credentials, (3)
accesibility, responsibility, and ownership of data and financial
instruments, and (4) personal information in data.
The organization monitors user behavior by tracing back the
actions of each employee and retaining application and local user
files (e.g. home directory, file properties, registry, profiles, and
signatures).
The organization uses keystroke monitoring on its computers.
The organization traces custody of an individual's devices for
upgrades and change of office or role.
The organization's investigators' background is more scientific than
practical.
Interactions among the organization's forensic staff, other
personnel, and external institutions involved in forensics or security
processes flow smoothly based on mutual trust.
Staff members have a strong understanding of the organization's
security policies.
The organization has the expertise and capabilities to distinguish
anomalous events or criminal activities from normal operational
activities.
The organization has the ability to repel attacks using tools such
as firewalls, user authentication, and diversification.
The organization has active digital forensic capabilities in live
system environments including automated live analysis,
authentication of collected data, and containment of incidents.
Corporate physical and digital assets are classified and controlled
considering their value, data linked to them, and likelihood of being
targeted.
The organization has the technology (e.g. relevant software and
automated tools) and human capacity to capture all types of
communications and store, analyze, preserve, integrate, secure,
and present admissible evidence in order to hold intruders
accountable in a court of law, and pursue legal remedies.
The organization lists the technologies and processes needed for
the forensic readiness program, and coordinates the deployment
of these resources.
The organization has forensic toolkits that each include a hardware
write blocker, e-camera, gloves, forms, supplies, etc.
The organization removes or relocates critical assets for better
management and implementation of the forensic program.
The organization possesses and implements updated techniques
and automated tools to investigate anti-forensics methods.
The organization has the ability and resources to recreate the
investigated environment.
The organization has sufficient decryption capabilities to counter
the increasingly pervasive use of encryption technologies.
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The organization offers personnel and IT staff standardized
training and certification programs in digital forensics including
information security awareness, sensitivity of evidence, how to
recognize and respond to an incident, roles and legal aspects of
the digital evidence process, latest threats, use of IT and forensic
tools, forensic policies' content, forensic examination, best
practices in information security, and proper staff incident
response behavior.
The organization calculates the cost-benefit of collecting and
analyzing digital evidence by weighing benefits against threats and
risks, internal vs outsourcing costs, and return on security
investment (ROSI).
The organization performs a risk assessment considering
vulnerabilities, threats, unknown risks, level of digital evidence
exposure to threats, potential loss, cost of measures and threats,
and benefit of measures.
The organization provides appropriate ongoing training
opportunities to managers, internal investigators, and members of
the Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT).
The organization has a business continuity plan to minimize
interruption to the business while gathering admissible evidence,
to provide or restore essential services during an attack, to avoid
ﬁnancial loss, and to recover assets using replication or backup.
The impact of the implementation of digital forensic readiness in
network operation, architecture, transmission frequencies, power
consumption, overhead or sensitivity has been high.
Corporate policies and procedures are developed collaboratively
using collaboration tools to maintain a shared workspace.
The organization prioritizes roles over positions, differentiates
information management from systems/technology management,
and segregates duties of digital forensics and information security
teams.
The organization has dedicated roles relating to security and
forensics, such as team leader, incident investigator, digital
forensics specialist, work space administrator, security/system
administrator, security/system architect, prosecutor, law
enforcement executive, point of contact/media liaison, and legal
adviser.
The corporate information security best practices include collection
and preservation of potential digital evidence.
The corporate governance model development process was
informed by a well-developed forensic readiness policy.
The organization's information systems development life cycle
(ISDLC) includes collection and preservation of potential digital
evidence.
The organization understands digital forensics training
requirements and encourages both formal and informal learning.
The organization looks for external policies, regulations, legislation
and recommendations to shape its policies, prevent incidents, and
implement control practices, countermeasures, and risk
management.
The organization follows best practice security standards that have
been validated by an international information security certification
process.
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The organization controls security information through dashboards
and metrics that continuously and dynamically measure
information security performance.
The organization uses an external company such as an
Independent Center for Incident Management (ICIM) to perform
forensic analysis but has internal triaging capabilities.
The organization manages external digital forensic investigators,
establishes their capabilities and response times, and validates the
accreditation of their laboratories.
The organization participates in Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs).
The organization's risk assessment process evaluates potential
losses, classifies digital evidence exposure correlated with threats,
checks security through audits, calibrates audits, and revisits
residual risks after controls are implemented.
The organization knows and adopts standards of the digital
forensics discipline, including automated practices, and strives to
monitor emerging academic digital forensics research.
The organization performs security benchmarking to assess the
preparedness of competitors and enemies.
The organizational structure (e.g rank hierarchy, privileges, and
roles and responsibilities model) has been designed or reviewed
with consideration given to digital forensics needs.
Information technology and information security objectives are
aligned with the business mission and objectives.
The organization's privacy policy and controls are aligned with the
objectives of the digital forensics readiness program (e.g.
compliance with regulation & legislation, internal investigation,
forensic response, and legal evidence management).
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about
admissibility and reliability of digital evidence for our organization
is difficult.
Our organization needs to produce reliable evidence:
The organization's security system is reliable.
The organization possesses automated systems, such as intrusion
detection systems, which provide alarms upon detection of
potential incidents and provide reports to track incidents and
perform audit trails.
The organization implements tamper-proof mechanisms for its
systems.
The organization's security configuration provides hardware
independence from operating systems.
The organization uses security event management software (SEM)
or incident management software with an event triggering function.
All relevant devices and systems in the organization are
synchronized with logging time recorded according to time-zones.
Information systems -- including operating systems, hardware, and
software applications -- are properly conﬁgured for security.
The organization supervises the responsible use of appropriate
and current digital forensic tools and systems, including automated
evidence collection systems such as IDS.
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The organization uses imaging technologies with lossless
compression and hashing functions to preserve forensic evidence.
The organization's technology -- such as hardware, software, and
forensic tools -- has been certified or validated.
The organization's storage technology is appropriate in capacity
and functionality, including storage visualization abilities.
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Higher Level Questionnaire
Because it will probably demand considerable time and knowledge for an individual respondent to
complete this questionnaire, a higher-level questionnaire is developed to perform exploratory factor
analysis and develop a statistically supported framework of DFR. While the dimensions previously
developed are useful to define the practitioners’ DFR framework and facilitate the reduction of the number
of indicators, a conceptual model requires a different approach where the indicators are grouped
according to their mutual, or lack of it, correlation. It is also important to note that items distilled from the
literature may comprehend both formative and reflective indicators. Therefore, it is necessary to make this
distinction.
Based on the definition of formative and reflective indicators, this research considers formative
those factors adding up to a better status of DFR, while deeming reflective those which are a perception
of respondents. In the first case, the respondent simply acknowledges a reality, whereas in the second
he/she gives his/her opinion. Figure 8 shows an extract of this classification as extant or perceptual
indicators, using factors 465, 58, 9, 628, and 656, previously presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 8. Extract of list of extant and perceptual questions

The higher level questionnaire reduces the length and amount of questions by omitting lowerlevel details associated to some questions. For example, instead of asking whether the organization has
a laboratory with proper tools and technologies (item 59), whether such laboratory is certified and
frequently audited (item 58), and whether its technology has been validated (item 189), a higher-level
question simply asks about the existence of the laboratory and the forensic tools. The certification and
validation of the laboratory and tools are at a deeper level of specialization in DFR that is not expected
from most organizations at this moment. If having a laboratory and tools for forensic investigation turns
out to be a good predictor of the forensic preparedness then further assessment should investigate more
specific conditions of those tools and laboratory.
Another characteristic of the higher-level questions is that they can be classified in one of five
subtypes. It can be seen that most items refer to something that the organization has, something that it
does or something that it knows. Few remaining items are demographic characteristics of the firm or a
respondent’s perception of an organizational situation. Therefore, we can name the subtypes as:
demographic, has, does, knows, and perceived. This reordering facilitates respondent’s understanding of
the questions.
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Most questions are Likert-type questions. Few other questions are Yes/No or ranges, and when
possible, semantic differential scales are used because they yield the same statistic results, increase
nomological validity and reduce time response (Chin, Johnson & Schwarz 2008). In order to make it
easier for respondents to identify the subject of the questions, each specific group has one general
introduction. Therefore, respondents know that all items below refer to a “has”, “does”, “knows” or
“perception” of the organization. Although most “demographics”, “has”, “does”, and “knows” questions
correspond to the originally labeled extant indicators, there are few exceptions. For example, while the
higher-level questionnaire asks whether the firm “has” a culture of secrecy, the researcher reads this as a
perceptual question based on the judgement of the respondent. The same happens with several “knows”
questions because whether the firm knows something or not is decided by the respondent’s perception.
On the contrary, it is more unlikely that something that the respondent acknowledges as existing
in, or being performed by the organization, is simply a matter of opinion. In general, questions move from
extant to perceptual in the following order of subtypes: demographics, has, does, knows, perceived. The
list of the 76 higher-level questions is attached as Appendix E and presents items subtypes, a new ID
identifier per question, and the items from the detailed questionnaire that are covered by each item of the
higher-level questionnaire, to facilitate back tracking.
Factor Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is performed on the extant and perceptual factors first in a pilot
study and later on the final study. Given that factor analysis can be used as a clustering technique to
group respondents, let us make clear that the objective of this EFA is to group variables and not
respondents.
For the perceptual factors, this research uses maximum likelihood as the extraction method, thus
assuming that these factors are a reflection of the real DFR status. As for the extant factors, these are
considered formative of the DFR construct; therefore, they are treated as components, and the principal
components extraction method is used in this case. In the pilot study, both extractions were done using
SPSS with the orthogonal varimax rotation, which maximizes the variance of the loadings of variables
within factors. The highest loading of an indicator, then, defines to what factor it should be assigned.
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Pilot Test for Factor Analysis
The pilot test is performed to test distribution of the variables - in this case the questions - on
factors. For this research, the unit of measure is the organization. Therefore, it was required to have
direct feedback from IT professionals working on IT security in each one of the organizations because
they are the most qualified witnesses of the DFR status of their firms. In addition, they are the ones who
better understand the technical terminology used in the questions. Because the surveys were directed to
this specific respondent profile, many surveyed were discarded for not complying with the requirements.
20 out of 151 respondents who took the survey qualified as valid surveyed. The demographics of these
respondents in terms of number of respondents per level in each question are shown below:

Table 11. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Age)
Respondent's age
Below 18

0

18 to 25

2

26 to 40

10

41 to 60

8

Above 60

0

Table 12. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Gender)
Respondent's gender
Male

14

Female

6

Table 13. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Tenure)
Respondent's years in the organization
Less than 2

0

2 to 5

4

6 to 10

10

11 to 20

6

More than 20

0
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Table 14. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Position)
Respondent's current position
IT Director

8

It Analyst

1

CIO

2

CEO

1

Co Op

1

Superv.

1

CISO

1

Systems Architect

1

IT VP

3

Mngr

1

Table 15. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Years in position)
Respondent's years in position
Less than 2

1

2 to 5

9

6 to 10

8

11 to 20

2

More than 20

0

Each IT professional provides information about a specific organization. The demographics of
these organizations in terms of number of organizations per level in each question are as follows:
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Table 16. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Industry)
Organization's Industry
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer)

0

Online Retailer

1

Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP)

0

Communications Carrier

0

Aerospace

0

Banking/Finance/Accounting

3

Insurance/Real Estate/Legal

0

Federal Government (including military)

0

State/Local Government

1

Medical/Dental/Healthcare

3

Transportation/Utilities

1

Construction/Architecture/Engineering

1

Data Processing Services

1

Wholesale/Retail/Distribution

1

Education

4

Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment

0

Research/Development Lab

0

Business Services/Consultant

0

Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals)

0

Computer/Network Services/Consultant

4

Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor

0

Other

0

Table 17. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Sales)
Organization's Year Sales in $1000
Less than 50

0

Between 50 and 200

0

Between 200 and 500

1

Between 500 and 2,000

7

More than 2,000

12
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Table 18. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Employees)
Organization's Number of Employees
1 to 50

0

Between 51 and 200

3

Between 201 and 500

6

Between 501 and 2000

6

More than 5,000

5

Table 19. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Customers)
Organization's Number of Customers
1 to 20

0

Between 21 and 200

1

Between 201 and 1,000

4

Between 1,001 and 10,000

11

More than 10,000

4

Table 20. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Data)
Organization's Monthly Produced Data
Less than 10 MB

0

Between 10 and 500 MB

0

Between 0.5 and 50 GB

2

Between 50 GB and 1 TB

5

More than 1 TB

13

Results of Pilot Study
18 questions represent perceptual variables and are, therefore, included in the search for factors
that reflect the DFR status. As shown in the rotated factor matrix delivered by SPSS, six factors were
found as representative of these 18 variables. A gray background shows the highest loading of each
variable.
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Table 21. Perceptual factors extracted from EFA
Rotated Factor Matrix

a

Factor
1
Per1

2

-0.461

0.024

Per2

0.87

Per3

-0.261

Per4

3

4

5

6

-0.276

0.118

-0.556

0.036

-0.269

0.006

-0.004

0.108

0.152

0.731

-0.181

0

0.269

0.022

-0.225

0.677

0

-0.063

0.117

0.031

Per5

-0.014

0.238

-0.062

0.079

0.965

0.015

Per6

-0.067

0.433

-0.33

-0.437

0.04

0.158

Per7

0.278

-0.231

0.22

0.043

-0.027

0.904

Per8

0.799

-0.231

0.27

0.126

0.141

0.102

Per9

0.354

-0.288

0.457

0.148

0.202

-0.009

Per10

0.701

-0.133

-0.013

0.431

-0.061

-0.149

Per11

-0.182

0.927

-0.09

-0.173

-0.112

-0.238

Per12

0.821

-0.225

0.282

-0.219

-0.028

0.128

Per13

0.07

0.085

0.72

0.163

-0.112

0.335

Per14

-0.026

-0.097

0.058

0.991

0.042

0.038

Per15

0.528

-0.194

0.444

0.325

0.263

-0.085

Per16

0.426

-0.298

0.204

0.306

-0.067

-0.541

Per17

0.476

-0.347

0.768

-0.084

0.146

-0.134

Per18

-0.712

0.162

-0.507

0.09

0.027

0.019

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations.

Factor analysis shows that six perceptual factors extracted explain 77% of the total variance
explained by the set of 18 perceptual variables. The name of each factor was chosen based on the
variable that has the highest loading on it, while making it general enough to account for all other
variables in the factor. The following is a list of the factors with their corresponding variables and loadings,
as well as the percentage of the variance of all variables that the factor explains. The questions are
added as they show up in the questionnaire, but it should be remembered that they are introduced as
something that the organization has, does, knows or is perceived, thus the reader should add those
words accordingly.
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Table 22. Perceptual variables per factor from pilot study
Perceptual Factor 2: Hesitation
Variance
15%
Var
Load
Question
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability
Per11 0.927
of digital evidence for our organization is hard.
Per3 0.731 Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive.
Per4

0.677

This organization is exposed to many risks and threats.

Perceptual Factor 3: Awareness
Variance 12.5%
Var

Load

Question
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic
Per17 0.768
incident.
Per13 0.72 A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users)
The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and
Per9 0.457
security policies.
Perceptual Factor 4: Knowledge
Variance 9.7%
Var

Load

Question

Per14

0.991

Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident.

Per6

-0.44

The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure.

Perceptual Factor 5: Self-image
Variance 8.5%
Var

Load

Per5

0.965

Question

Our firm has a public profile.
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness
Per1 -0.56 to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would
rate my organization's DFR as:
Perceptual Factor 6: Confidence
Variance 7.8%
Var

Load

Per7

0.904

Per16

-0.54

Question
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its
personnel privacy policies and applicable employment law.
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation
in case of a cyber incident.

53 questions were considered extant variables and therefore included in the search for factors
that form the DFR status. As shown in the rotated factor matrix delivered by SPSS, 11 factors were found
as representative of these 53 variables.

96

Table 23. Extant factors extracted from PCA
Rotated Component Matrix

Ext1
Ext2
Ext3
Ext4
Ext5
Ext6
Ext7
Ext8
Ext9
Ext10
Ext11
Ext12
Ext13
Ext14
Ext15
Ext16
Ext17
Ext18
Ext19
Ext20
Ext21
Ext22
Ext23
Ext24
Ext25
Ext26
Ext27
Ext28
Ext29
Ext30
Ext31
Ext32
Ext33
Ext34
Ext35
Ext36
Ext37
Ext38
Ext39
Ext40
Ext41
Ext42
Ext43
Ext44
Ext45
Ext46
Ext47
Ext48

1
0.229
-0.005
0.091
0.452
0.583
-0.014
0.182
0.198
0.524
0.363
0.029
0.287
0.239
0.326
0.024
0.722
0.51
0.228
0.791
0.703
0.173
0.313
0.221
0.199
0.766
0.104
0.44
0.592
-0.028
-0.048
0.672
0.288
0.388
0.09
0.117
0.382
0.3
0.325
0.628
0.83
0.021
0.722
0.43
0.83
0.842
0.43
0.611
0.284

2
0.646
0.167
-0.103
0.576
0.626
0.651
0.873
0.673
0.265
0.704
0.04
0.322
0.308
0.255
0.082
0.088
0.479
0.249
0.313
0.386
0.16
0.604
0.094
0.177
-0.106
0.231
0.103
0.044
0.455
0.202
0.228
0.076
0.454
0.078
0.272
0.466
0.245
0.186
0.511
0.15
0.564
0.263
0.2
0.143
-0.024
0.401
0.355
-0.012

3
0.27
0.139
-0.117
0.154
-0.123
0.358
0.205
0.196
0.074
0.097
0.235
-0.033
0.079
0.167
0.39
0.177
0.191
0.264
0.179
-0.107
0.818
-0.148
0.083
0.624
0.271
0.009
0.612
0.176
0.46
0.203
-0.126
0.606
0.336
0.69
0.097
0.2
0.414
0.828
0.12
0.167
0.096
0.309
0.534
0.369
0.241
0.179
0.394
0.359

4
0.184
0.159
-0.075
0.2
0.158
0.063
0.02
0.192
0.637
0.32
0.262
0.809
-0.053
0.085
0.805
0.4
0.401
0.384
-0.016
0.134
0.184
0.206
0.075
0.272
0.283
0.105
0.378
0.388
0.276
-0.245
0.18
0.052
0.071
0.263
0.372
0.538
0.341
-0.131
0.108
0.407
-0.056
-0.19
0.397
0.125
0.012
0.071
0.236
0.585

5
0.395
0.2
0.084
0.373
0.215
0.193
0.268
0.054
0.063
0.032
-0.039
0.184
0.583
0.716
0.12
0.217
0.005
0.1
0.294
0.43
0.233
0.214
0.936
0.192
0.089
0.063
0.128
0.162
0.13
0.017
0.179
0.002
-0.043
0.292
0.725
0.23
-0.128
0.005
0.074
0.001
0.534
0.329
0.097
0.108
0.288
0.295
-0.033
0.475

a

Component
6
7
0.115
0.083
0.07
0.011
-0.034
0.933
-0.003
0.142
0.207
0.158
0.441
0.138
0.014
0.128
0.522
0.137
0.132
0.11
0.086 -0.258
0.25
0.856
0.191 -0.024
0.441
0.026
0.145
0.148
0.25
0.083
0.192
-0.09
0.06
0.105
0.776
0.107
0.034
0.073
0.028
0.086
0.103
0.136
0.545
0.138
-0.025 -0.009
0.523
0.111
0.222
0
-0.044
0.884
-0.081
0.144
0.347
0.015
0.102
0.001
0.092
0.689
0.112 -0.056
0.67
0.011
0.474
0.014
0.085
0.008
0.107 -0.017
0.044
0.182
0.108
0.109
0.214 -0.028
-0.134
0.001
0.11
0.07
0.2
0.254
-0.079
0.105
0.084
0.063
-0.012
0.033
0.076
0.029
0.292 -0.068
0.202
0.273
-0.019
0.029
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8
-0.005
-0.029
0.11
0.38
0.043
0.258
0.075
-0.074
0.002
0.144
-0.121
0.026
0.432
-0.014
0.172
0.039
-0.179
0.068
0.048
0.235
0.262
0.199
0.005
-0.25
-0.009
-0.046
0.022
-0.018
0.031
0.533
0.59
0.153
0.102
0.053
0.002
0.331
0.643
-0.013
-0.039
0.032
0.133
-0.277
0.017
0.155
-0.062
0.072
-0.008
-0.103

9
-0.22
0.914
-0.1
0.168
0.269
0.202
0.019
0.278
0.259
-0.091
0.021
-0.007
0.129
0.294
0.188
0.072
0.371
-0.092
0.057
0.099
0.206
0.211
-0.007
0.038
0.047
0.171
0.125
-0.046
0.072
-0.08
-0.011
0.096
0.129
0.322
0.117
0.122
-0.139
-0.175
0.129
0.076
0.086
0.049
-0.134
-0.1
-0.128
-0.238
0.215
0.108

10
0.006
0.057
0.117
0.093
0.019
0.123
-0.059
-0.047
0.02
0.076
-0.004
0.109
-0.213
-0.244
-0.093
0.116
0.031
-0.041
-0.247
-0.069
0.059
-0.024
0.062
-0.144
-0.099
-0.094
0.011
0.452
0.132
-0.019
0.118
0.067
0.479
0.019
0.222
-0.066
-0.085
-0.057
0.455
0.036
-0.297
-0.039
0.378
0.076
-0.031
-0.54
-0.108
0.155

11
0.38
0.008
-0.073
-0.037
-0.034
0.085
-0.07
0.04
-0.307
-0.077
-0.002
0.143
0.048
-0.156
0.071
-0.335
-0.319
0.015
0.058
0.133
0.028
-0.093
0.011
-0.056
0.361
0.072
0.441
0.026
0.156
0.078
0.143
0.087
-0.114
-0.351
0.111
-0.062
-0.043
0.051
-0.013
0.207
0.056
0.071
0.192
-0.205
-0.183
-0.067
-0.195
-0.21

Ext49
0.215 0.411
0.369
0.27
Ext50
0.847 0.076
0.133
0.202
Ext51
0.779 0.225
0.114
0.352
Ext52
0.696 0.034
0.199 -0.024
Ext53
0.764 0.282 -0.179 -0.144
Extraction Method: Principal Component
Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 12
iterations.

0.53
0.068
0.217
0.014
-0.079

-0.041
0.367
-0.135
0.29
0.257

0.004
0.117
0.093
0.048
-0.106

-0.099
-0.03
0.22
0.274
0.197

0.003
-0.023
-0.107
0.051
0.089

-0.131
0.121
-0.069
0.191
0

-0.005
0.134
-0.02
0.489
-0.085

Although SPSS delivers 11 principal components or extant factors, no variable has its highest
loading on factor 11. Moreover, no variable loaded above 0.5 in that factor. Therefore, only 10 extant
factors are considered, which together explain around 90% of the total variance explained by the set of 53
extant variables:
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Table 24. Extant variables per factor from pilot study
Extant Factor 1: Preparedness
Variance 22.6%
Var

Load

Question
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved,
Ext50 0.847
and technical skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident.
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a
Ext45 0.842
cyber incident.
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems
Ext40 0.83 development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness
policy.
Ext44 0.83 How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and
Ext19 0.791
enemies.
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every
Ext51 0.779
step, including information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident.
A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards
Ext25 0.766
throughout the entire platform.
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies
Ext53 0.764 and all applicable laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation
process.
Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools
Ext16 0.722
to maintain a shared workspace.
Ext42 0.722 Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform.
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of
Ext20 0.703
systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring.
What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is
Ext52 0.696 generated, the associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for longterm storage.
Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud)
Ext31 0.672 possess content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability.
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering
Ext39 0.628 admissible evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial
loss, and to recover assets and data.
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination,
Ext47 0.611
seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a cyber incident.
A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic
Ext28 0.592
examiners.
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and
Ext17 0.51
dynamically measure information security performance.
Extant Factor 2: Control
Variance 13.1%
Var

Load

Ext7

0.873

Ext10

0.704

Question
Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and
assesses the value of potential evidence.
Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control
lists, user logging, encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent
exposures.
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Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and antiforensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography
Ext8 0.673
software) and assesses Internet activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs,
email, instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs.
Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS),
Ext6 0.651
security event management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware
Ext1 0.646 The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable.
Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital
Ext5 0.626
forensics tools and techniques.
Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental
Ext22 0.604 regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements,
international law, and penalties for security incidents).
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic
Ext4 0.576
responsibilities and the use of digital forensic tools.
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage
Ext41 0.564
visualization abilities.
Extant Factor 3: Policing
Variance 10.7%
Var

Load

Question
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of
Ext38 0.828
encryption technologies.
Ext21 0.818 Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them.
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and
Ext34 0.69
analyzing admissible evidence.
A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities,
Ext24 0.624
procedures, training, roles, documentation, and management.
A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating
Ext27 0.612 system files and for deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on
important assets.
Ext43 0.534 Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness.
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated metaExt29 0.46
data identifying times and authors.
Extant Factor 4: Prevention
Variance 9.3%
Var

Load

Question
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding
Ext12 0.809 forensic policies, procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging
academic digital forensics research.
Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital
Ext15 0.805
assets according to a digital forensic program.
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as
Ext9 0.637 authentication traffic monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time
synchronization.
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a
Ext48 0.585
legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident.
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics
Ext36 0.538
and manage legal evidence properly.
Extant Factor 5: Documentation
Variance 8.9%
Var

Load

Question
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Ext23

0.936

Ext35

0.725

Ext14

0.716

Ext13

0.583

A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and
procedures to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate,
and present evidence.
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in
the organization's information systems and the forensic readiness program.
Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices.

Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews.
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and
Ext49 0.53
duration of a cyber incident.
Extant Factor 6: Investigation
Variance 6.9%
Var

Load

Question
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and
Ext18 0.776
response times, and validates the accreditation of their laboratories.
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging
Ext32 0.67 mechanisms, including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted
communications.
Extant Factor 7: Permissiveness
Variance 6.5%
Var

Load

Ext3

0.933

Question

Allows wireless access.
Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute
Ext26 0.884
history and lessons learned.
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and antiExt11 0.856
forensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing).
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes
Ext30 0.689 and disputes, and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees.
This policy indicates how to manage people leaving the company.
Extant Factor 8: Focus
Variance 4.3%
Var

Load

Question
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and
Ext37 0.643 investigators ready to work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business,
and auditing representatives in case of a cyber incident.
Extant Factor 9: Redress
Variance 3.9%
Var

Load

Ext2

0.914

Question
Seeks accountability for intruders.

Extant Factor 10: Traceability
Variance 3.2%
Var

Load

Ext46

-0.54

Ext33

0.479

Question
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber
incident.
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business
systems, and monitoring of the forensics process.

Summary of Pilot Study
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The pilot study is done to assess the feasibility of the surveys and to have a first view of the
content validity of the factors. However, conclusions about final factors are done over the final sample.
The number of factors extracted from the pilot was limited to those with Eigen values above or
equal to one. The factor analysis delivers 16 factors, 6 perceptual factors and 10 extant factors. This is a
very similar number to that of the dimensions found via Q-Sort test; 15 in that case. This hindsight is used
in the definition of the number of factors to extract from the final sample, which is a key decision
researchers make in the application of factor analysis.
The sample size is insufficient to make conclusive decisions. However, the pilot test shows that
the survey, although long and in-depth, is feasible. Some respondents actually made comments such as
“I loved this survey[,] very important,” “great survey, would like to take more,” “Nice survey!,” and “Great
survey, would complete another one like it.” This improves the possibility that respondents will thoroughly
complete the survey despite its length. It is also an indicator that questions were understood and
informative. As expected, the results obtained in the pilot were suitable for exploratory factor analysis, in
the perceptual set, and for principal components analysis in the extant set. The percentage of variance
extracted for the perceptual and extant factors, 77% and 90% respectively, fall into acceptable levels for
factor analysis in social sciences (Hair, Black, Bavin & Henderson 2010).
The refinement of factors could continue with the removal of variables and even reorganization of
factors based on theoretical analysis. However, this should be done when the final survey is run and a
more solid sample of observations is obtained. No variables are removed at this moment to avoid missing
variance that could be explained by those variables or shared variance with other variables in the
consolidation of factors. The names of factors from the pilot study are not final, but provide a glimpse for
the denomination of final factors and the direction that the refinement of those factors can take.
Final Study
A final survey was run among IT professionals using the same questionnaire tested under the
pilot study. Unlike the pilot study’s requirement of IT professionals working on the security area in IT
departments, the final study relaxes this requirement and includes IT professionals working on IT
departments. This decision acknowledges that all IT related personnel are nowadays inevitably involved
in IT security. In addition, some managers and directors of IT departments, which make a considerable
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segment of potential respondents, could have skipped choosing security as one of their functions simply
for not being involved in the traditionally technically-related tasks of firewall configurations, antivirus
updates and backups. The final collection of responses confirms the appropriateness of this decision: IT
managers, administrators, VPs, and CIOs are popular positions cited by respondents. 52% of those who
finished the survey reported IT management as their role at work. The data was collected through
Qualtrics between the months of March and April of 2017 among organizations in the U.S. 1.243 attempts
to complete the survey were done. However, strict requirements for the time taken to complete the survey
were implemented such that responses completed in less than 6 minutes were considered not
acceptable. The average respondent took over 14 minutes and the median was over 10 minutes. Two
control questions to verify that respondents were thoughtfully reading the questions were strategically
added to the questionnaire. 250 respondents who comply with all the conditions and representing equal
number of organizations were selected for the analysis. The complete demographics for the respondents
and the organizations they represent are as follows:

Table 25. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Age)
Respondent's age
Below 18

0

18 to 25

14

26 to 40

151

41 to 60

81

Above 60

4

Table 26. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Gender)
Respondent's gender
Male

154

Female

96

103

Table 27. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Tenure)
Respondent's years in the organization
Less than 2

25

2 to 5

84

6 to 10

85

11 to 20

44

More than 20

12

Table 28. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Years in position)
Respondent's years in position
Less than 2

44

2 to 5

142

6 to 10

41

11 to 20

21

More than 20

2
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Table 29. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Industry)
Organization's Industry
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer)

20

Online Retailer

3

Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP)

9

Communications Carrier

4

Aerospace

1

Banking/Finance/Accounting

9

Insurance/Real Estate/Legal

4

Federal Government (including military)

7

State/Local Government

6

Medical/Dental/Healthcare

23

Transportation/Utilities

6

Construction/Architecture/Engineering

1

Data Processing Services

11

Wholesale/Retail/Distribution

4

Education

10

Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment

3

Research/Development Lab

5

Business Services/Consultant

22

Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals)

31

Computer/Network Services/Consultant

50

Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor

8

Other

13

Table 30. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Sales)
Organization's Year Sales in $1000
Less than 50

13

Between 50 and 200

25

Between 200 and 500

25

Between 500 and 2,000

46

More than 2,000

141
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Table 31. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Employees)
Organization's Number of Employees
1 to 50

24

Between 51 and 200

26

Between 201 and 500

50

Between 501 and 2000

68

More than 5,000

82

Table 32. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Customers)
Organization's Number of Customers
1 to 20

7

Between 21 and 200

35

Between 201 and 1,000

49

Between 1,001 and 10,000

64

More than 10,000

95

Table 33. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Data)
Organization's Monthly Data
Less than 10 MB

3

Between 10 and 500 MB

13

Between 0.5 and 50 GB

41

Between 50 GB and 1 TB

72

More than 1 TB

121

The objectives of the EFA are twofold, data reduction for the extant variables and structure
identification for the perceptual variables. In the case of the extant variables, this study assumes that they
represent what DFR is, according to a comprehensive review of the literature. Even with the reduction of
variables performed during this research the number of these variables, 53, is still large for a
parsimonious model. Digital forensics experts will benefit from a statistically-based reduction of the
variables into fewer factors. On the other hand, the 18 perceptual variables discovered may not tell the
whole story about the reflective indicators of DFR. The literature reviewed is mostly of a practical nature
rather than of a theoretical or concept-based nature; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that most of
what DFR is made of has been contemplated, but perceptions of such DFR may remain to be covered.
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Conceptual models of behavioral or perceptual indicators of DFR status have not been proposed by
researchers; therefore, there are no grounds to suggest completeness of the perceptual factors found in
the literature. Still, the perceptual factors inferred during the present review, while not comprehensive,
can shed light on the underlying structure of the DFR latent perceptual factors. Consequently, structure
identification is a better objective for the perceptual variables.
Sample Size for Final Study
The sample size of the final study is 250 observations, roughly five times the number of the
bigger of the two sets of variables (53 extant variables vs. 18 perceptual variables), which is
recommended for EFA (Hair et al. 2010). The separation between extant and perceptual variables also
avoids mixing dependent and independent variables in the analysis, as warned by Hair et al. Perceptual
variables are a reflection of the real status of DFR represented by extant variables. Therefore, variables
of both sets should not be mixed.
Factorability of Data
Hair et al. (2010) recommend a visual exploration of the data to detect that sufficient correlation
among variables and heterogeneity of those correlations exist in order to consider the data feasible for
factor analysis. Correlations above 0.3 are considered appropriate. After visual exploration, both data sets
provide evidence of their feasibility for factor analysis. Moreover, this research quantifies this evidence.
To do this, the number of substantial correlations was counted and their proportion in respect to
the total correlations was calculated. The number of possible correlations among perceptual variables is
153, given by the formula n*(n-1)/2, where n = 18, the number of perceptual variables. Likewise, the
number of possible correlations among extant variables is 1,378, where n = 53, the number of extant
variables. As an example, the formula =IF(ABS(C3)>=0.3,1,0) in Excel, was used to assign a number one
to the correlation in cell C3. The application of this formula with reference to the correlations’ cells range
identifies those correlations greater or equal to 0.3. The count was 69 for the perceptual correlations and
1,240 for the extant correlations, which corresponds to 45% and 90% of substantial correlations,
respectively.
Partial correlations higher than 0.7 indicate that variables have high unique variance, leaving
small variance that could be explained by other variables. This shows poor suitability for factor analysis
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according to Hair et al. (2010). A look at the anti-image matrices of both variable sets shows that no
partial correlation was greater or equal to 0.7. Likewise, the Bartlett test of sphericity that reviews that
there are significant correlations among the variables shows statistical significance with a p value that is
inferior to 0.0005 for both perceptual and extant variables. These results indicate suitability for factor
analysis.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO MSA) is an indicator of the
proportion of correlations over the sum of correlations and partial correlations. Kaiser proposes the
following interpretation of the results: below 0.50, unacceptable; in the 0.50s, miserable; in the 0.60s,
mediocre; in the 0.70s, middling; in the 0.80s, meritorious; and in the 0.90s, marvelous (Kaiser 1974). The
KMO is 0.885 or “meritorious” for the perceptual set and 0.962 or “marvelous” for the extant set.
Factor Extraction
Initially, the latent root criterion is used for the extraction of factors from both sets of variables.
This method extracts only factors accounting for the variance of at least one single variable, i.e. an Eigen
value of one. An orthogonal Varimax rotation is applied to simplify the factor structure. The result of these
extractions is four perceptual factors and eight extant components, as shown in the table below, where a
dark gray background identifies the highest loading of each variable and the light gray background
identifies significant loadings on other factors.
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Table 34. Perceptual factors extracted through Latent Root Criterion (Eigen value = 1)
Rotated Factor Matrix

a

Factor
Per7

1
.696

2
.142

3
.002

4
.017

Per9

.664

.230

.010

.107

Per8

.613

.394

.106

.190

Per10

.533

.205

.109

.135

Per14

.504

.132

.080

.292

Per16

.478

.336

.002

.451

Per15

.474

.081

.188

.402

Per12

.445

.410

.075

.287

Per1

-.380

-.808

-.095

-.092

Per18

-.519

-.658

-.027

-.242

Per2

.485

.553

.101

.186

Per6

-.005

.006

.677

.116

Per4

.043

.111

.569

.008

Per11

-.028

-.028

.546

-.015

Per3

.089

-.102

.429

.242

Per13

.051

.247

.388

.067

Per5

.229

.081

.326

.002

.278
.309
.214
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
a
Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

.700

Per17
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Table 35. Extant factors extracted through Latent Root Criterion (Eigen value = 1)
Rotated Component Matrix

a

Component
Ext6

1
.692

2
.171

3
-.037

4
.208

5
.223

6
.126

7
.132

8
.045

Ext7

.686

.154

.167

.191

.134

.184

.183

.119

Ext9

.686

.194

.315

.267

.121

.176

.083

.037

Ext8

.644

.265

.087

.075

.239

.217

.031

.083

Ext10

.623

.081

.225

-.051

.330

.183

.139

.095

Ext1

.572

.214

.257

.274

.157

-.005

.216

-.041

Ext12

.550

.180

.245

.317

.166

.349

.104

-.190

Ext4

.522

.183

.184

.374

.198

.307

.095

-.102

Ext13

.481

.169

.174

.168

.236

.460

.178

-.035

Ext5

.430

.203

.323

.308

.216

.332

.239

-.062

Ext52

.088

.740

.009

.011

.218

.011

.226

-.043

Ext49

.190

.689

.118

.253

.254

.229

.041

.006

Ext46

.294

.648

.278

.212

-.050

.160

.200

.121

Ext48

.066

.620

.197

.266

.196

.239

.040

-.008

Ext51

.346

.596

.336

.175

.136

.143

.052

.012

Ext50

.288

.595

.341

.286

.180

.205

.043

.042

Ext45

.364

.528

.269

.229

.160

.165

.216

.125

Ext44

.220

.518

.308

.350

.114

.176

.235

-.083

Ext53

.333

.463

.404

.070

.312

.157

.130

.020

Ext35

.401

.247

.588

.105

.249

.182

.085

-.008

Ext47

.135

.389

.566

.240

.069

.119

.139

.078

Ext40

.211

.291

.522

.441

.225

.125

.207

-.023

Ext27

.056

.225

.520

.421

.179

.271

.195

.180

Ext31

.276

.185

.482

.381

.363

.201

.065

.049

Ext38

.191

.306

.467

.331

.216

.248

.101

-.049

Ext2

.399

.221

.456

.074

.255

.177

.043

-.100

Ext26

.245

.251

.451

.396

.255

.219

.168

-.059

Ext36

.338

.280

.424

.255

.079

.224

.360

-.113

Ext39

.110

.343

.407

.197

.371

.256

.217

-.048

Ext33

.282

.188

.393

.315

.370

.184

.296

.019

Ext28

.125

.255

.153

.772

.035

.220

.068

.046

Ext18

.279

.202

.291

.569

.068

.423

-.077

-.008

Ext30

.242

.199

.125

.507

.474

.101

.238

.017

Ext37

.202

.341

.273

.507

.238

.254

.109

.000

Ext29

.270

.207

.021

.503

.492

.078

.205

.036

Ext23

.330

.197

.303

.468

.329

.160

-.027

.071

Ext17

.290

.130

.278

.424

.287

.363

.143

-.014

Ext25

.271

.313

.285

.388

.323

-.040

.257

-.004
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Ext22

.302

.213

.237

.089

.654

.208

.004

-.035

Ext20

.335

.234

.050

.096

.623

.098

.170

-.014

Ext21

.365

.157

.360

.178

.536

.237

.124

-.039

Ext32

.132

.145

.429

.250

.509

.252

.187

.086

Ext24

.234

.219

.296

.323

.506

.166

.092

.124

Ext16

.374

.193

.240

.080

.379

.341

.288

-.123

Ext11

.175

.152

.241

.214

.085

.658

.038

.031

Ext14

.239

.226

-.001

.258

.187

.623

.142

.027

Ext15

.284

.171

.268

.071

.168

.584

.153

.034

Ext19

.274

.143

.411

.346

.216

.506

.135

-.037

Ext42

.096

.181

-.106

-.015

.127

.403

.615

.223

Ext41

.183

.305

.280

.067

.082

.041

.572

-.086

Ext34

.325

.109

.210

.169

.355

.064

.539

.028

Ext43

.177

.108

.256

.453

.126

.094

.525

-.023

.074
.027
.019
.037
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations.

.015

.019

.029

.918

Ext3

Several considerations must be taken into account before settling for the factors extracted, such
that conceptual bases and statistical support are maintained. First, the statistical significance of loadings
should be evaluated under stricter levels than those of correlation coefficients, given the larger standard
errors of loadings. In order to obtain a 0.05 significance level for a sample of 250 observations, a target
power level of 80% is achieved with minimum factor loadings of 0.35 (Hair et al. 2010). Only the
perceptual variable PER5 (Our firm has a public profile) loading on factor 3 has a factor loading below this
limit, at 0.326. Given that PER5 also has a low communality of 0.165 (i.e., small variance that is explained
by other perceptual variables) it becomes a candidate for deletion. This is shown with gray background in
the table of communalities below. This does not mean that the perception in an organization of having a
public profile is not a reflection of its DFR status, but simply that no other variable in the set of perceptual
variables of this research explains a similar construct significantly. All other perceptual and extant
variables have factor loadings above the significant level of 0.35.
Regarding communalities, nine other perceptual variables have what is considered low levels
(below 0.5 or at least half of their variance explained by other variables in their respective set). All of the
extant variables have communalities above 0.5. These values coincide with the assumption that the set of
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perceptual variables is unlikely to be as comprehensive as the set of extant variables given the technical
orientation of the current literature in DFR. It is expected that future research can detect more perceptual
variables of DFR sharing variance with those proposed here.

Table 36. Communalities on Four-factor Perceptual Solution
Communalities of Perceptual Variables
Initial

Extraction

Per1

0.672

0.815

Per2

0.62

0.586

Per3

0.218

0.261

Per4

0.31

0.338

Per5

0.197

0.165

Per6

0.317

0.472

Per7

0.396

0.504

Per8

0.589

0.578

Per9

0.46

0.505

Per10

0.339

0.356

Per11

0.259

0.3

Per12

0.497

0.455

Per13

0.252

0.218

Per14

0.373

0.363

Per15

0.405

0.428

Per16
0.505
Per17
0.495
Per18
0.735
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
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0.545
0.708
0.762

Table 37. Communalities on Eight-Factor Extant Solution
Communalities of Extant Variables
Initial

Extraction

Ext1

1

0.588

Ext2

1

0.529

Ext3

1

0.853

Ext4

1

0.633

Ext5

1

0.644

Ext6

1

0.638

Ext7

1

0.658

Ext8

1

0.61

Ext9

1

0.732

Ext10

1

0.619

Ext11

1

0.6

Ext12

1

0.692

Ext13

1

0.619

Ext14

1

0.618

Ext15

1

0.582

Ext16

1

0.599

Ext17

1

0.593

Ext18

1

0.717

Ext19

1

0.707

Ext20

1

0.606

Ext21

1

0.679

Ext22

1

0.672

Ext23

1

0.599

Ext24

1

0.603

Ext25

1

0.575

Ext26

1

0.628

Ext27

1

0.677

Ext28

1

0.756

Ext29

1

0.661

Ext30

1

0.664

Ext31

1

0.667

Ext32

1

0.649

Ext33

1

0.627

Ext34

1

0.611

Ext35

1

0.68

Ext36

1

0.636

Ext37

1

0.621

Ext38

1

0.579

Ext39

1

0.587
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Ext40

1

0.706

Ext41

1

0.552

Ext42

1

0.66

Ext43

1

0.615

Ext44

1

0.639

Ext45

1

0.651

Ext46

1

0.711

Ext47

1

0.592

Ext48

1

0.595

Ext49

1

0.708

Ext50

1

0.713

Ext51

1

0.661

Ext52

1

0.656

Ext53
1
0.633
Extraction Method: Principal Component
Analysis.
On the other hand, 7 perceptual and 26 extant variables present more than one significant factor
loading. These cross-loadings are:
Table 38. Cross-loadings
Variables

Factors

PER8, PER16, PER1, PER18 and PER2

Factors 1 and 2

PER16 and PER15

Factors 1 and 4

EXT4

Factors 1 and 4

EXT13

Factors 1 and 6

EXT45

Factors 1 and 2

EXT44

Factors 2 and 4

EXT53 and EXT47

Factors 2 and 3

EXT35 and EXT2

Factors 1 and 3

EXT40, EXT27 and EXT26

Factors 3 and 4

EXT36

Factors 3 and 7

EXT31

Factors 3, 4 and 5

EXT39, EXT33 and EXT32

Factors 3 and 5

EXT18 and EXT17

Factors 4 and 6

EXT30 and EXT29

Factors 4 and 5

EXT21

Factors 1, 3 and 5

EXT16

Factors 1 and 5

EXT19

Factors 3 and 6

EXT42

Factors 6 and 7

EXT34

Factors 5 and 7

EXT43

Factors 4 and 7
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Different extraction criteria, rotation methods, and/or deletion of variables can improve
significance of loadings and reduce cross-loadings.
Another consideration to explore about the loadings is regarding factors defined by a single
variable, which make it impractical to assess reliability. This assessment aims to reduce measurement
errors by testing that the items in a factor are consistently measuring the same construct. One variable in
each set falls under this condition PER17 and EXT3. However, they both have high loadings on the factor
they define and non-significant loading in others, which means that deleting them, could not only
eliminate the variables, but also a potential real factor from the model. Assessment of reliability on those
factors defined by a single variable is left for future research if/when new variables for those factors are
found.
Finally, there is the evaluation of the variance extracted after rotation, which is 46.45% for
perceptual factors and 64.33% for the extant ones. Hair et al. (2010) assert that a 60% or even lower
level of total variance extracted is commonly accepted as satisfactory in the social sciences. Given that
the variance explained by the extant factors is above 60% with all variable loadings being significant,
analysis and labeling proceeds with the factors extracted. For the perceptual factors, extra refinement can
increase the variance explained and the significance of PER5, as well as a better simplification of their
structure.
Deletion of variables is avoided for different reasons in each set of variables. In the case of the
extant variables, each of the variables tested is the product of thorough conceptual analysis of the extant
literature and thus is deemed to have an important meaning for the definition of DFR. Those variables’
cross-loadings over different factors might not be due to a problem of the variables but due to a problem
in the definition of the factors. Therefore, eliminating variables will leave us with an incomplete view of
DFR. The elimination of variables from the perceptual set, on the other hand, is not recommended for a
different reason. It is clear in this research that the perceptual set that arose from the literature does not
give a complete reflection of a DFR status. Thus, the lack of significance of a variable and the crossloadings of others might not respond to poor variables, but to the absence of other variables that help
shape the structure of the perceptual factors. Because this is an exploratory approach to a model of DFR,
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future researchers will benefit from testing all possible significant factors found in this research. Therefore,
the refinement will aim to produce a factor model with as many as possible significant variables.
It should be noted that the factors extracted in the final study, four perceptual and eight extant,
are fewer than those extracted in the pilot study and the dimensions of DFR for practitioners resulting
from the Q-Sort test. In the case of the perceptual variables, this confirms Hair et al.’s contention that for
fewer than 20 variables the latent root criterion extracts a conservative number of factors. Considering
that the pilot study and the Q-Sort test are the only antecedents available for the application of an a priori
criterion for the number of factors to extract, new factor analyses are run to extract more perceptual
factors.
The comparison between the four-factor extraction obtained under the latent root criterion and a
five-factor extraction with an a priori criterion are shown below. The same number of variables has crossloadings, but PER1 has an additional cross-loading, thus, cross-loadings increase instead of decrease. A
benefit of the five-factor extraction, though, is that PER5’s factor loading of 0.326 increases to 0.347, very
close to significance, but still below it. Likewise, its communality increases from 0.165 to 0.208 and the
total variance explained increases from 46.45 to 49.4%.
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Table 39. Comparison between four and five factor solutions

A six-factor extraction delivers the same number of cross-loadings than with the latent root
criterion, but brings all variables to significance, while increasing the variance explained to 51.63%. An
extraction of seven factors delivers similar results to those of the six-factor extraction, but no variable has
its highest loading on the seventh factor.
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Table 40. Comparison between six and seven factor solutions

The same exercise of extracting more a priori factors for the extant set was run for 9, 10, 11, 12
and 13 factors, resulting in the eleven-factor model being the solution with fewer cross-loadings while
keeping all variables significant. The thirteen-factor solution failed to converge after 25 iterations. It does
deliver fewer cross-loadings after converging at the thirtieth iteration, but four of them become singlevariable factors, in contrast to two in the ten and eleven-factor solutions. Still, the decision between the
eleven-factor solution with fewer cross-loadings and the initially extracted eight-factor solution can be
decided in favor of parsimony, following Hair et al.’s (2010) warning that for more than 50 variables, the
latent root criteria tends to deliver too many factors. Thus, eight factors should be sufficient.
The labeling of factors proceeds, then, with the eight-factor solution of the extant set and the sixfactor solution of the perceptual set, both presenting significant factor loadings for all variables. In these
solutions, most cross-loadings appear in variables which are not those with the highest loading in a factor;
hence, they will not affect labeling. The only exception is PER12, which is the main variable loading 0.498
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in factor 6 and cross-loading 0.484 in factor 1. This cross-loading is considered in the labeling of
perceptual factors 1 and 6.
Reliability
Reliability is measured through Cronbach’s Alpha. Two perceptual variables show negative
loadings, PER1 and PER18, but the former defines a single-variable factor whereas the latter is part of
factor one. Therefore, PER18 must be reverse scored in order to approprietaly calculate the Cronbach’s
Alpha for that factor. All extant factors have Cronbach’s Alphas in the generally accepted level of 0.7,
except for factor eight which Cronbach’s Alpha cannot be calculated because it is a single-variable factor.
Likewise, two perceptual factors’ Cronbach’s Alpha cannot be calculated for the same reason.
Perceptual factors 4, 5, and 6 have Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.584, 0.489, and 0.423, respectively. Only
factor one in the perceptual set has a Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.7. It is expected that future research can
discover additional perceptual factors with more satisfactory reliability measures.
Factors from Final Study
The following is a list of the factors with their corresponding variables and loadings, as well as the
percentage of the variance of all variables that the factor explains and the reliability measure of each
factor. Appendix F (Final Survey) can be used o determine whether the item refers to something that the
organization has, does, knows or perceives.
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Table 41. Perceived Organizational Commitment (COMM)
Perceived Organizational Commitment
Cronbach's Alpha 0.855
Variance 20.5%
Var

Load

Per8

.714

Per9

.683

Per7

.671

Per2

.572

Per10

.547

Per16

.524

Per14

.494

Question
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics program and implement
lessons learned from previous incidents.
The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and
security policies.
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its
personnel privacy policies and applicable employment law.
Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic readiness.
Information technology and information security objectives are aligned with the
business mission and objectives.
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation
in case of a cyber incident.
Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident.

Per15

.457

How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing incident.

Table 42. Summary of DFR Assessment (SDFR)
Summary of DFR Assessment
Cronbach's Alpha 0.865
Variance 7.7%
Var

Load

Per1

-.783

Per18

-.565

Question
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness
to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would
rate my organization's DFR as:
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital forensic readiness
(DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable
digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR as:

Table 43. Perceived Response Control (RESP)
Perceived Response Control
Cronbach's Alpha N/A
Variance 7.3%
Var

Load

Per17

.704

Question
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic
incident.
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Table 44. Perceived Burden (BURD)
Perceived Burden
Cronbach's Alpha 0.584
Variance 7.3%
Var

Load

Per11

.627

Per6

.596

Question
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability
of digital evidence for our organization is hard.
The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure.

Per3

.426

Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive.

Table 45. Perceived Exposure (EXPO)
Perceived Exposure
Cronbach's Alpha 0.489
Variance 4.4%
Var

Load

Per4

.576

This organization is exposed to many risks and threats.

Question

Per5

.385

Our firm has a public profile.

Table 46. Perceived DFR Culture (CULT)
Perceived DFR culture
Cronbach's Alpha 0.423
Variance 4.4%
Var

Load

Per12

.498

Per13

.464

Question
A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge in computer
security and digital forensics.
A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users)
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Table 47. Extant Technological Capacity (TECH)
Technological Capacity
Cronbach's Alpha 0.916
Variance 12.2%
Var

Load

Ext6

.692

Ext7

.686

Ext9

.686

Ext8

.644

Ext10

.623

Ext1

.572

Ext12

.550

Ext4

.522

Ext13

.481

Ext5

.430

Question
Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS),
security event management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware
Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and
assesses the value of potential evidence.
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as
authentication traffic monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time
synchronization.
Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and antiforensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography software)
and assesses Internet activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email,
instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs.
Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control
lists, user logging, encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent
exposures.
The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable.
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding
forensic policies, procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging
academic digital forensics research.
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic
responsibilities and the use of digital forensic tools.
Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews.
Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital
forensics tools and techniques.
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Table 48. Extant Incident & Evidence Expertise (IEXP)
Incident & Evidence Expertise
Cronbach's Alpha 0.919
Variance 10.2%
Var

Load

Ext52

.740

Ext49

.689

Ext46

.648

Ext48

.620

Ext51

.596

Ext50

.595

Ext45

.528

Ext44

.518

Ext53

.463

Question
What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is
generated, the associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for longterm storage.
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and
duration of a cyber incident.
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber
incident.
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a
legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident.
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every
step, including information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident.
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved,
and technical skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident.
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a
cyber incident.
How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies
and all applicable laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation
process.
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Table 49. Extant DFR Embeddedness (EMBD)
DFR Embeddedness
Cronbach's Alpha 0.928
Variance 9.8%
Var

Load

Ext35

.588

Ext47

.566

Ext40

.522

Ext27

.520

Ext31

.482

Ext38

.467

Ext2

.456

Ext26

.451

Ext36

.424

Ext39

.407

Ext33

.393

Question
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in
the organization's information systems and the forensic readiness program.
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination,
seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a cyber incident.
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems
development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness
policy.
A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating
system files and for deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on
important assets.
Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud)
possess content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability.
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of
encryption technologies.
Seeks accountability for intruders.
Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute
history and lessons learned.
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics
and manage legal evidence properly.
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering
admissible evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial
loss, and to recover assets and data.
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business
systems, and monitoring of the forensics process.
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Table 50. Extant Investigative Capacity (INVE)
Investigative Capacity
Cronbach's Alpha 0.897
Variance 9.6%
Var

Load

Ext28

.772

Ext18

.569

Ext30

.507

Ext37

.507

Ext29

.503

Ext23

.468

Ext17

.424

Ext25

.388

Question
A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic
examiners.
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and
response times, and validates the accreditation of their laboratories.
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes
and disputes, and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees.
This policy indicates how to manage people leaving the company.
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and
investigators ready to work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business,
and auditing representatives in case of a cyber incident.
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated metadata identifying times and authors.
A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and procedures
to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate, and present
evidence.
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and
dynamically measure information security performance.
A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards
throughout the entire platform.

Table 51. Extant Policing (POLI)
Policing
Cronbach's Alpha 0.870
Variance 8.3%
Var

Load

Ext22

.654

Ext20

.623

Ext21

.536

Ext32

.509

Ext24

.506

Ext16

.379

Question
Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental
regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements,
international law, and penalties for security incidents).
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of
systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring.
Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them.
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging
mechanisms, including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted
communications.
A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities,
procedures, training, roles, documentation, and management.
Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools
to maintain a shared workspace.
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Table 52. Extant Active Control (ACON)
Active Control
Cronbach's Alpha 0.807
Variance 7.2%
Var

Load

Ext11

.658

Ext14

.623

Ext15

.584

Ext19

.506

Question
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and antiforensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing).
Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices.
Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital
assets according to a digital forensic program.
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and
enemies.

Table 53. Extant Backup Resourcing (BACK)
Backup Resourcing
Cronbach's Alpha 0.699
Variance 4.9%
Var

Load

Question

Ext42

.615

Ext41

.572

Ext34

.539

Ext43

.525

Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform.
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage
visualization abilities.
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and
analyzing admissible evidence.
Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness.

Table 54. Extant Wireless Accessibility (WIRE)
Wireless Accessibility
Cronbach's Alpha N/A
Variance 2.2%
Var

Load

Ext3

.918

Question
Allows wireless access.

Conceptual Model from EFA
In light of the findings and the conceptual analysis, the DFR model consists of eight extant and
six perceptual factors. The extant factors, representing 53 variables, define what DFR is, according to the
literature. The perceptual factors, representing 18 variables, should reflect the DFR status as defined by
the extant factors. This is depicted by the following model where ovals represent the extant and
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perceptual DFR constructs and rectangles represent the latent factors that comprise the extant DFR, on
one side, and those which reflect the perceptual DFR, on the other. The small squares indicate the
number of variables loading on each factor. The demographic variables have not yet been included in the
analysis.

Figure 9. Conceptual model from exploratory factor analysis

Demographic Variables
Demographic variables were not included in the factor analysis. Even though they can be
considered extant conditions, they do not correspond to things that the organization has, does or knows;
hence, it would be inappropriate to include them in the EFA. Nevertheless, this study found five relevant
characteristics supported by the literature that can eventually affect DFR. Four of the demographic
variables are continuous and refer to the size of the organization, i.e., Yearly Sales, Number of
Employees, Number of Customers, and Amount of Data produced in a month. The fifth demographic
variable nominally identifies the industry to which the organization belongs. One way to assess these
variables effect is to develop a composite measure of extant DFR and use it as the dependent variable in
a regression on them.
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This research recommends that future researchers use summated scales for each factor, thus,
including, only and equally, each one of their respective indicators with significant loadings. However, the
factors’ impact on the Extant or Perceived DFR constructs should not be treated equally because
variables in factors defined by few variables would have a larger impact than the variables in factors
defined by many variables. For example, the variable defining the Perceived Response Control factor
would have nine times the weight of a variable in the Perceived Organizational Commitment factor. A
more conservative approach would be to give an equal weight to each variable and calculate a composite
Extant DFR and a composite Perceived DFR. By running a multiple regression of the composite Extant
DFR on the four continuous organizational demographic variables (i.e., Sales, Number of Employees,
Number of Customers and Amount of Data), a significant effect of the Number of Employees on the
Extant DFR (p value = .006) is obtained. The other demographics are not significant when considering all
these variables in the model. This is shown in the following table where the significant variable DemEmp
is highlighted with a gray background.

Table 55. Test for Continuous Demographic Variables

Model
(Constant)
1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
2.88
0.187

Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients

a

T

Sig.

Beta
15.393

0

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
2.511
3.248

DemSal

-0.023

0.042

-0.043

-0.549

0.584

-0.105

0.059

DemEmp

-0.112

0.041

-0.223

-2.764

0.006

-0.192

-0.032

DemCus

0.024

0.044

0.042

0.542

0.588

-0.062

0.11

DemDat

-0.073

0.054

-0.108

-1.361

0.175

-0.178

0.033

a. Dependent Variable: EXTDFR

This suggests that the number of employees could be a predictor of EXTDFR, although in the
opposite direction inferred from the literature. Even though “a higher number of employees increase the
risks for criminal incidents” (Barske et al. 2010), this condition might create awareness of the risks and
make organizations take measures to counter those risks and be more prepared for them. Also, bigger
organizations are more likely to count among their employees some with the qualifications required for
DFR.
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Further, a multiple covariate ANCOVA test is run to test the effect of the industry to which the
organization belongs. Barske et al. (2010) suggest that financial firms might have a higher incidence of
criminal activity than other firms. Thus, a dummy variable separating financial institutions from
organizations in other industries was created and used as the variable of interest. The other
organizational demographic variables are used as covariates. This test was not significant for the impact
of Industry. The appropriateness of this test was validated by a test of homogeneity of variance based on
median, which resulted in failing to reject the equality of the variance of the residuals in the two groups.
The number of covariates satisfies Huitema’s (1980) suggestion of being less than 0.1 * N - J + 1, where
J is the number of groups and N, the sample size.

Table 56. Test for Nominal Demographic Variable
b

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (DemInd6 = 1 )
Dependent Variable: EXTDFR
Type III Sum of
Source
Squares
Corrected
a
9.406
Model
Intercept
63.895

Mean
Square

df

F

5

1.881

4.731

Sig.
0

1

63.895

160.685

0

DemSal

0.114

1

0.114

0.288

0.592

DemEmp

2.987

1

2.987

7.512

0.007

DemCus

0.132

1

0.132

0.333

0.564

DemDat

0.737

1

0.737

1.855

0.175

DemInd6

0.113

1

0.113

0.284

0.594

97.024

244

0.398

Error

Total
1277.562
250
Corrected
106.43
249
Total
a. R Squared = .088 (Adjusted R Squared = .070)
b. Dummy variable for the sixth choice of Industry (Finance) = 1

Notwithstanding, applying a more sophisticated analysis such as SEM is recommended in the
future in order to obtain a more precise picture of the interactions of the constructs, factors and indicators
proposed herein.

129

Testing Awareness
This research took an additional step by directly asking its respondents about their perception of
the DFR status in their organizations. This question was asked twice, at the beginning and at the end of
the survey, to take into account the effect of the survey as a mechanism that creates awareness of the
construct. If a significant difference is detected between the pre- and post-survey perception of DFR,
then, the survey itself affects this perception. Otherwise, we can think that respondents already had a
clear idea of what the DFR status was in their organizations. By running a t-test it is found that the mean
for both PER1 and PER18 is the same, 3.52. Their Pearson correlation is 0.762, showing high
consistency between them along respondents. The survey, then, does not seem to have an effect on
respondents’ answers. This effect may change if subjects not as qualified as those surveyed in this
research are recruited. Otherwise, the instrument has shown good potential to be deployed again as it is.
Given that PER1 and PER18 are asking the exact same question at different times, it was
estimated appropriate to move PER18 to the Summary of DFR Assessment factor in the final model.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The Employees variable, conceptualy affecting the Extant DFR, was found significant; hence, the
complete DFR framework should include this variable. However, running independent regressions for
each of the organization size variables shows that thay all are significant predictors of DFR. Therefore, it
is reasonable to think that organization size is the broader factor affecting DFR and Number of
Employees is the proxy variable to which this factor can be reduced. This conceptual approach is visually
represented by creating a box for the Organization Size factor which contains the proxy variable Number
of Empoyees.
This demographic factor, although an existent condition, is of a different nature from the extant
variables and, thus, not expected to be part of the components of DFR. The exact relationship between
this and the extant factors should be the subject of future studies. The present model places the
Organization Size factor apart from the extant factors to emphasize the difference.
The relationships among the Extant and Perceptual factors within their repective groups are also
to be defined by future research as many different configurations can be devised from this initial
framework. Given that the information currently used for exploratory purposes should not be used to
confirm proposed models, those configurations must be theoretically supported and tested on new data.
However, an additional step can be pursued by running a second order factor analysis on the
factors already found. Because the factors have been chosen so they are orthogonal, the correlations
among them resulting from the new factor analysis are low. The MSA KMO indicators are 0.50 and 0.532
for the Extant and Perceptual variables sets respectively, which are considered not adequate for factor
analysis. Still, one point of attention is that the perceptual factors are considered as reflective of DFR;
therefore, they should move together reflecting changes in DFR. However, the low correlations among
them, as shown below, do not support this assumption.
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Table 57. Correlations among Perceptual Factors
Correlation Matrix
COMM
SDFR

COMM
1.000

SDFR
.137

RESP
.164

BURD
-.021

EXPO
.025

CULT
.127

.137

1.000

.012

-.037

.082

.130

RESP

.164

.012

1.000

.084

.028

.099

BURD

-.021

-.037

.084

1.000

.163

.080

EXPO

.025

.082

.028

.163

1.000

.019

CULT

.127

.130

.099

.080

.019

1.000

There could be different explanations for this to happen, from lacking perceptual variables that
help define the perceptual factors to having a different configuration for the relationship of the factors with
each other. Testing these hypotheses requires new data and must be undertaken in future studies. The
framework proposed herein acknowledges this uncertainty by using a dotted box to enclose all perceptual
factors within the Extant DFR construct.
Some of the factors found in the pilot study, such as those related to Commitment, Control,
Policing, and Investigation, remain equally relevant in the present framework. Other factors from the pilot
study have been condensed in the more consistent factors resulted from the final study.
Conceptual Model of DFR
As a result of the previous considerations, a proposed framework of DFR is proposed including
the demographic factor Organization Size measured through Number of Employees as a predictor of
Extant DFR, distinct from the components extracted from the factor analysis. The model also depicts the
fact that the Perceptual factors are yet to be statistically proven to be reflections of the latent construct
Perceived DFR. The DFR framework developed in this study is represented by the following conceptual
model:
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Figure 10. Conceptual model of DFR

The demographic, perceptual, and extant factors are explained in better detail in the following
table:
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Table 58. Definition of factors
Demographic Factor
Number of Employees
This is the only demographic factor that showed some effect in the extant DFR and is a simple count
of the number of employees in the organization.

Perceptual Factors

Perceived Organizational Commitment
This factor represents the commitment of the managers and all personnel with the digital forensics
program reflected in the knowledge of the personnel and the consistency of the DFR program with
the corporate objectives and the employees’ privacy.

Summary of DFR Assessment
This factor is a straightforward assessment of the general perception of DFR before and after the
application of the survey. Although the pos-survey variable loaded higher in factor one, it also loads
higher in this factor, where it is conceptually considered to belong.

Perceived Response Control
This factor captures the ability of the organization to balance the benefits of the investigation with its
costs, as perceived by their personnel.

Perceived Burden
This factor explores aspects that can be perceived as obstacles for the implementation of DFR
measures, such as legal requirements, the location of the firm, and the costs associated to the DFR
program.

Perceived Exposure
This factor detects the organization’s personnel feelings of being exposed to attacks, for example,
by disgruntled employees or for having a public profile or given the nature of the firm activities.

Perceived DFR Culture
This factor assesses the perception that a culture exists in favor of preserving evidence and keeping
up to date knowledge of DFR.
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Extant Factors

Technological Capacity
This extant factor evaluates the DFR capacities of the organization in terms of digital and physical
infrastructure, systems, software, hardware, tools, training, monitoring, and qualified consultancy.

Incident & Evidence Expertise
This factor explores the knowledge of the organization personnel about the sources and qualifiers of
data; the identification, causes and consequences of incidents; the people involved and the incident;
and the appropriate tools and techniques to investigate and manage potential evidence in order to
demonstrate due diligence.

DFR Embeddedness
This factor examines the extent to which the DFR program and practices are part of the corporate
plans, processes, and systems, as well as customary in people’s behaviors.

Investigative Capacity
This factor evaluates whether the organization has the infrastructure and specialized personnel to
perform digital investigations.

Policing
This factor assesses the completeness and adequacy of corporate policies regarding regulatory
compliance, accessibility to network and resources, ownership of data, use of systems and tools,
expectations of privacy, and incident management.

Active Control
This factor evaluates the actions taken by the organization in order to control access to its systems
and facilities, and the use of anti-forensic strategies and tools.

Backup Resourcing
This factor examines the financial, physical and digital resources for the storage and analysis of
data.

Wireless Accessibility
This factor measures to what extent wireless access to the corporate resources is available.
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Assumptions and Limitations
The assessment of digital forensic readiness (DFR) has proven to be a complex endeavor. Many
variables are involved and only the occurrence of an event can truly unveil the preparedness of an
organization to collect, analyze, preserve and provide digital evidence about it. In addition, practical rather
than theoretical literature is available for the exploration of this construct from a quantitative stand point.
In response to these limitations, this study decided to obtain information about DFR indicators
from what is assumed to be the most qualified source: the academic literature. It is assumed here that
this literature represents what defines the construct in a comprehensive way. On the other hand, the
collection of data from organizations assumed that IT professionals in those organizations are
knowledgeable enough to represent the DFR characteristics of those organizations.
Consequently, the Extant DFR proposed is assumed to be a comprehensive measure of DFR. On
the other hand, given the limited availability of research exploring perceptual or behavioral aspects of
DFR, some perceived factors should be seen with caution as more indicators are needed for their
assessment. Still, the perceived organizational commitment and perceived DFR factors found here show
good measures of reliability.
There are also limitations in terms of the generalizability of this study. Because this is the first
and, heretofore, only statistically supported framework of the DFR construct, it is difficult to provide solid
assessments of nomological validity; rather new researchers will benefit from this study to make it a
reference for the assessment of the validity of their own DFR proposals. More research must be done to
validate the scales and framework proposed herein. Likewise, data from different geographic regions
outside the United States should be collected in order to prove the appropriateness of the framework in
other contexts. Moreover, in the current rapidly evolving technological environment, it is expected that
some aspects of the framework will need to be adjusted to these changes.
Contribution and Directions for Future Research
This research has undertaken the assessment of DFR by reviewing all DFR-related literature that
was found until 2015 and methodically distilling potential indicators of DFR in organizations. This process
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has included a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques for the classification and quantification of
dimensions, factors and indicators, such as semantic analisis, Q-Sort tests, association rules, and
exploratory factor analysis.
The approach of the study has been inductive rather than deductive, thereby building theory
rather than testing. However, the exercise of regressing the proposed composite perceived DFR on the
proposed composite extant DFR produces a significant p value below 0.0005 with an adjusted R-Square
of 0.746. The results are, then, encouraging, not only in terms of the assessment of DFR, but also in
terms of the feasibility of developing a methodology to quantify a construct whose quantification has been
elusive heretofore.
In the process, several contributions have been provided to the discipline of digital forensics, to
the field of information systems and to the social sciences, in general. The three most general of these
contributions are:
•

Providing a practitioners’ framework for the assessment of DFR;

•

Providing the first quantitative approach to measure the DFR construct;

•

Proposing an innovative methodology for the structured assessment of unstructured problems,
such as measuring DFR and other qualitatively-treated constructs.
These contributions have complementary but distinct implications for practitioners and

academics.
Implications for Practice
In first place, this study delivered a practitioner’s framework of DFR that allows professionals to
focus, in a systematic way, on the aspects that are more relevant in the evaluation of DFR in
organizations. The dimensions proposed refer to entities that must be easily recognized by practitioners
of IT security and digital forensics. Likewise, the indicators represent actions and conditions associated to
those entities in a straightforward fashion.
The practitioner’s framework proposed in Table 10 has not been subjected to statistical validation.
Therefore, some demographic variables later found not to be significant predictors of the Extant DFR
remain in the framework. This was purposely done because these variables have support from the
literature and should not be discarded in real assessments of DFR. Practitioners can, instead, accumulate
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data on their real assessments in order to prove or disprove the relevance of such variables. Also, some
indicators inferred to be negatively correlated to the Extant DFR variable, such as the culture of secrecy,
the firm’s location, and the cost of the forensic program seem to be, instead, positively correlated to it.
One possible cause of this lies in the wording of the question or the interpretation of the
respondents in the final survey. Another, perhaps, more plausible cause, is that those external elements
seen as particular disadvantages for a firm make it more proactive in implementing measures that
strengthen its DFR posture. For example, keeping the DFR program secret from employees might not be
good for DFR, while keeping it secret from external agents, could be. This will require the practitioner to
be cautious in the inquiries and diligent in the interpretation of responses.
The framework is not aimed to be a deterministic predictor of DFR but rather a structured tool
through which DFR assessments can be compared and improved. Practitioners should use the
framework as a guide to perform an organized assessment of DFR but be active in the interpretation of
the results.
Implications for Research
The second outcome of this study offers a conceptual model separating what can be considered
as a status of DFR from the perceptions reflecting that status. This model is more appropriate for
academics and researchers, who would benefit from the statistically supported framework in order to
advance in the investigation of the construct. More research is needed, especially in the assessment of
the Perceptual DFR. Likewise, replication of the study can help confirm the consistency of the Extant DFR
factors. Additionally, new trends and technologies, such as blockchain and the Internet of Things (IoT),
which were not mentioned as potential indicators of DFR status, should be included in future explorations
of the DFR construct. New research should work on the confirmatory power of the framework and its
continuous refinement.
Future research is expected to focus on the improvement of the scales of indicators for each
factor and on each factor’s impact on the final status of DFR. The suggestion, then, is to find an
alternative measure of DFR against which these factors could be compared. It is also recommended that
specific indicators for those new factors are developed. New data should be collected to run a
confirmatory analysis and, further, a structural equation model of this framework. Researchers should
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also provide guidelines for practitioners along the lines of Capability Maturity Models where real or ideal
organizations at different levels of DFR can be used as examples to compare and contrast the status of
those ones under evaluation.
As an additional contribution, this study has implemented innovative modifications to the
application of the Q-Sort test and association rules algorithms that have demonstrated not only their
usefulness, but the potential for new implementations of these techniques. Furthermore, this study
provides an approach for the whole process of providing structure to an essentially unstructured problem,
such as the assessment of DFR. This process can be summarized as the comprehensive review of the
literature available on the construct, the identification of potential indicators, the classifications and
refinement of those indicators, and the exploration of the latent factors explaining those variables and
their relationships. Researchers in the social sciences are encouraged to use and test this approach to
help building structured methodologies for the assessment of the plethora of elusive constructs in our
disciplines.
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DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003

2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003

Factor

DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003
DFRWS cited by Stephenson
2003

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Industry

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Confidence in the security systems
Managers awareness and kowledge
of security investigations

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Ability to recognize an incident
Regulatory penalties for security
incidents
Forensic toolkit (e-camera, gloves,
etc.) and equipment, forms and
supplies

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Factor

Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe 2003

2003

Documenting the chain of evidence
Management Example and Support
of security
Codes of conduct and security
policies
Fiduciary, statutory or government
regulations

Factor

Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

D7. Hidden Data Extraction
E. Analysis
E1. Preservation
E2. Traceability
E3. Statistical
E4. Protocols
E5. Data Mining
E6. Timeline
E7. Link
E8. Spatial
F. Presentation
F1. Documentation
F2. Expert Testimony
F3. Clarification
F4. Mission Impact Statement
F5. Recommended Countermeasure
F6. Statistical Interpretation
Lack of awareness of tangible and
intangible benefits
Firm interest in prosecuting
offenders

Factor
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Factor
Factor
Factor
Dimension
Factor
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
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2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003

Impact of previous security events

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Budget
Politically sensitive or public
embarrassment type incident
Threat of opportunist, criminal,
competitor or disgruntled employee

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Chain of evidence

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

IDS, IPS, Network traffic and logs
Internal forensics group or external
Computer Emergency Response
Team - CERT
Laboratory and specialized hardware
and software
Audit that confirms good practices
and tests the controls in place
Defining a risk mode
Following best practice security
standards
Implementing good security products
Defining security policies and
procedures
Training IT staff and educating users
Continually reviewing the security
threats
Knowing and monitoring the
organization’s IT infrastructure

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

2003

Factor

2003

Chain of custody

Dimension

Honey pots
Secrecy of proactive forensics
system from users

Factor
Factor

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003
Bradford, Brown, Perdue &
Self 2004
Bradford, Brown, Perdue &
Self 2004
Bradford, Brown, Perdue &
Self 2004

Infrastructure
Preservation of physical and digital
evidence
1. Awareness (that investigation is
needed)
2. Authorisation (Legal or
Managerial)

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2004

2004

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2004

2004

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

3. Planning

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

4. Notification

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

5. Search for and identify evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

6. Collection of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

7. Transport of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

8. Storage of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

9. Examination of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

10. Hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

11. Presentation of hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

12. Proof/Defense of hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

13. Dissemination of information

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

154

2004
2004
2004

IDS

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Having external investigators

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Information flow and controls
Influence of external policies,
regulation and legislation on the
policies of the investigating
organisation
Link between external policies,
regulation & legislation, and
organisational policies to information
controls

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Factor

Ciardhuáin 2004

2004

Cost
1. Where is data generated?

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

2. What format is it in?

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

3. For how long is it stored?
4. How is data currently controlled,
secured and managed?
5. Who has access to the data?

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

6. How much data is produced?
7. Is it archived? If so where and for
how long?
8. How much is reviewed?
9. What additional evidence sources
could be enabled?
10. Who is responsible for this data?
11. Who is the formal owner of the
data?
12. How could data be made
available to an investigation?
To what business processes does
data relate?
Does data contain personal
information?
Definition of business scenarios
requiring digital evidence
Identification of sources and types of
potential evidence
Identification of evidence collection
requirements
Capability for securely gathering
legally admissible evidence
Establishment of policies for secure
storage and handling of potential
evidence
Monitoring of incidents detection and
deterrence systems
Specify when escalation to formal
investigation must be launched
Train personnel in incident
awareness, roles and legal aspects
of digital evidence process
Document incident-based case for
the incident and its impact

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004
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Ensure legal review to facilitate
action in response to incident
Keeping business continuity (w/o
interruption)

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Benefit/cost proportionality

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Potential crimes and disputes

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Legality of collection process

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Evidence collection requirements

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Retention of information

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Planning of the response

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Training

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Acceleration of the investigation

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Prevention of anonymous activities

Factor

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Legal

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Technical

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Non-technical
Personnel and external
organizations
Understanding possible evidence
sources, how to gather evidence
legally and cost-effectively, when to
escalate into a formal investigation,
and how to put together a case
involving law enforcement agencies.

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

2004

Need for privacy
Maturity of information security
posture
Legal requirements and constraints
on collection and preservation of
potential digital evidence
A method for analyzing the
organizations’ need for digital
evidence
Identification and classification of
potential digital evidence sources
Enumeration of technologies and
processes for utilizing these sources
Guidelines for preserving digital
evidence, processes, procedures,
and suggestions to use technologies
Guidance on when and how to report
incidents
Organization’s crime and dispute
history
The different crimes and disputes the
organization is likely to be exposed
to

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Factor

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Assets and customers

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

2004

Management support

Factor

Wolfe 2004

2004

Forensic policies

Dimension

Wolfe 2004

2004

Validity of capture process

Factor

Wolfe 2004

2004
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Chain of evidence
Computing knowledge of
investigators
Teaching System Administrators and
Incident Handlers how to respond to
an incident
Training individuals who deal with
network intrusions as both Incident
Handlers and Forensic Examiners.
Identify the firm's most valuable
digital assets
Develop a strategy to prepare the
underlying systems from a forensic
viewpoint
Internal monitoring of network
activities
Case management and incident
tracking
Amount of information that Incident
Handlers preserve on compromised
systems
Communicating information to law
enforcement, ISPs, and other third
parties
Developing reputation of tracking
back intruders

Dimension

Wolfe 2004

2004

Factor

Wolfe 2004

2004

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Dimension

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Dimension

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

Factor

Casey 2005

2005

DF accreditation of staff

Factor

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Laboratory accreditation and auditing

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Follow regulations
A quality assurance system that
covers quality policies, activities,
procedures, documentation, and
management.
Procedures to control the quality of
documents
Accreditation of outsourcing
laboratories

Factor

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Factor

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Monitoring of the forensics process

Factor

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Archive Management
Forensic knowledge of IT
management

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

2005

Dimension

Quinn 2005

2005

Policies and procedures

Dimension

Quinn 2005

2005

Training of IT staff
Assess risk considering
vulnerabilities, threats,
loss/exposure, etc.;
Develop an information retention
plan (both pre/post-incident);
Develop an Incident Response Plan,
including policies, procedures,
personnel assignments, technical
requirements

Factor

Quinn 2005

2005

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Develop technical capabilities (e.g.

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

157

response toolkits);
Train personnel;

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Prepare host and network devices;
Develop evidence preservation and
handling procedures; and
Develop legal activities coordination
plan (both pre/post-incident)

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005

2005

Factor

2005

Timely short investigation process
1. Find useable evidence
immediately;

Factor

2. Identify victims at acute risk;

Factor

3. Guide the ongoing investigation;

Factor

4. Identify potential charges;
5. Accurately assess the offender’s
danger to society
Does the warrant allow for the
seizure and removal of the
system(s)?
Is there sufficient particularity in the
warrant and application for the
warrant that allows for an onsite or in
situ examination?
Are there any 4th Amendment issues
that need to be addressed?
What are the reporting obligations to
the issuing magistrate or judge?
Are there particular discovery issues
present or anticipated?
Conducting an onsite examination
affects the integrity of the original
evidence?

Factor
Factor

Beebe & Clark 2005
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

The type of case?

Factor

How critical is the time factor?
What are the skills and abilities of
the computer forensic examiners?
What type of technology is involved
(standalone systems, complex
networks etc.)?
Can the scene be safely and
effectively controlled?
Can the systems in question be
powered off or must they remain
“live”?
What is the technical skill and
knowledge level of the suspect?
Do the computer forensic examiners
have the proper equipment for onsite
examinations?

Factor

Maintaining the integrity of digital

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

Dimension
Dimension
Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

2006

Dimension

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,

2006

Factor
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2006
2006

evidence
Maintaining the chain of custody of
evidence
Complying with rules of evidence for
admissibility at the Federal and State
levels

Wedge & Debrota 2006
Dimension
Dimension

Planning and pre-raid intelligence
Multiple physical and virtual
locations, wired and wireless
networks, and OS
Triaging the investigation (Rank in
terms of importance or priority)

Dimension

Toolkit (with hardware write blocker)
Profiling use/users/suspects (Home
directory, File properties, Registry)
Define temporal value of evidence
(MAC times, cookies, cache and the
index.dat file)
Evaluate type of Internet activities
(Cookies, Temps, URLs, Email, IM)

Factor

Focus on case specific evidence

Factor

Resistance through Firewalls
Resistance through User
authentication

Factor

Resistance through Diversification

Factor

Recognition through IDS
Recognition through Internal Integrity
Checks

Factor

Recovery through Incident response

Factor

Recovery through Replication

Factor

Recovery through Backup systems
Recovery through Fault tolerant
designs

Factor

Redress through computer forensics
Redress by pursuing accountability
for intruder behavior in the legal
system

Factor

Redress through active defense
Policies including contacting law
enforcement, performing monitoring,
and
conducting regular reviews of
forensic policies and procedures
Procedures and guidelines for
performing forensic tasks,based on

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006

Factor
Factor

Factor

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge & Debrota 2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006

Factor
Factor

Factor

Factor

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2006

Factor

Dimension
Dimension
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Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006
2006

the organization’s policies and all
applicable laws and regulations
Policies and procedures supporting
reasonable and appropriate use of
forensic tools
Legal advisors review of forensic
policy and high-level procedures
IT professionals prepared to
participate in forensic activities
Interactions between forensic staff
and other teams
Separation of policy for incident
handlers and others with forensic
roles
Policies on roles and responsibilities
of all people and external
organizations
The policy should discuss
jurisdictional conflicts
Providing Guidance for Forensic
Tool Use
Sensitive information safeguards and
handling of inadvertent exposures
Performing regular backups of
systems and maintaining previous
backups for a specific period of time
Enabling auditing on workstations,
servers, and network devices
Forwarding audit records to secure
centralized log servers
Configuring mission-critical
applications to perform auditing,
including recording all authentication
attempts
Maintaining a DB of file hashes for
the files of common OS and
application deployments, and using
file integrity checking software on
important assets
Maintaining records (e.g., baselines)
of network and system
configurations
Establishing data retention policies
for historical reviews of system and
network activity
Comply with requirements to
preserve data on ongoing litigation
and investigations
Destroying data that is no longer
needed
Procedures for performing routine
tasks (e.g. imaging a hard disk,
capturing and recording volatile
information from systems, or
securing physical evidence
Demonstrate conclusively the

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Dimension
Factor
Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Factor
Factor

2006
2006
2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &

2006

Factor
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2006
2006

authenticity, credibility, and reliability
of electronic records
Capability to perform computer and
network forensics
Incident handling teams should have
robust forensic capabilities
Incorporating forensic considerations
into the information system life cycle

Dang 2006
Dimension
Factor
Factor

Centralized logging
Security monitoring controls (e.g.
IDS, antivirus software, and spyware
detection and removal utilities)
Monitoring of user behavior, such as
keystroke monitoring
Developing a plan to acquire the
data, acquiring the data, and
verifying the integrity of the acquired
data.
Detailed log and documentation of
every step of data collection,
including information about tools
used

Factor

Audience Consideration

Factor

Consistency of processes

Factor

Awareness of data sources

Factor

Proactive collection of data

Factor

Procedure for collecting volatile data

Factor

Attacker Identification
1. What are the potential sources of
data?
2. Of the potential sources of data,
which are the most likely to contain
helpful information and why?
3. Which data source would be
checked first and why?
4. Which forensic tools and
techniques would most likely be
used? Which other tools and
techniques might also be used?
5. Which groups and individuals
within the organization would
probably be involved in the forensic
activities?
6. What communications with
external parties might occur, if any?
7. From a forensic standpoint, what
would be done differently if the
scenario had occurred on a different
day or at a different time (regular

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Factor

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Dimension
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2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

2006

2006
2006

2006

hours versus off-hours)?
8. From a forensic standpoint, what
would be done differently if the
scenario had occurred at a different
physical location (onsite versus
offsite)?

Factor

The existence of a toolkit

Factor

The existence of a response team
Clear weighed criteria on whether
turning off a hacked device
Clear weighed criteria on volatility
orders to collect evidence in each
case
Information Management Team
including experts in computer
forensics, law, information
management, information
technology, and auditing
Electronic document retention and
deletion policy
Fexibility to implement litigation
holds by suspending routine
document deletion when litigation is
imminent
Determination of what documents
should be retained and when they
should be destroyed
Management support for the forensic
team
Information Management Director
distinct from the Information
Systems/Technology Director
Employees knowledge on
information management and
awareness of policies
Regular information management
audit
Determining sources of electronic
data being used by the
organization’s employees
Information Security Governance
thorugh top management
commitment
Information Security Governance
thorugh organizational structures
Information Security Governance
thorugh user awareness and
commitment
Information Security Governance
thorugh technology, policies,
procedures and enforcement
Planning Information Retention
Requirements

Factor
Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006
Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

Factor

Kent, Chevalier, Grance &
Dang 2006

2006

Dimension

Luoma 2006

2006

Dimension

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Dimension

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

Luoma 2006

2006

Factor

VonSolms 2006

2006

Factor

VonSolms 2006

2006

Factor

VonSolms 2006

2006

Factor

VonSolms 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

2006

Dimension
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2006
2006
2006
2006

2006

Define the business scenarios that
require digital evidence
Identify available sources and
different types of potential evidence
Determine the evidence collection
requirement
Establish policy for secure storage
and handling of potential evidence
Establish a capability for securely
gathering legally admissible
evidence to meet the requirement
Synchronize all relevant devices and
systems

VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Gather potential evidence

Dimension

Prevent anonymous activities

Dimension

Planning the response.
Ensure monitoring is targeted to
detect and deter major incidents

Dimension

Implement IDS
Specify circumstances when
escalation to a full formal
investigation should be launched
Establish a Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT)
Establish capabilities and response
times for external digital forensic
investigation professionals

Factor

Digital Forensic Training
Train staff in incident awareness to
understand roles and sensitivity of
evidence
Develop an in-house investigative
capability if required
Enhance capability for evidence
retrieval

Dimension

Accelerating the DF investigation.
Document and validate an
investigation protocol against best
practice
Acquire appropriate DF tools and
systems
Ensure legal review to facilitate
action in response to the incident
Define responsibilities and authority
for CERT and investigative teams
Define circumstances for engaging
professional investigative services

Dimension

Factor

VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

Speed of reaction

Factor

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Review of previous incidents

Factor

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Factor

VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

Factor
Factor
Factor

Factor
Factor
Factor

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
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VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky
& Grobler 2006

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Incident response team
Organisational policies and
procedures

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Pre-emptive systems in place
Corporate governance material
converted into a Forensic Readiness
Policy

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Legal context
Management conviction of the
importance of DFR
Good corporate governance,
specifically IS governance
To enrich / augment the security
program of the organization so
adequate evidence, processes and
procedures are in place to determine
the source of an attack

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Use of DF tools
To prevent the use of anti-forensic
strategies for example data
destruction or manipulation and data
hiding

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

IS and DF awareness training

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

IS and DF policies
Identifying all the business scenarios
that will require digital evidence
Determine the vulnerabilities and
threats and what evidence will be
required to determine the rootcause
of the event
Determine what information is
required for evidence (the format and
exactly what is required)
Determine how to legally capture
and preserve the evidence
considering privacy
Ensure that monitoring is targeted to
detect and deter incidents;
Augment the IRP to specify when to
escalate to a full investigation;
Define the first response guidelines
to the Incident response plan to
preserve evidence
Determine when and how to activate
Disaster recovery plan (DRP) and
Business Continuity plan (BCP)
Establish an organizational structure
with roles and responsibilities to deal
with DF in the organization with
segregation of DF and IS teams
duties
Establish a digital evidence
management program

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Incorporate DF techniques in the IS

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007
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auditing procedures
Access controls should be reviewed
to prevent anonymous activities;
Establish a capability to securely
gather admissible evidence by
considering technology and human
capacity
Use DF tools and processes to
demonstrate good corporate
governance
Use DF tools for non-forensic
purposes to enhance the ISA, for
example data recovery if a hard disk
crashes
Developing a preservation culture in
the organization to preserve all
processes and activities should an
investigation arise;
Design all security controls to
prevent any anti-forensic activities
(No password crackers, key-loggers,
steganography software etc.)
Monitoring and controlling removable
/ portable devices
Accepting an expanded role for
systems and network administrators
Understanding of how legal
requirements for admissible
evidence can be translated into
information system requirements
Embedding forensic capabilities in
networks
Ability to repel attacks using tools
such as Firewalls, User
authentication, and Diversification.
Ability to detect an attack or a probe
using IDS, and Internal integrity
checks.
Ability to provide essential services
during attack and restore services
using Incident response, Replication,
Backup systems, and Fault tolerant
design.
Ability to hold intruders accountable
in a court of law and to retaliate
using Forensics (the who), legal
remedies and active defense.
The identification of relevant target
assets.
The test and calibration of the
collection devices and their
frequency of calibration

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

2007

Factor

Grobler & Louwrens 2007
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

2007

Factor

2007

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

2007

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

2007

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

2007

Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007

Factor
Factor

Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke &
Taylor 2007
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007

Factor

Including DF into the ISDLC

Factor

Identification of assets of value

Factor
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2007
2007

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

Performance of risk assessment for
potential losses and threats
Removal of assets that do not
warrant the effort of prosecution
Identification of associated data
linked to valuable assets
Identification of collection and
storage needs for data
Establishment of policies in terms of
digital assets, forensic events, data
collection and storage

Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

2007
2007
2007
2007

Factor

Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky &
Frincke 2007
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008

Factor

Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008

2008

Factor

Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008

2008

Dimension

Forensics policy enforcement
Is the evidence based on a testable
theory or technique?
In the case of a particular technique,
does it have a known or potential
error rate?
Does the technique have and
maintain standards controlling its
operation?
Is the underlying science generally
accepted within the relevant
scientific community?
Has the theory or technique been
subjected to peer review?
Lack of Standards within the
Discipline

Factor

Storage capacity

Factor

File and operating systems

Factor

Online storage

Factor

Storage visualization abilities

Factor

Decryption ability
Small and easy to hide storage
devices

Factor

Volatility
A triage process model of analysis
and interpretation of digital evidence
Ability to recreate the investigated
environment
Multidisciplinary approach (Law, IT,
Enforcement, Business)
Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (CSIRTs)

Factor

Digital investigation procedures
Sharing of logs across institutional
boundaries

Dimension

Interaction with law enforcement

Dimension

Factor
Factor
Factor

Factor

Factor
Factor
Dimension
Dimension

Factor

166

Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem
2008
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

2007
2007
2008

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Factor

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

2009

Factor

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

2009

Interaction with the media
Independent Center for Incident
Management (ICIM)

Factor

Collectively deﬁne access policies
Role based access control with the
least privilege principle in mind
Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs)
Establish adequate levels of trust
between the involved institutions and
personnel
Managing all the tasks and
processes in the response and
investigation processes
Analysis of logs and alerts gathered
by IDSs, server logs, and network
logs

Factor

Roles and Responsibilities Model
Process Model defining the phases
of the response and investigation
process

Dimension

Strong two-factor authentication
Secured network perimeter around
the servers of a centralized
workspace
Plethora of useful tools (IDS,
Centralized logging)
Distinguish between site roles and
collaboration roles
Site Technical Roles (Lead, Incident
Investigator, Digital Forensics
Specialist, Security/System
Administrator, Security/System
Architect)
Collaboration Technical Roles (Lead,
Incident Investigator, Digital
Forensics Specialist, Workspace
Administrator)
Site Legal Roles (Legal Adviser,
Liason with Law Enforcement)
Law Enforcement Roles (Prosecutor,
Investigator, Executive, Media
Liason)
Preparation of security system
architecture documentation
Train staff on latest threats and
software tools
Follow recommended practices to
prevent incidents
Deploy intrusion detection and
forensics data collection capabilities

Factor

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Develop incident response policies,

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,

Factor

Factor

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Factor

Factor

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Factor
Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Factor
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Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

2009

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

procedures and legal coordination
plan
Establish and maintain a
collaborative workspace hosting
environment
Develop/deploy collaborative tools,
policies and procedures

Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Dimension
Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

2009
2009

Chain of custody
Identify the lessons that can be
learned from the handling of the
incident
Wizards in the workspace
environment
Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs)

Dimension

Factor

Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht,
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009

Multi-user systems

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Digital signatures

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Encryption standards
Anti virus software environments and
ﬁltering ﬁrewalls
Authorization and authentication
credentials

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

ID Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Information Security Awareness

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Information Security Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Legal & Regulatory Compliance

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Network Security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Perimeter Security

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Physical Security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Privacy

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Risk Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Software Security
Standardization, configuration
management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

PKI implementation

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Endpoint security

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Managed cybersecurity provider

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Two-factor authentication

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Employee misuse

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Intrusion detection systems

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Patch management

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Wireless infrastructure security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Internal network security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Access control
Management involvement, risk
management
User education, training and
awareness

Factor

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Factor
Factor

168

2009
2009
2009
2009

Policy & regulatory compliance
(Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA)

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

Data protection

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

2009

An overall forensic policy
Technical readiness procedures and
processes
Non-technical readiness procedures
and processes

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Monitoring and auditing
Hardware and software conﬁgured
properly
Education of forensic team members
and appropriate certifications

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Multi-disciplinary team

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Architecture
Alignment of privacy policy with
business policies

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2009

2009

Virtualization

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Size of storage

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Variety of storage device

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

OS and File formats

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Cost of tools

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Pervasive encryption

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Cloudification

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Legal limitations

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Mobile computing

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Training

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

2010

International laws

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Functionality of DF tools
Lack of standardization and
automation in DF processes
Poor transfer of academic research
to practice

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Factor

Garfinkel 2010

2010

Collaboration

Dimension

2010

Strategy

Dimension

Compliance & Monitoring

Dimension

Policy & Procedures

Dimension

Technology

Dimension

Digital Forensic Response

Dimension

Perception of high cost of forensics

Factor

Lack of forensic skills

Factor

Organization size

Factor

Garfinkel 2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
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2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Industry sector

Factor

Available funding

Factor

Number of employees
Employees accessibility to financial
instruments

Factor

Staff IT skills

Dimension

Public profile condition
Proper legal authority to conduct the
search and examination
Chain of custody is kept for the
evidence
Using forensic tools that have been
validated
The use of imaging and hashing
functions to acquire evidence
Quality assurance to ensure that the
examination and analysis

Factor

ICT systems configuration
Policy, people and process
adaptation to DF
Updating the organisation’s policies
and procedures
Improvements in training of
employees
The systematic gathering of potential
digital evidence
The secure storage of potential
digital evidence
Preparation for events requiring
digital forensic intervention
Enhanced capability for evidence
retrieval

Factor

Legal advice
Developing of an in-house digital
forensics examination and analysis
capacity
Identifying and understanding
retention records legislation
Determining which scenarios could
potentially require digital evidence
Identifying the available sources and
different types of digital evidence
Identifying policies needed to ensure
DFR and legality of the DFR
practices
Identify the technological and human
resources needed for DFR
Ensure sufficient funding the set up
and maintain the DFR program

Dimension

Factor

Factor
Dimension
Factor
Factor
Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
Factor
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
Factor
Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

Factor
Factor
Factor
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2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

A policy for the acceptable use of
information systems resources by
members of the organization
A policy clarifying organization
ownership of information systems
resources and data w/o expectation
of privacy or ownership by
employees, plus consent of
monitoring
A policy about information systems
monitoring
A policy which states what
information and under what
circumstances is preserved
A policy which states the periods of
time and categories of digital
evidence retention, as well as the
storage and secure handling thereof
A policy which states the
circumstance when internal
investigations can be initiated and
the actions that may be taken
A policy which states the manner
and circumstances of evidence
release to external parties
A policy for the roles and
responsibilities of parties involved in
preserving, maintaining and
examining evidence
A policy which stipulate a legal
review process for any digital
forensic investigation or incident

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

Factor

2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010

2010

Factor

2010
2010

Factor

Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Barske, Stander & Jordaan
2010
Duranti & Endicott-Popovsky
2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010

2010

Factor

Grobler, Louwrens & Von

2010

Factor

Logs

Factor

Computers and Servers

Dimension

Acquisition and Analysis technology

Dimension

Evidence Storage technology
Interdisciplinary formal programs to
educate professionals

Dimension

Infrastructure preparedness
Development of evidence
management plan (EMP)

Dimension

Development of evidence map
Development of evidence
management policies
Development of procedures to
manage CDE
Existance of risk mitigation plans
including evidence and process
requirements

Factor

Application of an algorithm to

Dimension

Factor

Factor
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2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

calculate completeness and
admissibility of the evidence
Implementation of an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS)
Definition of trigger events for
investigations
Preparation for containments of
incidents to include containment on
live systems
Development of a DF awareness
program
Development of a DF training
program
Development of a management
capability for DF investigators and
CERT
Documentation and validation of a
DF investigation (DFI) protocol
against best practice
Effectiveness of controls against IT
and IS objectives

Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010

Factor
Factor

Factor

Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010

Factor

Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010

Dimension
Factor

Factor
Factor

Use of IT tools
Controls for the responsible use of
DF tools
Existence of Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT)

Dimension

Minimization of business interruption

Dimension

Effectiveness of controls
IT & IS Objectives vs business
objectives

Factor

Efficiency

Dimension

Responsible use of DF tools
Specific requirements per country,
jurisdiction, and industry for
admissible evidence

Factor

Ability to prove compliance
Active DF capabilities in live system
environments
Pre-defined trigger event or
procedures to start active monitoring

Dimension

Soundness of processes
Education level of investigators and
staff
Availability of acceptable tools and
technologies
Establishment of policies and
procedures

Factor

Legal

Dimension

Factor
Factor

Factor

Dimension

Dimension
Factor

Factor
Factor
Dimension
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Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Policies

Dimension

Governance

Dimension

People

Dimension

Process

Dimension

Technology

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von
Solms 2010 (2)

The digital media in question
Implemented processes and
methodologies

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Legal aspects
The individuals involved in the
investigation
Do not use the intranet for policies
regarding the handling of digital
evidence
Have a centralized co-ordination
point so staff members are clear on
who should be contacted
Use an external company to perform
forensic analysis but have internal
‘triaging’ capabilities

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Business aspects

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Social aspects

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Technical aspects
Legal apects e.g. admissibility and
jurisdiction
Recognition of the range of
personnel within the firm who can be
involved in a legal inquiry
Unreasonable expectations of
security policy understanding from
staff
Automated tools reducing
dependence on humans
Too many staff knowing too much
detailed security informationFirst
responder preparation

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Security training

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

First response errors

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Firm's reputation

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Organizational culture

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

DF budget

Factor

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

2010

Wireless access

Factor

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

2010

Monitoring

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

2010

Logging

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

2010

Preservation

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

2010

Analysis

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

2010
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2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Report

Dimension

2010

Factor

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Hegarty 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Hegarty 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Hegarty 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Hegarty 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Hegarty 2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver
2010

Cloud computing

Dimension

Jurisdictional difficulties

Dimension

Encryption

Dimension

Response time

Factor

Availability of an audit trail
Previous success in recovering from
incidents
Resourcing of the incident response
capability
Availability and application of
technical expertise

Factor

Support from senior management
Lack of effective learning from
incident response
Organizational willingness to update
organizational memory
Organizational skill in creating,
acquiring and transfering knowledge
Encouraging both formal, informal
and double-loop learning
Enterprise objectives reflected in the
security policies
Develop and implement a risk-based
IS audit strategy
Plan audits to ensure that IT and
business systems are protected and
controlled
Conduct audits in accordance with IS
audit standards, guidelines and best
practices
Communicate emerging issues,
potential risks and audit results to
key stakeholders
Advise on the implementation of risk
management and control practices
Use of cryptographic hashes for
dead forensics
Ability to distinguish malicious from
benign activities
Requirement of timeliness of serving
electronic documents in court
Due diligence and the ability to
demonstrate this
A dedicated role relating to security
and forensics
Keeping business continuity (w/o
interruption)

Factor

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010

2010

Factor

Pangalos & Ketos 2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010

2010

Benefit/cost proportionality

Factor

Factor
Dimension
Dimension

Factor
Factor
Dimension

Factor
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2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

2010
2010

Corporate security policies

Dimension

Revisit the risk analysis paradigm

Factor

Law framework

Dimension

Security policy
The scene, the requirements, the
methodology and tools used, the
results and reports

Dimension

Retained records accessibility
Electronic version should accurately
represent the original format
Meta-data such as author and date
should be retained with the record
Adapt current Information Security
Best Practices to include aspects of
Digital Forensic Readiness
Support of Good Information
Security Governance
Integration of Forensics and Audit
practice
Ability to hold intruders accountable
in a court of law and the ability to
retaliate
Processes related to data backup
and recovery

Factor

Establish new roles for Forensics
Full responsibility and accountability
from management
Existence of gaps in the SMTP sendreceiver pair

Factor

Risk profile of the individual user
Adoption of a probe based security
monitoring on electronic
communications
Remote web access

Factor

Virtualised platform or resource
Independence from hardware and
OS profiles
Physical access to the relevant
server computer

Factor

Encryption
Lack of standardisation and crossplatform development
To gather admissible evidence
legally and without interfering with
business processes;
To gather evidence targeting the
potential crimes and disputes that

Dimension

Dimension

Factor
Factor

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010

Factor
Factor
Factor

2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Factor

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos
2010

Factor

VanStaden & Venter 2010

2010

Factor

Serra & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

2011

Factor

VanStaden & Venter 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty &
Lamb 2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor
Dimension

Factor
Factor
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2010
2010
2010
2010

2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011

may adversely impact an
organization;
To allow an investigation to proceed
at a cost in proportion to the incident;
To minimize interruption to the
business from any investigation;
To ensure that evidence makes a
positive impact on the outcome of
any legal action.

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

1. Scenario definition
2. Identification of possible sources
of evidence
3. Defining procedures for preincident collection, storage and
manipulation with data representing
possible evidence
4. Defining procedures for preincident analyses of data
representing possible evidence

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

5. Defining procedures for incident
6. Defining procedures for postincident collection, storage and
manipulation with data representing
possible evidence
7. Defining procedures for postincident analyses of data
representing possible evidence

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

8. Defining PKI system architecture
9. Implementing defined procedures
and PKI system architecture
10. Assessment of digital forensic
readiness implementation
There should exist separate log files
relating to access (log-in, access to
all files)
There should exist separate user lifecycle related log
There should exist separate PKI
services-related logs
Lack of technical forensics
standardization both in the industry
and academia
Complexity of the information
security legal background

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Dimension

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

2011

Differences in jurisdictions
Specifying what needs to be
preserved and for which set of
events
Identifying techniques and
methodologies
Organizational policy which will
consider the preventative side of
security
Digital evidence (DE) identification.

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

Factor
Factor

2011
2011
2011

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

2011

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li

2011

Factor
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2011
2011

2011
Risk Assessment by classifying DE
exposure and correlating with
threats.
Control to DE access and
maintenance of a digital chain of
custody (DCOC).
Statistical representation of the DE
by establishing a Bayesian network;
it will calculate the relationship
between cost and benefit factors of
each measure.
The events that will escalate an
event into a full forensic
investigation; the policy should
specifically correlate events with the
established Bayesian network.
Evidence Management Plan
development
Single point of contact (SPOC)
establishment with legal authorities.
Digital forensic investigation (DFI)
model choice - the procedure to be
followed after an incident occurs.
Technical infrastructure standards.
Staff training procedures on the
policy’s contents
Time period required to perform a
digital forensic investigation.
Cost involved in performing a digital
forensic investigation.
Ability to collect the evidence without
disrupting the environment.
Acknowledgement packet protocol
Assuring no alteration of intercepted
communications
Ability to capture all types of
communication
Authenticity and integrity of data
packets in capture and store
Verifiability of authenticity and
integrity of data packets
Data packets should have a
timestamp
Representativity of the sequence of
the packets
Implementation of forensic readiness
that does not affect current network
operation, architecture, transmission
frequencies, consumption power,
overhead or sensitivity.
Automated live collection of a predefined data in the order of volatility
and priority, and related to a specific

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

2011

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

2011

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

2011

Factor
Dimension
Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

2011
2011
2011

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li
2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Dimension

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Mouton & Venter 2011

2011

Factor

Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011

2011

Factor
Dimension
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2011
2011
2011

requirement of an organization
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011

Event Triggering Function
Automated preservation of the
evidence related to the suspicious
event, via hashing
Automated live analysis of the
evidence
Use forensics techniques such as
data mining to support initial
hypothesis of incident
Automated report for the proactive
component
Techniques and automated tools to
investigate antiforensics methods

Factor

Factor

Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011

Privacy

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Jurisdiction

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Cloud storage

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Legal procedure
A block-to-last-chunk name mapping
in the cloud
Persistent storage of chunk location
and metadata in a master server
Weighing costs against risks for
implementing DFR
Number and amount of activities
required for digital forensics
Return on security investment
(ROSI)
Organisational resources
coordination
Organization's high level
determination

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Factor

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Factor

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

2011

Factor

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Factor

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Factor

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Factor

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Development of IT infrastructure
IT security and DF programmes
maturity

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

2012

Legal requirements
IT systems in use.

Dimension

Leigh 2012

2012

Dimension

Leigh 2012

2012

Where data is stored.

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Back-up procedures.
Electronic document retention and
archiving policies.
The number of documents likely to
be located
Tracing custody of individual's
devices for upgrades, people's
change of office or role.
Asset registry for items of electronic
equipment that could record
information

Dimension

Leigh 2012

2012

Dimension

Leigh 2012

2012

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Employment law or privacy issues
Training staff in awareness and
incident behavior

Dimension

Leigh 2012

2012

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke &
Traore 2011

Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
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2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011

Centralization of data

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Storage in personal devices
Determine crimes and disputes the
organization is exposed to
Underestimate the demands that the
legal system makes for ensuring
admissibility and reliability of digital
evidence
Underestimate how often they may
need to produce reliable evidence
Identify potential evidence based on
a risk analysis combined with a
cost/benefit approach
Maturity of information security
posture
Information security auditors'
assessment

Factor

Leigh 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Likely threats
Sorts of evidence it is likely to need
in a civil litigation or criminal
proceeding

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

How to secure data
The amount and quality of evidence
already collected
Legal problems (e.g. admissibility,
data protection, human rights, limits
to surveillance, obligations to staff
members and others, and disclosure
in legal proceedings)
Management, skill, and resource
implications and developed an action
plan

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Factor

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

2012

Information retention

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Response planning

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Training

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Investigation acceleration

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Anonymous activities prevention

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Evidence protection

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

People

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Process

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Policy

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Technology
Computer Incident response Team
(CIRT) information and skills
management

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Security awareness

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Planning of incident response
Development of investigation
methodology
Definition of organizational
requirements

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012
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Definition of legal requirements
Existance of reactive and proactive
tools
Security/forensic orientation of
network design
Modern storage devices own volition
in the absence of computer
instructions
Hashing tool for authentication of
collected data in dead forensics
Tool for authentication of collected
data in live forensics
Forensic blurriness affecting ﬁdelity
and quantity of evidence acquired in
live forensics

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Storage technology

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Rising surge of anti-forensic tools

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Mature technical environment

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Policies & Procedures

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Incident Management

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Response Team
Securing the evidence without
contaminating it
Acquiring the evidence without
altering or damaging the original
Authenticating that the recovered
evidence is the same as the original
seized data
Analysing the data without modifying
it
Management commitment and
leadership to secure information
systems
The adoption of standards for
information security
User awareness of the issues,
threats and best practices in
information security
The implementation of policies,
processes and procedures to secure
the information system
Adequate technology to secure the
information system
Compliance with regulatory
requirements according to
information security information
Establishment of a dashboard of
measurement and control of the
security information

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Factor

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

2012

Risk analysis
Measure maturity of repositories of
information

Dimension

Factor

Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012

Dimension

Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012

Dimension

Dimension

Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012

Dimension

Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012

Dimension

Factor

Factor
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Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012

2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012

Security indicators

Dimension

Check security through audits

Factor

Penetration tests

Factor

Security benchmark

Factor

Security of premises

Dimension

Architecture and Systems Security

Dimension

Application security

Factor

Development of action plans

Dimension

Cloud service’s systems functionality
Records management including the
cloud
Information governance and
assurance (confidentiality, integrity,
availability, authentication and nonrepudiation)

Factor

Appraisal strategies

Factor

Retention schedules

Factor

Disposition plans
Assuring the records posses content,
context and structure
Assuring records authenticity,
reliability, integrity and usability

Factor

Identify where to look in the system
Identify how to store and for how
long

Factor

Data retrieval mechanism

Factor

Tamper-proof mechanism

Factor

Create evidence

Factor

Capture evidence

Factor

Organize evidence

Factor

Pluralize evidence
Assessing evidence for evidential
weight
Curation of evidence movement
through time
Patterns of physical traces and
imprints (logs, audits)

Factor

Dimension

Dimension

Factor
Factor

Factor

Factor
Factor
Factor
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Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi
& Regragui 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012

2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012

Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

Manifestation of evidence

Factor

Calibration audits
Chain of custody is kept for the
evidence

Factor

Cross-disciplinary teams

Dimension

Senser location near key assets

Factor

IDS
Monitoring of regulation and
legislation
The preservation, continuity,
mainainability and resilience of cloud
information
Relocate critical assets for better
management
Keeping association of data to
metadata when moving to the cloud
Monitoring organizational regulations
compliance when moving to the
cloud

Factor

Cloud warehousing

Dimension

Legal framework and jurisdictions
Generally accepted standardized
training and certification programs
Daubert test of technique (tested,
peer reviewed, error rate and
accepted)

Dimension

Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Policies from yasinsac & Manzano

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Digital assets value assessment

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Risk assessment

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Digital assets filtering

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Data identification
Forensic policy writing and Legal
review

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Forensic policy ensurance

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Digital evidence management

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Incident response process

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Staff training

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Identify sources of potential evidence

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Calculate value of digital evidence
Correlate potential sources with
threats
Calculate level of digital evidence
exposure to threats
Conduct assessment of digital
evidence from its value and
exposure

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Dimension

Factor
Dimension
Factor
Factor
Factor
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Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012

Identify potential cost of measures
and threats

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Identify potential benefit of measures
Relate cost and benefits trhough a
Bayesian Network
Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis of
measures and threats
Depict results on a Cost-Benefit
factor relation model
Choose a forensic investigation
model to perform after incident

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Develop chain of custody
Decide on trigger event of full DF
investigation
Decide on single point of contact
with authorities

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Prioritization model

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

Business continuity plan

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

2012

System monitoring

Factor

2012

Risk Assessment

Dimension

Digital Evidence Management

Dimension

Staff Training

Dimension

Incident Response Process

Dimension

Policies & Procedures

Dimension

Business Scenarios

Dimension

Digital Evidence Preparation

Dimension

IR Team Preparation

Factor

Response Toolkit Preparation

Factor

Legal review
Tracing back the actions of each
employee

Factor

Human factor
Specific methodology to capture,
stored, analyze, preserve, integrate,
present evidence
Relevant software tools to capture,
stored, analyze, preserve, integrate,
present evidence

Dimension

VanStaden & Venter 2012
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis &
Li 2013

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler
2012

Outsourcing costs

Factor

Risk assessment analysis

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler
2012
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler
2012
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler
2012

Regulatory framework meeting

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler

Factor

Dimension
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2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012

organizational needs

2012

Cost-benefit analysis of compliance
costs vs. value-added proactive
security benefits

Factor

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler
2012

2012

Event analysis

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

DFR information

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Costing

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Access control

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

User interface
Staff from multiple departments and
business units
Network infrastructure and
computing platforms
Monitor or log network and host
activity

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Secure storage of logs
Distinguish whether hardware or
software elements are being
monitored
Automated alarm upon detection of
potential or actual incident
Conﬁguration procedures for
monitoring and logging
Investigative teams (DF teams) and
incident response teams descriptions

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Training requirements and training

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Business process descriptions
Organisational DF policies and
policies related to DFR

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Existence of a suspicion policy

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Law enforcement contact policy

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Escalation procedures

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Incident response procedure

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Law enforcement contact procedure
Defined organisational structure,
privileges and rank hierarchy
Staff involved in DFR and incident
response
Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
Security event management
software (SEM)

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Incident management software
Storage of information about training,
procedures, people, roles, policies,
etc.
Documentation of incidents and
investigation archive

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Leave management

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Organization size

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013

Organization industry

Factor

Reddy & Venter 2013

2013
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Multi-jurisdictions

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Multi-tenants of data
A lack of forensic readiness
mechanisms in cloud infrastructures

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Escalation of costs
Applications layer that interact with
layer 7 of the ISO/OSI model (e.g.
static and dynamic web applications,
web clients, web servers, application
servers and web services

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Ram forensics

Factor

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Network forensics

Dimension

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Computer forensics

Dimension

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

2013

Centralized logging

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Data and Process provenance
The proportionality rule to collect
only useful evidence upon good
cause
Integrity of the evidence and chain of
custody
Difficulty of device isolation in the
cloud

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Jurisdictional issues
Decreased control over data and
decreased access to forensic data
from a client side

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Access control on the central server

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Cloudification
Communication Channel

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Encryption

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Compression
Authentication of log data and proof
of integrity
Authenticating the client and server

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Factor

Trenwith & Venter 2013

2013

Timestamping

Factor

2013

Qualified individuals

Dimension

Forensic strategy

Dimension

Non-technical stakeholders

Dimension

Technical stakeholders

Dimension

Technology

Dimension

Monitoring

Dimension

Architecture

Dimension

Policies

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
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2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

Training

Dimension

Forensic culture

Dimension

Top management support

Factor

Governance

Dimension

Need of regulatory compliance

Factor

Need of internal investigations

Factor

Involvement in legal proceedings

Factor

Data indexing

Factor

Information fusion

Factor

Cryptographic Time-stamps

Factor

System synchronization

Factor

Digital signatures

Factor

File hashing
Maintaining change management
database

Factor

CCTVs

Factor

Encryption

Dimension

Hashing
Remote secure central servers for
logs

Factor

IDS

Factor

Anti-virus and Anti-Spyware
Communications with external
stakeholders
Leadership commitment towards the
forensic program
Appropriate organizational structure
that takes forensics into account

Factor

Staff awareness

Dimension

Enforcement of policies
Identify the objectives of forensic
program
Identify potential scenarios that will
require digital evidence
Identify and prioritize evidence
sources

Factor

Factor

Factor

Dimension
Factor
Dimension

Factor
Factor
Factor
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Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014

2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad &
Lonie 2014
Web, Ahmad, Maynard /
Shanks 2014
Web, Ahmad, Maynard /
Shanks 2014
Web, Ahmad, Maynard /
Shanks 2014
Web, Ahmad, Maynard /
Shanks 2014

Factor

Starkman 2014

Identify forensic roles

Factor

Plan for budget
Capabilities of legal evidence
management

Factor

Capabilities of internal investigations

Dimension

Capabilities of regulatory compliance

Dimension

Is there intelligence in place?

Factor

Security awareness
Personnel believe in the necessity of
technology such as anti-spyware
Personnel understand the
technology
Impact on stakeholders (e.g.
customers and employees)
Provide data that is triangulated with
other data, and to be able to prove
timeline

Dimension

Knowing what information you have

Factor

Knowing where information is stored
Knowing who is in charge of the
information
Objective of DFR program e.g.
business objectives, compliance,
internal investigation, forensic
response, and legal evidence
management
Business objectives e.g. Satisfaying
de directors and Corporate
reputation
Organizational Factors (Top
Management Support, Governance,
Culture) Elyas 2014
Roles instead of positions (Forensic
stakeholder instead of Technical
stakeholder)
Extent to which design &
conﬁguration of IT architecture
complements forensic process
Having logging features architected
for digital forensics

Factor

Validated forensic tools

Dimension

Transparency

Factor

Maintenance and testing of systems
Need for adequate resources to
sustain the forensic readiness

Dimension

Dimension

Factor

2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

Factor

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

2015

Factor

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

2015

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

2015

Factor

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

2015

Factor

Factor
Factor

Factor
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Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

2015
2015
2015
2015

2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015

program
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

Senior management buy-in
Ability to recover assets, or avoiding
ﬁnancial loss

Factor

Certified or validated technology
Practice and experience with
technology

Factor

Updated technology

Factor

Cost of technology

Factor

Resourcing

Dimension

Technology use and selection

Dimension

Forensic Training

Dimension

Legal investigations

Factor

Incident response

Factor

Policy

Dimension

Training in the of use forensic tools
Training about the Forensic Policy
and how to recognise and respond to
an incident
Leadership commitment towards
forensics
Staff awareness and commitment
towards forensics
Organisational structure that takes
forensics into consideration
Enforcement of forensic policy and
training
Accountability of staff towards their
forensic responsibilities
Active monitoring and continuous
assessment of system activities

Factor

Factor

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard &
Lonie 2015

Type of data

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Potential sources of attacks or failure

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Number of customers

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Sales

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Location
Preparedness of competitors and
enemies

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

BYOD policies
Is it data or metadata?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Is it part of the content?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Is it a dimension or a measure?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Factor

Factor
Factor
Factor
Dimension
Factor
Factor
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2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015

Can it be derived?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

What other data are related to it?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Is it legal to store or view?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Where else the data are?

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Concern about corporate image

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Perceptions of security risk
Culture or requirements of corporate
secrecy
Past successes in dealing with digital
forensics incidents
Business continuity is critical
Completeness of the DFR framework
itself
Timing of events

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014

Factor

Diaz Lopez

2014
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Item

ReClassification

Security policy

Dimension

Security organization

Dimension

Personnel security

Dimension

Physical and environmental security

Dimension

Communications and operations

Dimension

Management

Dimension

Systems development and maintenance

Dimension

Business Continuity management

Dimension

Compliance
Cultivating an Information Security Culture
Right

Dimension

Paper
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 1 (BS 7799)

Dimension

VonSolms 2000

Tools & Equipment

Dimension

US DoS/NIJ 2001

Evidence Collection

Dimension

US DoS/NIJ 2001

Packaging, Transportation, and Storage

Dimension

US DoS/NIJ 2001

Forensic Acquisition

Dimension

Tan 2001

Evidence Handling

Dimension

Tan 2001

Chain of custody

Dimension

Tan 2001

Transport and encryption

Dimension

Tan 2001

Physical storage & transport of evidence
Planning the response.

Dimension

Tan 2001

Dimension

Yasinsac & Manzano 2001

Training.

Dimension

Yasinsac & Manzano 2001

Accelerating the investigation.

Dimension

Yasinsac & Manzano 2001

Protect the evidence.

Dimension

Information States

Dimension

Security Services

Dimension

Security Countermeasures

Dimension

Time

Dimension

Education

Dimension

Training.

Dimension

Literacy

Dimension

Yasinsac & Manzano 2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001
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Awareness
Reliable unbiased methods to extract and
analyze evidence

Dimension

Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch
2001

Dimension

Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002

Storage technology

Dimension

Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002

Chain of custody

Dimension

Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002

Infrastructure digital and physical

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

Operations

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

Training

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

Equipment

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

Maintenance of the target environment
How can we be sure that there even was
an incident?
What legal issues need to be addressed
(policies, privacy, subpoenas, warrants,
etc.)?
What non-technical (business) issues
impacted the success or failure of the
attack?
Logs from involved computers, detection
systems, firewalls, etc.
A. Identification

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2003

Dimension

Stephenson 2003

Dimension

Stephenson 2003

Dimension

Stephenson 2003

Dimension

Stephenson 2003 / Daubert test

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

A6. System

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

B. Preservation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

B1. Case Management

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

B3. Chain of Custody

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C. Collection

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C1. Preservation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C2. Approved Methods

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C3. Approved Software

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C4.Approved Hardware

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

C5. Legal Authority

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

D. Examination

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

D1. Preservation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

E. Analysis

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

E1. Preservation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

E2. Traceability

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

E6. Timeline

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

E8. Spatial

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

F. Presentation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

F1. Documentation

Dimension

DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003

Codes of conduct and security policies

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

Chain of evidence
Laboratory and specialized hardware and
software

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003

Dimension

Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003
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Chain of custody

Dimension

Bradford, Brown, Perdue & Self 2004

Infrastructure
Preservation of physical and digital
evidence

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2004

Dimension

Carrier & Spafford 2004

3. Planning

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

4. Notification

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

5. Search for and identify evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

6. Collection of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

7. Transport of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

8. Storage of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

9. Examination of evidence

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

10. Hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

11. Presentation of hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

12. Proof/Defense of hypothesis

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

13. Dissemination of information

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

Information flow and controls

Dimension

Ciardhuáin 2004

Cost
4. How is data currently controlled,
secured and managed?
12. How could data be made available to
an investigation?
Capability for securely gathering legally
admissible evidence
Establishment of policies for secure
storage and handling of potential evidence
Monitoring of incidents detection and
deterrence systems
Train personnel in incident awareness,
roles and legal aspects of digital evidence
process

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Benefit/cost proportionality

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Evidence collection requirements

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Retention of information

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Planning of the response

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Training

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Acceleration of the investigation

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Legal

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Technical

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Non-technical

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Personnel and external organizations
Understanding possible evidence sources,
how to gather evidence legally and costeffectively, when to escalate into a formal
investigation, and how to put together a
case involving law enforcement agencies.
Legal requirements and constraints on
collection and preservation of potential
digital evidence

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Rowlingson 2004

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

193

Guidelines for preserving digital evidence,
processes, procedures, and suggestions
to use technologies

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

Assets and customers

Dimension

Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004

Forensic policies

Dimension

Wolfe 2004

Chain of evidence
Develop a strategy to prepare the
underlying systems from a forensic
viewpoint

Dimension

Wolfe 2004

Dimension

Casey 2005

Case management and incident tracking

Dimension

Casey 2005

Laboratory accreditation and auditing
A quality assurance system that covers
quality policies, activities, procedures,
documentation, and management.
Procedures to control the quality of
documents

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

Archive Management

Dimension

Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005

Forensic knowledge of IT management

Dimension

Quinn 2005

Policies and procedures
What are the skills and abilities of the
computer forensic examiners?
What type of technology is involved
(standalone systems, complex networks
etc.)?

Dimension

Quinn 2005
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006

Maintaining the integrity of digital evidence
Maintaining the chain of custody of
evidence
Complying with rules of evidence for
admissibility at the Federal and State
levels

Dimension

Planning and pre-raid intelligence
Policies including contacting law
enforcement, performing monitoring, and
conducting regular reviews of forensic
policies and procedures
Procedures and guidelines for performing
forensic tasks,based on the organization’s
policies and all applicable laws and
regulations
Policies and procedures supporting
reasonable and appropriate use of forensic
tools
Demonstrate conclusively the authenticity,
credibility, and reliability of electronic
records
Capability to perform computer and
network forensics
1. What are the potential sources of data?
4. Which forensic tools and techniques
would most likely be used? Which other
tools and techniques might also be used?

Dimension

Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension
Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
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Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge &
Debrota 2006

5. Which groups and individuals within the
organization would probably be involved in
the forensic activities?
6. What communications with external
parties might occur, if any?
Information Management Team including
experts in computer forensics, law,
information management, information
technology, and auditing
Electronic document retention and deletion
policy
Employees knowledge on information
management and awareness of policies
Planning Information Retention
Requirements

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006

Dimension

Luoma 2006

Dimension

Luoma 2006

Dimension

Gather potential evidence

Dimension

Prevent anonymous activities

Dimension

Planning the response.

Dimension

Digital Forensic Training

Dimension

Accelerating the DF investigation.

Dimension

Luoma 2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler
2006

Incident response team

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

Organisational policies and procedures

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

Pre-emptive systems in place
Corporate governance material converted
into a Forensic Readiness Policy

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

Legal context
Good corporate governance, specifically
IS governance

Dimension

Forrester & Irwin 2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

Use of DF tools

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

IS and DF awareness training

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

IS and DF policies
Establish a capability to securely gather
admissible evidence by considering
technology and human capacity
Developing a preservation culture in the
organization to preserve all processes and
activities should an investigation arise;
Establishment of policies in terms of digital
assets, forensic events, data collection
and storage
Multidisciplinary approach (Law, IT,
Enforcement, Business)
Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs)

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

Dimension

Grobler & Louwrens 2007

Dimension

Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke
2007

Digital investigation procedures

Dimension

Interaction with law enforcement

Dimension

Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
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Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 2008
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009

Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
Analysis of logs and alerts gathered by
IDSs, server logs, and network logs

Dimension

Roles and Responsibilities Model
Plethora of useful tools (IDS, Centralized
logging)
Site Technical Roles (Lead, Incident
Investigator, Digital Forensics Specialist,
Security/System Administrator,
Security/System Architect)
Collaboration Technical Roles (Lead,
Incident Investigator, Digital Forensics
Specialist, Workspace Administrator)
Site Legal Roles (Legal Adviser, Liason
with Law Enforcement)
Law Enforcement Roles (Prosecutor,
Investigator, Executive, Media Liason)
Preparation of security system architecture
documentation
Train staff on latest threats and software
tools
Deploy intrusion detection and forensics
data collection capabilities
Develop incident response policies,
procedures and legal coordination plan
Establish and maintain a collaborative
workspace hosting environment
Develop/deploy collaborative tools,
policies and procedures

Dimension

Chain of custody

Dimension

Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon,
Welch & Butler 2009

ID Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Information Security Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Legal & Regulatory Compliance

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Network Security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Physical Security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Privacy

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Risk Management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Software Security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Wireless infrastructure security

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Internal network security
Management involvement, risk
management

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

User education, training and awareness
Policy & regulatory compliance
(Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA)

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

Data protection

Dimension

Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009

An overall forensic policy
Technical readiness procedures and
processes

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Dimension

Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
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Non-technical readiness procedures and
processes

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Monitoring and auditing
Hardware and software conﬁgured
properly
Education of forensic team members and
appropriate certifications

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Architecture

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2009

Legal limitations

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

Mobile computing

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

Training

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

International laws

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

Functionality of DF tools

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

Collaboration

Dimension

Garfinkel 2010

Strategy

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Compliance & Monitoring

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Policy & Procedures

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Technology

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Digital Forensic Response

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Staff IT skills

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Chain of custody is kept for the evidence
Quality assurance to ensure that the
examination and analysis
Policy, people and process adaptation to
DF
Updating the organisation’s policies and
procedures
The systematic gathering of potential
digital evidence
The secure storage of potential digital
evidence
Preparation for events requiring digital
forensic intervention

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Enhanced capability for evidence retrieval

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Legal advice
Developing of an in-house digital forensics
examination and analysis capacity
Identifying and understanding retention
records legislation

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Computers and Servers

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Acquisition and Analysis technology

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Evidence Storage technology
Interdisciplinary formal programs to
educate professionals

Dimension

Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010

Dimension

Duranti & Endicott-Popovsky 2010

Infrastructure preparedness
Existance of risk mitigation plans including
evidence and process requirements
Preparation for containments of incidents
to include containment on live systems

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
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Use of IT tools

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Minimization of business interruption

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Efficiency
Specific requirements per country,
jurisdiction, and industry for admissible
evidence

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Ability to prove compliance
Active DF capabilities in live system
environments

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010

Dimension

Establishment of policies and procedures

Dimension

Legal

Dimension

Policies

Dimension

Governance

Dimension

People

Dimension

Process

Dimension

Technology
Implemented processes and
methodologies

Dimension

Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010
(2)

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Legal aspects
The individuals involved in the
investigation

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Business aspects

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Social aspects

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Technical aspects
Legal apects e.g. admissibility and
jurisdiction

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Security training

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Organizational culture

Dimension

Hoolachan & Glisson 2010

Monitoring

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

Logging

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

Preservation

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

Analysis

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010

Report

Dimension

Cloud computing

Dimension

Jurisdictional difficulties

Dimension

Encryption
Resourcing of the incident response
capability
Availability and application of technical
expertise

Dimension

Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty
2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty
2010
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty
2010

Dimension

Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010

Dimension

Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010

Organizational skill in creating, acquiring

Dimension

Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010
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and transfering knowledge
Corporate security policies

Dimension

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010

Law framework

Dimension

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010

Security policy
The scene, the requirements, the
methodology and tools used, the results
and reports
Processes related to data backup and
recovery

Dimension

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010

Dimension

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010

Dimension

Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010

Encryption
9. Implementing defined procedures and
PKI system architecture
Organizational policy which will consider
the preventative side of security
Control to DE access and maintenance of
a digital chain of custody (DCOC).
Evidence Management Plan development

Dimension

Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Lamb 2011

Dimension

Valjarevic & Venter 2011

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011

Technical infrastructure standards.
Ability to collect the evidence without
disrupting the environment.

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011

Dimension

Mouton & Venter 2011

Privacy

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

Jurisdiction

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

Cloud storage

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

Legal procedure

Dimension

Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011

Organisational resources coordination

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

Development of IT infrastructure

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

IT security and DF programmes maturity

Dimension

Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012

Legal requirements
IT systems in use.

Dimension

Leigh 2012

Dimension

Leigh 2012

Back-up procedures.
Electronic document retention and
archiving policies.

Dimension

Leigh 2012

Dimension

Leigh 2012

Employment law or privacy issues

Dimension

Leigh 2012

Likely threats

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

How to secure data
Legal problems (e.g. admissibility, data
protection, human rights, limits to
surveillance, obligations to staff members
and others, and disclosure in legal
proceedings)
Management, skill, and resource
implications and developed an action plan

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

Dimension

Hamidovic 2012

Information retention

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Response planning

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Training

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Investigation acceleration

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Evidence protection

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

People

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012
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Process

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Policy

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Technology
Computer Incident response Team (CIRT)
information and skills management

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Security awareness

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Planning of incident response

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Storage technology

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Policies & Procedures

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012

Incident Management
Management commitment and leadership
to secure information systems
User awareness of the issues, threats and
best practices in information security
The implementation of policies, processes
and procedures to secure the information
system
Adequate technology to secure the
information system
Compliance with regulatory requirements
according to information security
information

Dimension

Pooe & Labuschagne 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012

Risk analysis

Dimension

Security indicators

Dimension

Security of premises

Dimension

Architecture and Systems Security

Dimension

Development of action plans

Dimension

Records management including the cloud
Information governance and assurance
(confidentiality, integrity, availability,
authentication and non-repudiation)

Dimension

Chain of custody is kept for the evidence

Dimension

Cross-disciplinary teams
The preservation, continuity, mainainability
and resilience of cloud information

Dimension

Cloud warehousing

Dimension

Legal framework and jurisdictions
Generally accepted standardized training
and certification programs

Dimension

Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Policies from yasinsac & Manzano

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Risk assessment

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Data identification

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension
Dimension

Dimension

Dimension
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Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi &
Regragui 2012
Ferguson-Boucher & EndicottPopovsky 2012

Forensic policy writing and Legal review

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Digital evidence management

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Incident response process

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Staff training
Depict results on a Cost-Benefit factor
relation model

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012

Risk Assessment

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Digital Evidence Management

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Staff Training

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Incident Response Process

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Policies & Procedures

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Business Scenarios

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Digital Evidence Preparation

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Human factor
Specific methodology to capture, stored,
analyze, preserve, integrate, present
evidence
Relevant software tools to capture, stored,
analyze, preserve, integrate, present
evidence

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012

Risk assessment analysis

Dimension

Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012

Event analysis

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

DFR information

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Costing
Staff from multiple departments and
business units
Network infrastructure and computing
platforms
Investigative teams (DF teams) and
incident response teams descriptions

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Training requirements and training

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Business process descriptions
Organisational DF policies and policies
related to DFR

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Incident response procedure
Defined organisational structure, privileges
and rank hierarchy
Staff involved in DFR and incident
response
Storage of information about training,
procedures, people, roles, policies, etc.
Documentation of incidents and
investigation archive

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Dimension

Reddy & Venter 2013

Network forensics

Dimension

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

Computer forensics

Dimension

Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013

Data and Process provenance
Integrity of the evidence and chain of
custody

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

Jurisdictional issues

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013
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Cloudification
Encryption

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

Dimension

Trenwith & Venter 2013

Qualified individuals

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Forensic strategy

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Non-technical stakeholders

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Technical stakeholders

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Technology

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Monitoring

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Architecture

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Policies

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Training

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Forensic culture

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Governance

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Encryption
Communications with external
stakeholders
Appropriate organizational structure that
takes forensics into account

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Staff awareness
Capabilities of legal evidence
management

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Capabilities of internal investigations

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Capabilities of regulatory compliance

Dimension

Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014

Security awareness

Dimension

Web, Ahmad, Maynard / Shanks 2014

Personnel understand the technology
Objective of DFR program e.g. business
objectives, compliance, internal
investigation, forensic response, and legal
evidence management
Organizational Factors (Top Management
Support, Governance, Culture) Elyas 2014

Dimension

Web, Ahmad, Maynard / Shanks 2014

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Validated forensic tools

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Maintenance and testing of systems

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Resourcing

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Technology use and selection

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Forensic Training

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Policy
Organisational structure that takes
forensics into consideration

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015

Dimension

Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015
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DFR Dimensions Survey
Q1 Thanks for your participation in this study. By accepting to take this survey you consent with
the utilization of this information for the purpose of the study and acknowledge that your participation is
voluntary. You can abandon this survey at any time. However, it is appreciated that you complete all
required information to the best of your knowledge. This study has been reviewed by The University of
Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding
your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482 or irb@olemiss.edu.
Mark with an x:
 Accept (1)
 Decline (2)
Q2 What is your age range in years?








Below 18 (1)
18 to 25 (2)
26 to 33 (3)
34 to 41 (4)
42 to 49 (5)
50 to 57 (6)
Above 57 (7)

Q3 What is your gender?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
Q4 What is your experience with computer information systems in years?








Less than 1 (1)
1 to 5 (2)
6 to 10 (3)
11 to 15 (4)
16 to 20 (5)
21 to 25 (6)
More than 25 (7)

Q5 What is your experience in information security in years?








Less than 1 (1)
1 to 5 (2)
6 to 10 (3)
11 to 15 (4)
16 to 20 (5)
21 to 25 (6)
More than 25 (7)

Q6 What is your level of expertise in information security?
 Layman (1)
 Minimal (2)
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Below average (3)
Average (4)
Above average (5)
Superior (6)
Expert (7)

Q7 Many factors affect the digital forensic readiness (DFR) of organizations. These factors can be
classified in different categories or dimensions. Your task is to help determine these categories by
grouping the following words into a set of minimal, unique and independent dimensions to which different
factors of DFR might belong.
Instructions
Along with this document, you will find 65 tags that each contain a different word. These words might
each indicate an independent category. However, some of them might belong to the same category
because they are synonyms or because they together determine a theme that is independent of other
categories proposed. It is your task to determine whether some of the words should be grouped or not.
An easy way to perform this task is to spread all the tags on a table and make clusters of words by
placing together those which you believe belong together in a category, leaving alone those words that
define a category by themselves. There is no limit for the number of words in a category or group. You
might decide that each word is an independent category. However, the purpose of the exercise is to
attempt to define the minimum number of categories possible.
Once your grouping is done, please place a rubber band (provided) around each bundle of two or more
words making a category. Please, place the word that best represents the category on the top of the
stack before placing the rubber band around it.
Count the total categories you defined and write it here: _____
If you feel that there may exist super-categories into which one or several rubber-band-bound collections
and remaining single-words categories may be arranged, please place the grouped items together with
another rubber band around all items within each super-category.
Count the total super-categories you defined and write it here: _____
Please, put all documents, the tied bundles of words and the loose words into the envelope provided and
return it to the researcher.
Thanks for your time and effort.
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Apriori
Parameter specification:
Confidence: 0.5263
Minval: 0.1
Smax: 1
Arem: none
Aval: FALSE
OriginalSupport: TRUE
Support: 0.03968
Minlen: 2
Maxlen: 10
Target: rules
Ext: FALSE
Algorithmic control:
Filter: 0.1
Tree: TRUE
Heap: TRUE
Memopt: FALSE
Load: TRUE
Sort: 2
Verbose: TRUE
Absolute minimum support count: 9
set item appearances ...[0 item(s)] done [0.00s].
set transactions ...[65 item(s), 252 transaction(s)] done [0.00s].
sorting and recoding items ... [65 item(s)] done [0.00s].
creating transaction tree ... done [0.00s].
checking subsets of size 1 2 3 4 5 6 done [0.00s].
writing ... [403 rule(s)] done [0.00s].
creating S4 object ... done [0.00s].
Accepted Association Rules (Min. Support = 0.0397, Min. Confidence = 0.526)
lhs
support confidence lift
1 {Stakeholder}
2 {People}
3 {Stakeholder}
4 {User}
5 {Stakeholder}
6 {Customer}
7 {Stakeholder}
8 {Team}
9 {Stakeholder}
10 {Personnel}
11 {Threat}
12 {Risk}
13 {Threat}
14 {Intrusion}
15 {Threat}
16 {Attack}
17 {Threat}

rhs
=> {People}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {User}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Customer}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Stakeholder} 0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Risk}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Threat}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Intrusion}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Threat}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Attack}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Threat}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Target}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

{Target}
{People}
{User}
{People}
{Customer}
{People}
{Team}
{People}
{Personnel}
{Business}
{Corporate}
{Business}
{Organization}
{User}
{Customer}
{User}
{Team}
{User}
{Personnel}
{Risk}
{Intrusion}
{Risk}
{Attack}
{Customer}
{Team}
{Customer}
{Personnel}
{Corporate}
{Organization}
{Team}
{Personnel}
{Workspace}
{Site}
{Workspace}
{Space}
{Workspace}
{Premises}
{Workspace}
{Environment}
{Workspace}
{Lab}
{Site}
{Space}
{Site}
{Premises}
{Site}
{Environment}
{Intrusion}
{Attack}
{Intrusion}
{Event}
{Intrusion}
{Incident}
{Intrusion}
{Target}
{Attack}

=> {Threat}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {User}
0.06746032 0.8947368 11.867036
=> {People}
0.06746032 0.8947368 11.867036
=> {Customer}
0.06746032 0.8947368 11.867036
=> {People}
0.06746032 0.8947368 11.867036
=> {Team}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {People}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {People}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Corporate}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Business}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Organization} 0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Business}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Customer}
0.07142857 0.9473684 12.565097
=> {User}
0.07142857 0.9473684 12.565097
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {User}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {User}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Intrusion}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Attack}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Customer}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Organization} 0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Corporate}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Personnel}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Team}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Site}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Workspace}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Space}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Workspace}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Premises}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Workspace}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Environment} 0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Workspace}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Lab}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Workspace}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Space}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Site}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Premises}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Site}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Environment} 0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Site}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Attack}
0.07539683 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.07539683 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Event}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Intrusion}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Incident}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Intrusion}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Target}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Intrusion}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Event}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
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74 {Event}
75 {Attack}
76 {Incident}
77 {Attack}
78 {Target}
79 {Event}
80 {Incident}
81 {Space}
82 {Premises}
83 {Space}
84 {Environment}
85 {Record}
86 {Document}
87 {Law}
88 {Rule}
89 {Resource}
90 {Asset}
91 {Evidence}
92 {Proof}
93 {Proof}
94 {Case}
95 {Information}
96 {Data}
97 {System}
98 {Software}
99 {Requirement}
100 {Policy}
101 {Operation}
102 {Process}
103 {Equipment}
104 {Server}
105 {Equipment}
106 {Network}
107 {Equipment}
108 {Hardware}
109 {Equipment}
110 {Computer}
111 {Program}
112 {Software}
113 {Program}
114 {Code}
115 {Rule}
116 {Policy}
117 {Rule}
118 {Guideline}
119 {Objective}
120 {Strategy}
121 {Software}
122 {Code}
123 {Plan}
124 {Guideline}
125 {Plan}
126 {Strategy}
127 {Architecture}
128 {Infrastructure}
129 {Policy}

=> {Attack}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Incident}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Attack}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Target}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Attack}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Incident}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Event}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Premises}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Space}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Environment} 0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Space}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Document}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Record}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Rule}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Law}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Asset}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Resource}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Proof}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Evidence}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Case}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Proof}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Data}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Information} 0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Software}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {System}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Policy}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Requirement} 0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Process}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Operation}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Server}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Equipment}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Network}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Equipment}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Hardware}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Equipment}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Computer}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Equipment}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Software}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Program}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Code}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Program}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Policy}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Rule}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Guideline}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Rule}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Strategy}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Objective}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Code}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Software}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Guideline}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Plan}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Strategy}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Plan}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Infrastructure} 0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Architecture} 0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Guideline}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
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130 {Guideline}
131 {Policy}
132 {Procedure}
133 {Process}
134 {Flow}
135 {Process}
136 {Procedure}
137 {Technology}
138 {Computer}
139 {Server}
140 {Network}
141 {Server}
142 {Hardware}
143 {Server}
144 {Computer}
145 {Guideline}
146 {Strategy}
147 {Guideline}
148 {Procedure}
149 {Network}
150 {Hardware}
151 {Network}
152 {Computer}
153 {Hardware}
154 {Computer}
155 {Method}
156 {Procedure}
157 {People,Stakeholder}
158 {Stakeholder,User}
159 {People,User}
160 {People,Stakeholder}
161 {Customer,Stakeholder}
162 {Customer,People}
163 {People,Stakeholder}
164 {Stakeholder,Team}
165 {People,Team}
166 {People,Stakeholder}
167 {Personnel,Stakeholder}
168 {People,Personnel}
169 {Stakeholder,User}
170 {Customer,Stakeholder}
171 {Customer,User}
172 {Stakeholder,User}
173 {Stakeholder,Team}
174 {Team,User}
175 {Stakeholder,User}
176 {Personnel,Stakeholder}
177 {Personnel,User}
178 {Customer,Stakeholder}
179 {Stakeholder,Team}
180 {Customer,Team}
181 {Customer,Stakeholder}
182 {Personnel,Stakeholder}
183 {Customer,Personnel}
184 {Stakeholder,Team}
185 {Personnel,Stakeholder}

=> {Policy}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Procedure}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Policy}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Flow}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Process}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Procedure}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Process}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Computer}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Technology} 0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Network}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Server}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Hardware}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Server}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Computer}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Server}
0.05952381 0.7894737 10.470914
=> {Strategy}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Guideline}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Procedure}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Guideline}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Hardware}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Network}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Computer}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Network}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Computer}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Hardware}
0.06349206 0.8421053 11.168975
=> {Procedure}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Method}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {User}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.8823529 11.702786
=> {Customer}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05952381 0.9375000 12.434211
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.8823529 11.702786
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Customer}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05952381 0.9375000 12.434211
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.7500000 9.947368
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8125000 10.776316
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672

210

186 {Personnel,Team}
187 {Risk,Threat}
188 {Intrusion,Threat}
189 {Intrusion,Risk}
190 {Risk,Threat}
191 {Attack,Threat}
192 {Attack,Risk}
193 {Intrusion,Threat}
194 {Attack,Threat}
195 {Attack,Intrusion}
196 {People,User}
197 {Customer,People}
198 {Customer,User}
199 {People,User}
200 {People,Team}
201 {Team,User}
202 {People,User}
203 {People,Personnel}
204 {Personnel,User}
205 {Customer,People}
206 {People,Team}
207 {Customer,Team}
208 {Customer,People}
209 {People,Personnel}
210 {Customer,Personnel}
211 {People,Team}
212 {People,Personnel}
213 {Personnel,Team}
214 {Business,Corporate}
215 {Business,Organization}
216 {Corporate,Organization}
217 {Customer,User}
218 {Team,User}
219 {Customer,Team}
220 {Customer,User}
221 {Personnel,User}
222 {Customer,Personnel}
223 {Team,User}
224 {Personnel,User}
225 {Personnel,Team}
226 {Intrusion,Risk}
227 {Attack,Risk}
228 {Attack,Intrusion}
229 {Customer,Team}
230 {Customer,Personnel}
231 {Personnel,Team}
232 {Site,Workspace}
233 {Space,Workspace}
234 {Site,Space}
235 {Site,Workspace}
236 {Premises,Workspace}
237 {Premises,Site}
238 {Space,Workspace}
239 {Premises,Workspace}
240 {Premises,Space}
241 {Space,Workspace}

=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.7333333 9.726316
=> {Intrusion}
0.04761905 0.7500000 9.947368
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Threat}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Attack}
0.04761905 0.7500000 9.947368
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Threat}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Attack}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Threat}
0.05555556 0.7368421 9.772853
=> {Customer}
0.06746032 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.06746032 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.06746032 0.9444444 12.526316
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.7647059 10.142415
=> {User}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.8235294 10.922601
=> {User}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.7647059 10.142415
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.8235294 10.922601
=> {Customer}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {People}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {Organization} 0.05158730 0.8125000 10.776316
=> {Corporate}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {Business}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.7222222 9.578947
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.7777778 10.315789
=> {Customer}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {User}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {Attack}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.6315789 8.376731
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {Space}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Site}
0.03968254 0.7142857 9.473684
=> {Workspace}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Premises}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Site}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Workspace}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
=> {Premises}
0.03968254 0.7142857 9.473684
=> {Space}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Workspace}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Environment} 0.03968254 0.7142857 9.473684
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242 {Environment,Workspace}
243 {Environment,Space}
244 {Attack,Intrusion}
245 {Event,Intrusion}
246 {Attack,Event}
247 {Attack,Intrusion}
248 {Incident,Intrusion}
249 {Attack,Incident}
250 {Attack,Intrusion}
251 {Intrusion,Target}
252 {Attack,Target}
253 {Event,Intrusion}
254 {Incident,Intrusion}
255 {Event,Incident}
256 {Attack,Event}
257 {Attack,Incident}
258 {Event,Incident}
259 {Equipment,Server}
260 {Equipment,Hardware}
261 {Hardware,Server}
262 {Equipment,Server}
263 {Computer,Equipment}
264 {Computer,Server}
265 {Equipment,Network}
266 {Equipment,Hardware}
267 {Hardware,Network}
268 {Equipment,Hardware}
269 {Computer,Equipment}
270 {Computer,Hardware}
271 {Program,Software}
272 {Code,Program}
273 {Code,Software}
274 {Policy,Rule}
275 {Guideline,Rule}
276 {Guideline,Policy}
277 {Guideline,Plan}
278 {Plan,Strategy}
279 {Guideline,Strategy}
280 {Network,Server}
281 {Hardware,Server}
282 {Hardware,Network}
283 {Network,Server}
284 {Computer,Server}
285 {Computer,Network}
286 {Hardware,Server}
287 {Computer,Server}
288 {Computer,Hardware}
289 {Hardware,Network}
290 {Computer,Network}
291 {Computer,Hardware}
292 {People,Stakeholder,User}
293 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}
294 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}
295 {Customer,People,User}
296 {People,Stakeholder,User}
297 {People,Stakeholder,Team}

=> {Space}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Workspace}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Event}
0.04365079 0.5789474 7.678670
=> {Attack}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Incident}
0.05158730 0.6842105 9.074792
=> {Attack}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Target}
0.03968254 0.5263158 6.980609
=> {Attack}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Incident}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
=> {Event}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
=> {Intrusion}
0.03968254 0.6666667 8.842105
=> {Incident}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
=> {Event}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
=> {Attack}
0.03968254 0.6666667 8.842105
=> {Hardware}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Server}
0.05555556 0.8750000 11.605263
=> {Equipment}
0.05555556 0.8750000 11.605263
=> {Computer}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Server}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Equipment}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {Hardware}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Network}
0.03968254 0.6250000 8.289474
=> {Equipment}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Computer}
0.05555556 0.8750000 11.605263
=> {Hardware}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Equipment}
0.05555556 0.8750000 11.605263
=> {Code}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
=> {Software}
0.04365079 0.7857143 10.421053
=> {Program}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
=> {Guideline}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
=> {Policy}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
=> {Rule}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
=> {Strategy}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
=> {Guideline}
0.03968254 0.6666667 8.842105
=> {Plan}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Hardware}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Network}
0.04365079 0.6875000 9.118421
=> {Server}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Computer}
0.03968254 0.8333333 11.052632
=> {Network}
0.03968254 0.6666667 8.842105
=> {Server}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
=> {Computer}
0.05952381 0.9375000 12.434211
=> {Hardware}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Server}
0.05952381 0.9375000 12.434211
=> {Computer}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Hardware}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Network}
0.04365079 0.6875000 9.118421
=> {Customer}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05952381 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05952381 0.8823529 11.702786
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
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298 {Stakeholder,Team,User}
299 {People,Team,User}
300 {People,Stakeholder,User}
301 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}
302 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
303 {People,Personnel,User}
304 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}
305 {People,Stakeholder,Team}
306 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}
307 {Customer,People,Team}
308 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}
309 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}
310 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}
311 {Customer,People,Personnel}
312 {People,Stakeholder,Team}
313 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}
314 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
315 {People,Personnel,Team}
316 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}
317 {Stakeholder,Team,User}
318 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}
319 {Customer,Team,User}
320 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}
321 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
322 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}
323 {Customer,Personnel,User}
324 {Stakeholder,Team,User}
325 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
326 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
327 {Personnel,Team,User}
328 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}
329 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}
330 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
331 {Customer,Personnel,Team}
332 {Intrusion,Risk,Threat}
333 {Attack,Risk,Threat}
334 {Attack,Intrusion,Threat}
335 {Attack,Intrusion,Risk}
336 {Customer,People,User}
337 {People,Team,User}
338 {Customer,People,Team}
339 {Customer,Team,User}
340 {Customer,People,User}
341 {People,Personnel,User}
342 {Customer,People,Personnel}
343 {Customer,Personnel,User}
344 {People,Team,User}
345 {People,Personnel,User}
346 {People,Personnel,Team}
347 {Personnel,Team,User}
348 {Customer,People,Team}
349 {Customer,People,Personnel}
350 {People,Personnel,Team}
351 {Customer,Personnel,Team}
352 {Customer,Team,User}
353 {Customer,Personnel,User}

=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
=> {People}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
=> {User}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
=> {Customer}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
=> {Attack}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Intrusion}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Risk}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Threat}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Team}
0.05158730 0.7647059 10.142415
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.05555556 0.8235294 10.922601
=> {Customer}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {User}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.05555556 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
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354 {Personnel,Team,User}
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
355 {Customer,Personnel,Team}
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
356 {Attack,Event,Intrusion}
=> {Incident}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
357 {Attack,Incident,Intrusion}
=> {Event}
0.03968254 0.7692308 10.202429
358 {Event,Incident,Intrusion}
=> {Attack}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
359 {Attack,Event,Incident}
=> {Intrusion}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
360 {Equipment,Hardware,Server}
=> {Computer}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
361 {Computer,Equipment,Server}
=> {Hardware}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
362 {Computer,Equipment,Hardware}
=> {Server}
0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
363 {Computer,Hardware,Server}
=> {Equipment}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
364 {Hardware,Network,Server}
=> {Computer}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
365 {Computer,Network,Server}
=> {Hardware}
0.03968254 1.0000000 13.263158
366 {Computer,Hardware,Server}
=> {Network}
0.03968254 0.6666667 8.842105
367 {Computer,Hardware,Network}
=> {Server}
0.03968254 0.9090909 12.057416
368 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,User}
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8000000 10.610526
369 {People,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
370 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
371 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
372 {Customer,People,Team,User}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
373 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,User}
=> {Personnel}
0.05158730 0.8666667 11.494737
374 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
=> {Customer}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
375 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder}
=> {User}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
376 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
=> {People}
0.05158730 1.0000000 13.263158
377 {Customer,People,Personnel,User}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.05158730 0.9285714 12.315789
378 {People,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
379 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
380 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {User}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
381 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {People}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
382 {People,Personnel,Team,User}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
383 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
384 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder}
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
385 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {Customer}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
386 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {People}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
387 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
388 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
389 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}
=> {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
390 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {Customer}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
391 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}
=> {User}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
392 {Customer,Personnel,Team,User}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
393 {Customer,People,Team,User}
=> {Personnel}
0.04761905 0.9230769 12.242915
394 {Customer,People,Personnel,User}
=> {Team}
0.04761905 0.8571429 11.368421
395 {People,Personnel,Team,User}
=> {Customer}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
396 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team}
=> {User}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
397 {Customer,Personnel,Team,User}
=> {People}
0.04761905 1.0000000 13.263158
398 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team,User}
=> {Personnel}
0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
399 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User} => {Team}
0.04365079 0.8461538 11.222672
400 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User} => {Customer}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
401 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team} => {User}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
402 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User} => {People}
0.04365079 1.0000000 13.263158
403 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team,User}
=> {Stakeholder} 0.04365079 0.9166667 12.157895
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ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Question Type 2 High Level
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the
state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present
verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my
organization's DFR as:
Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic
readiness
Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive.
This organization is exposed to many risks and threats.
Our firm has a public profile.
The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure.
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are
consistent with its personnel privacy policies and applicable
employment law.
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics
program and implement lessons learned from previous incidents.
The organization's employees have knowledge of information
management and security policies.
The organization's security system has been proven to be
reliable.
Information technology and information security objectives are
aligned with the business mission and objectives.
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about
admissibility and reliability of digital evidence for our organization
is:
Seeks accountability for intruders.
Allows wireless access.
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their
digital forensic responsibilities and the use of digital forensic
tools.

Subtype

Covers

Perceived

40

Perceived

8

Perceived
Perceived
Demographic
Perceived

9
10
11
12, 16

Perceived

29, 178

Perceived

32, 36

Perceived

34, 37, 143

Perceived

39, 102,
136, 186,
145

Perceived

177

Perceived

179

Does
Does

7, 43
20

Does

27, 123,
187

16

Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure
conduct and digital forensics tools and techniques.

Does

17

Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion
detection systems (IDS), security event management software
(SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware.

Does

18

Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs
and data, and assesses the value of potential evidence.

Does

19

20

Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous
activities and anti-forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, keyloggers, and steganography software) and assesses Internet
activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email, instant
messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs.
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic
capabilities such as authentication traffic monitoring, tamper
proof mechanisms and logging time synchronization.
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13, 31, 33,
38, 123,
157, 166
43, 100,
101, 145,
152, 181,
184
61, 76, 80,
85, 86, 87,
99, 106,
121,155,
188

Does

88, 92,
145, 159

Does

89, 100,
159, 182,
185

21

22

23

Controls access to data and evidence through strong
authentication, access control lists, user logging, encryption, and
implements measures for handling inadvertent exposures.
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file
encryption, and anti-forensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data
destruction/alteration, and onion routing).
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published
standards, regarding forensic policies, procedures, and
information security, and monitors emerging academic digital
forensics research.

Does

81, 91, 93,
96, 97, 98,
103, 145

Does

104, 152

Does

111, 167,
168, 170,
172, 174

24

Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews.

Does

25

Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices.

Does

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate
physical and digital assets according to a digital forensic
program.
Develop corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using
collaboration tools to maintain a shared workspace.
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics
that continuously and dynamically measure information security
performance.
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their
capabilities and response times, and validates the accreditation
of their laboratories.
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of
competitors and enemies.
A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge
in computer security and digital forensics.
A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from
users).
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel
devices, use of systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring.

Does

47, 57,
147, 151

Does

160

Does

169

Does

171

Does

175

Has

5

Has

6

Has

22, 23, 26

34

Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them.

Has

35

Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory
and/or governmental regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA,
admissibility rules, reporting requirements, international law and
penalties for security incidents).

Has

36

A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing
roles and procedures to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve,
control access to, integrate, and present evidence.

Has

37
38

A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers
policies, activities, procedures, training, roles, documentation,
and management.
A documented system security architecture configuration with
consistent standards throughout the entire platform.

217

112, 156,
173
137, 138,
139, 140

14, 21, 24,
25, 26, 74,
75, 105,
113, 116
28, 77,
107, 109,
116, 125,
180
30, 26, 48,
74, 78,
110, 114,
115, 120
121, 127,
128, 129,
130, 131

Has

41, 56

Has

46, 54, 90

39

Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations,
crime and dispute history and lessons learned.

Has

49, 50, 51

40

A change management database that includes file hashes for
common operating system files and for deployed applications,
using file integrity checking software on important assets.

Has

52, 53

Has

58, 59, 189

Has

55, 84, 94,
95

Has

108

Has

115

Has

117

Has

118, 119

Has

120, 122,
124, 163

Has

126, 149

41
42

43

44

45
46
47
48

49

50

51

52

53
54
55
56
57

A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite
computer forensic examiners.
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the
associated meta-data identifying times and authors.
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or
failure, complaints, crimes and disputes, and threats from
opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. This policy
indicates how to manage people leaving the company.
Archive management procedures to assure that records
(including those in the cloud) possess content, context and
structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability.
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active
monitoring and logging mechanisms, including procedures to
prevent alteration of intercepted communications.
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT
and business systems, and monitoring of the forensics process.
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and
volatile data, and analyzing admissible evidence.
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of
technology deployed in the organization's information systems
and the forensic readiness program.
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer
and network forensics and manage legal evidence properly.
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first
responders and investigators ready to work collaboratively with
legal, IT, law enforcement, business, and auditing
representatives in case of a cyber incident.
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly
pervasive use of encryption technologies.
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the
business while gathering admissible evidence, to restore
essential services during an attack, to avoid ﬁnancial loss, and to
recover assets and data.
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an
information systems development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by
a well-developed forensic readiness policy.
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and
functionality, including storage visualization abilities.
Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a
mobile platform.
Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic
readiness.
The standards of the digital forensics discipline and how to
conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original
evidence.
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Has

Has

35, 132,
141, 144,
146, 148,
150, 153
133, 134,
135, 142,
161, 162,
176

Has

154

Has

158

Has

45, 46,
164, 165

Has

190

Demographic

60

Demographic

42

Knows

15, 19,
125, 174

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a
cyber incident.
How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing
incident.
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to
deploy in case of a cyber incident.
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in
case of a cyber incident.
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and
accelerate its investigation in case of a cyber incident.
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a
digital forensic incident.
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ
examination, seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a
cyber incident.
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may
be involved in a legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident.
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time,
timeline of events, and duration of a cyber incident.
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of
technologies used or involved, and technical skill and knowledge
of a suspect in a cyber incident.
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of
evidence at every step, including information about the tools
used, in case of a cyber incident.
The sources and format of the organization's data, when and
where data is generated, the associated threats to the data, and
how data is preserved for long-term storage.
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the
organization’'s policies and all applicable laws and regulations in
all phases of a forensic investigation process.
Industry sector of the organization.
What are the estimated organization sales? (in thousands of
dollars per year).
What is the organization size in number of employees?
What is the organization size in number of customers?
What is the amount of data produced in the organization every
month?
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital
forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain,
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed,
I would rate my organization's DFR as:
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Knows

17

Knows

11, 18

Knows

63, 123

Knows

64

Knows

65

Knows

66

Knows

67

Knows

62, 68

Knows

69, 70

Knows

62, 71, 72,
73

Knows

79

Knows

83

Knows

125

Demographic

1

Demographic

2

Demographic
Demographic

3
4

Demographic

82

Perceived

191

APPENDIX F – FINAL SURVEY
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Thanks for your participation in this study. By agreeing to participate in this survey you consent with the
utilization of this information for the purpose of the study and acknowledge that your participation is
voluntary. You can abandon this this survey at any time. However, we appreciate that you complete all
required information to the best of your knowledge.
Choices: Accept, Decline
Please read each sentence carefully and check the circle corresponding to your level of agreement with it
according to your perception of the situation in your organization.
1. Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain,
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR as:
Choices: Very low, Low, Average, High, Very high
Question Matrix:
2. Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic readiness
3. Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive.
4. This organization is exposed to many risks and threats.
5. Our firm has a public profile.
6. The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure.
7. The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its personnel privacy
policies and applicable employment law.
8. The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics program and implement lessons learned
from previous incidents.
9. The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and security policies.
10.The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable.
11.Information technology and information security objectives are aligned with the business mission and
objectives.
12.Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability of digital evidence
for our organization is hard.
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree
Question Matrix:
Please select your level of agreement with the following assertions of what your organization currently
does.
13.Seeks accountability for intruders.
14.Allows wireless access.
15.Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic responsibilities and the
use of digital forensic tools.
16.Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital forensics tools
and techniques.
17.Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS), security event
management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware.
18.Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and assesses the value of
potential evidence.
19.Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and anti-forensic activities
(e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography software) and assesses Internet activities such
as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email, instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs.
20.Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as authentication traffic
monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time synchronization.
21.Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control lists, user logging,
encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent exposures.
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22.Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and anti-forensic strategies
(e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing).
23.Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding forensic policies,
procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging academic digital forensics research.
24.Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews.
25.Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices.
26.Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital assets according
to a digital forensic program.
27.Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools to maintain a
shared workspace.
28.Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and dynamically
measure information security performance.
29.Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and response times, and
validates the accreditation of their laboratories.
30.Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and enemies.
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree
Question Matrix:
Please select your level of agreement with the following assertions of what your organization currently
has.
31.A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge in computer security and digital
forensics.
32.A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users).
33.Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of systems, privacy, and
consent of monitoring.
34.Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them.
35.Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental regulations (e.g.
Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements, international law, and penalties for
security incidents).
36.A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and procedures to capture,
store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate, and present evidence.
37.A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities, procedures, training,
roles, documentation, and management.
38.A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards throughout the
entire platform.
39.Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute history and lessons
learned.
40.A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating system files and for
deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on important assets.
41.A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic examiners.
42.A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated meta-data identifying times
and authors.
43.A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes and disputes,
and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. This policy indicates how to
manage people leaving the company.
44.Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud) possess
content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of authenticity, reliability,
integrity, and usability.
45.Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging mechanisms,
including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted communications.
46.Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business systems, and
monitoring of the forensics process.
47.Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and analyzing admissible
evidence.
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48.A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in the organization's
information systems and the forensic readiness program.
49.The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics and manage
legal evidence properly.
50.Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and investigators ready to
work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business, and auditing representatives in case of a
cyber incident.
51.Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of encryption technologies.
52.A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering admissible
evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial loss, and to recover assets and
data.
53.Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems development life cycle
(ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness policy.
54.Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage visualization
abilities.
55.Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform.
56.Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness.
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree
Question Matrix:
Please select your level of agreement with whether or not the people in your organization in charge of the
following tasks has the knowledge to perform them.
57.How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence.
58.Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident.
59.How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing incident.
60.Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a cyber incident.
61.Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber incident.
62.How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation in case of a cyber
incident.
63.How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic incident.
64.How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination, seizure and removal of
the system(s), in case of a cyber incident.
65.How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a legal inquiry, in case
of a cyber incident.
66.How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and duration of a
cyber incident.
67.How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved, and technical
skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident.
68.How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every step, including
information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident.
69.What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is generated, the
associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for long-term storage.
70.How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies and all applicable
laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation process.
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree
Organizational demographics
1. What is your organization's primary business activity? (Select one only)
Choices:
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer)
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Online Retailer
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP)
Communications Carrier
Aerospace
Banking/Finance/Accounting
Insurance/Real Estate/Legal
Federal Government (including military)
State/Local Government
Medical/Dental/Healthcare
Transportation/Utilities
Construction/Architecture/Engineering
Data Processing Services
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution
Education
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment
Research/Development Lab
Business Services/Consultant
Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals)
Computer/Network Services/Consultant
Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor
Other
2. What are the estimated organization sales? (in thousands of dollars per year).
Choices:
Less than 50
Between 50 and 200
Between 200 and 500
Between 500 and 2,000
More than 2,000
3. What is the organization size in number of employees?
Choices:
1 to 50
Between 51 and 200
Between 201 and 500
Between 501 and 2000
More than 5,000
4. What is the organization size in number of customers?
Choices:
1 to 20
Between 21 and 200
Between 201 and 1,000
Between 1,001 and 10,000
More than 10,000
5. What is the amount of data produced in the organization every month?
Choices:
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Less than 10 MB
Between 10 and 500 MB
Between 0.5 and 50 GB
Between 50 GB and 1 TB
More than 1 TB
6. After completing this survey and given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of
preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my
organization's DFR as:
Choices: Very low, Low, Average, High, Very high
Basic demographics questions:
1. What is your age range in years?
Choices:
Below 18
18 to 25
26 to 40
41 to 60
Above 60
2. What is your gender?
Choices:
Male
Female
Omit to answer
3. For how many years have you been in this organization?
Choices:
Less than 2
2 to 5
6 to 10
11 to 20
More than 20
4. What is your current position in this organization?
5. For how many years have you been in your current position?
Choices:
Less than 2
2 to 5
6 to 10
11 to 20
More than 20
6. Let us know if you have any comments about this survey and add your email if you want to be
contacted.
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